

DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF PIGS

10 December 1959

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997

CUBA UNDER FIDEL CASTRO

Prime Minister Fidel Castro's frequently stated objective is the rapid imposition of drastic social and economic reforms so as to improve the lot of Cuba's



FIDEL CASTRO

lowest income groups and, by a more efficient organization of production, to produce more wealth and a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency. He uses these objectives to justify the establishment of tight

state controls over the economy. In attempting to build an authoritarian political machine based on mass support, Castro is turning more and more to Communist-oriented advisers, and Communists are benefiting from the demagogic tirades against the rich and against the United States that Castro uses to mobilize his mass following.

The Communists

The Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP) of Cuba, which has some 17,000 members including its youth section, has made steady gains since Castro came to power last January. The party has benefited directly from the actions of such highly placed sympathizers as armed forces chief Raul Castro, economic and foreign policy adviser "Che" Guevara, and agrarian reform chief Antonio Munoz Jimenez, all of whom have been instrumental in securing important government positions for known Communists.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

10 December 1959

The armed forces and the agrarian reform machinery have been penetrated by Communists whose potential for infiltrating the economic organizations of the state was greatly enhanced by the appointment on 26 November of "Che" Guevara to head the National Bank. Osmani Cienfuegos, named minister of public works the same day, is the first probable Communist to secure a post in the cabinet. Reliable sources reported recently that a top PSP official was being considered as minister of finance.

In contrast to Communist policy in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime, when an attempt was made rapidly to build a mass party, the PSP in Cuba appears to be concentrating on quality rather than quantity. The slow recruitment and emphasis on indoctrination suggest considerable care in the selection of new members, particularly in view of the extremely favorable conditions existing for the party's growth.

Cuban Communists appear to realize that the freedom they now enjoy is still dependent on the toleration of Fidel Castro and that overstepping the



RAUL CASTRO

bounds would cause Castro to react against them. Only in organized labor have the Communists gone to the extent of antagonizing pro-Castro elements in an open fight to extend their influence.

Castro has publicly declared that he will never permit the revolution to be stolen from him or from his 26 of July Movement. What the Communists evidently hope to achieve in the



GUEVARA

near future is acceptance into the government with control over economic sources of power and such potent groups as the armed forces and organized labor. Their pose as the staunchest defenders of the revolution tends to further these objectives.

Formal seizure of power is probably not an immediate Communist objective. It is already evident that the present regime, partially because it is nominally non-Communist, may be serving world Communist objectives as effectively as would an outright Communist government--through its bitter anti-US propaganda throughout Latin America, its disruption of private US investments, and the implicit threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area.

On the other hand, a growing number of observers, including former Costa Rican President Jose Figueres, maintain that the real Communist objective in Cuba is to create a situation that would force the United States to intervene militarily. Such a "Hungary in reverse" would be a potent propaganda weapon for Moscow.

Political Factors

Although Castro is fast losing the support of the middle

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

10 December 1959

class, which is larger and more influential in Cuba than in most Latin American countries, several important factors remain strongly in his favor. The bulk of the Cuban people, especially those in the lowest economic strata, continue their strong emotional attachment to him. The core of military and administrative officials is also dedicated to him. His virtual monopoly of plans for social and economic reform, which the majority of Cubans regard as desirable and necessary, also enhances his position. The opposition, divided and lacking effective leadership, offers the public little in the way of a desirable alternative to Castro.

The course of the regime in the near future is likely to be further to the left and increasingly authoritarian. Castro has firmly stated that there will be no national elections until the objectives of the revolution are realized--at best many years from now.

He considers the political processes associated with elections as serving merely to confuse and divide the people--a view that has not led to strong opposition to him, since most Cubans, from years of experience with corrupt politicians, take a cynical view of elections. The gigantic mass rallies organized periodically to endorse Castro's policies enable him to claim overwhelming popular support. Meanwhile, he is resorting to many of the same tactics he violently attacked during his war on the Batista dictatorship.

Economic Factors

The effects of the drastic and hastily implemented reforms could eventually be so disruptive as to bring economic collapse. Such a collapse is not believed imminent, however. The expanded economic functions being assumed by the state will partially compensate for the drying up of foreign and do-

mestic private investment. The state, by such measures as a unified tax program, public bond issues, and the "patriotic contributions" from organized labor and other groups, has more thoroughly mobilized the sources of domestic revenue than had its predecessors. If necessary, it is likely to resort to more drastic measures, even to the forced transfer of private savings to government bonds.

Agrarian reform has progressed rapidly and is revolutionizing rural Cuba. The reform law passed in May has been stringently and often arbitrarily interpreted, particularly against extensive cattle holdings. Apparently these have been taken over without formal expropriation or compensation, and much of the land has already been turned into cooperatives under control of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), rather than distributed--as promised--among the peasants who work it.

INRA Director Nunez said on 4 December that 485 produc-



NUNEZ

tion cooperatives and 440 consumer cooperatives, probably "peoples' stores," were operating. The effects on food production have not as yet caused severe shortages or, at least in rural areas, substantial price increases, since the "peoples' stores" are restricted to a 10-percent profit. Food

10 December 1959

prices are rising, however. The government has levied a three-cent-per-pound tax on rice and one-cent-per-pound tax on potatoes to help purchase agricultural machinery. Controls on imports have reduced supplies of foodstuffs and other goods.

Sugar, which constitutes about 80 percent of Cuban exports, will be affected by INRA's land expropriations after next spring's harvest. The immediate effect is unlikely to reduce production substantially. There are persistent rumors that Cuba may abandon the International Sugar Agreement and seek to increase its exports above its assigned quota. If all restrictions were lifted, Cuba could probably double its sugar production. Some Cubans maintain that by concentrating on volume of sales, Cuba could afford to consider price a secondary factor. Others believe it doubtful whether Cuba could find sufficient markets to dispose of greatly expanded sugar exports, even at very low prices.

Cuba's foreign exchange reserves, already at an abnormally low level, will go even lower before the proceeds of the coming sugar harvest begin to arrive in January. On taking over as National Bank head, Guevara admitted that a period of austerity may be required. Guevara, now in a position to determine the allocation of foreign exchange, will attempt to shift the pattern of Cuban trade away from dependence on the United States--an objective he considers a requisite to real Cuban independence. He is likely also to promote barter trade in an attempt to conserve exchange.

Foreign Affairs

Castro's basic suspicion of US motives, which he exploits in his demagogic attempts

to mobilize his mass following, strongly suggests that Cuban-US relations are unlikely to improve appreciably as long as he remains in power. It is notable, however, that private American property has not yet been subjected to discriminatory treatment, and agrarian reform appears thus far to have been implemented impartially as regards holdings of foreigners.

On the broader international scene, Cuba served notice at the opening of the UN General Assembly last September that it intends to follow a neutralist policy in the "cold war." By abstaining on the UN moratorium on Chinese representation, Cuba broke the solid Latin American front against admitting Communist China to the UN. There is evidence that "Che" Guevara has become an important influence in the formulation of this "neutralist" foreign policy since his return from a three-month trip last summer to nine Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia.

Cuba's efforts to convince other Latin American nations that their interests would be served by joining the Afro-Asian countries in a neutralist bloc have not yet been effective. Other Latin American governments--even that of Venezuela, which materially supported Castro's war on Batista--are alarmed at the course of events. Cuba appears to be seeking its objectives by appealing over the heads of the governments to disaffected elements in several Latin American countries.

The new Cuban-subsidized Latin American news agency, Prensa Latina, has played an active propaganda role in this effort, and the several officially inspired Cuban "revolutionary" missions sent to various Latin American countries have had a frankly propagandistic purpose. The resolution passed at the congress of the Cuban Workers' Confederation

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

10 December 1959

to found a "revolutionary" Latin American confederation, to name labor attaches to Cuban diplomatic missions abroad, and to send special labor emissaries throughout Latin America to spread the word of the Cuban revolution is a further indication of a stepped-up effort to reach disaffected and extremist labor elements elsewhere in the hemisphere.

In some instances the Cubans have resorted to direct subversion. The revolutionary incursions into Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic last summer were clearly mounted by Cuban officials. The incursions into Panama and Haiti may also have been. More subtle methods were evident in Panama, where Cuban "newsmen" were prominent in organizing and leading the nationalist anti-US demonstrations against the Canal Zone on 28 November.

There is evidence that the Cuban diplomatic mission in El Salvador is financing extremist student leaders in making attacks on the Salvadoran Government and on the United States. Guatemalan ex-President Arevalo, a bitter enemy of the US who retains popular support in his country, is reliably reported to be receiving funds for his political activity from the Cuban Government.

The Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly Communist China, has shown considerable interest in Cuban developments. Moscow views Castro's advent in Cuba as a "turning point" marking "a new stage in the national liberation struggle in Latin America" and has welcomed the opportunities for Soviet exploitation. Several bloc economic missions have visited Cuba, bid on projects, and reportedly offered credits. Cuban economic delegations have been welcomed to bloc countries.

DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF PIGS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

9-165 (9)

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE
CUBAN GOVERNMENT

February 1960

Approved for Release
Date OCT 1999

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

004529

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

1. Introduction

The objective of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party) at this time is to increase its control over Fidel Castro and his government without unduly emphasizing the existence of Communist Party members in official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the membership, recruitment, or reaffiliation of Party members who now occupy key positions in the government. This is in accord with the training in "legal and illegal activity" which Communist Party leaders from Latin America have been given in China since 1956, epitomized in a secret training manual prepared by the CP China which states, in part, that:

"All of the Party members who work in legal organizations and institutions should patiently retain their legal position for a long time, without revealing their Party affiliation. They should gain power in the organizations and institutions in which they work and they should retain their legal position as long as necessary."

Through these secret Party members, the Party is able to influence governmental policy, and bring about the appointment of additional Communist Party members (secret or known) to governmental positions, and/or the dismissal or neutralization of individuals who cannot be easily influenced or used as fronts. Thus within the Cuban government today there are some known Communists (particularly in the armed forces), some secret Communist Party members who seek to guide and direct governmental policy and administration, and numerous non-Communists, often young and inexperienced, who are used by

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

the Communists to execute their plans for national and international subversion. These secret members are also used to defend "unity of action", as advocated by the Communist Party and its known leaders, in order to prepare public and official opinion for the acceptance of recognized Communists in progressively higher levels of government.

These secret Communist Party members are in close contact with known Communist Party leaders, such as Blas Roca, Joaquin Ordoqui, Severo Aguirre, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who establish public Communist Party policy and are in turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the international Communist apparatus. It is the intention of the Communists to eventually bring such known Communist Party officials into the government, but only after the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) and other revolutionary political parties have been infiltrated sufficiently to insure protection for the Communists under the guise of a "popular democratic government of national liberation."

Since the victory of the Castro forces, Communist infiltration of the Cuban government and government-supported institutions has been progressing rapidly at all levels. This report cannot cover, in detail, the entire scope of the Communist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates, therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning prior to the rebel victory and on three areas of major Communist effort. These three areas, on which the Communists have concentrated successively as their strength and influence have increased, are control of the armed forces, control of agrarian reform and the peasantry, and control of foreign policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the following sections.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

2. The Development of Communist Policy and Activity during the Guerrilla War.

The nature of the Communist policy and tactics can be traced back to the Cuban Communist Party program developed in 1956-57 and officially approved in December 1957, after Cuban Communist leaders had consulted with Soviet leaders at the time of the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. This program, which is the prototype of that which the Castro government is now carrying out, was described by the party to be an interim program -- "no el programa socialista del desarrollo futuro sino el programa democratico, nacional-libertado y agrario del desarrollo actual" ("not the socialist program for future development, but the democratic, agrarian, and national-liberationist program for current development"). It is the program, therefore, that the Communist Party wants to see carried out under Fidel Castro's "bourgeois" government in anticipation of the next stage in which the proletarian dictatorship will be established -- after "democracy and national liberation" have served their purposes and when the Communist Party is officially in control. The Communists have avoided public discussion of their program for this next stage, however.

Following the approval of the Cuban Communist Party program by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the full weight of the international Communist apparatus began to be mobilized in support of the Cuban Communists and their effort to further penetrate and gain control over the 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro. In Moscow, representatives of all the Latin American CP's were instructed in December 1957 to pass resolutions and hold solidarity demonstrations in behalf of the "Cuban People". In January 1958, the Cuban CP addressed a letter to "all socialist and workers' parties of the world" and established an office in Mexico ("care of Sr. Baldomero Albarran, Apartado 7751, Mexico, D.F.") through

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

which support was coordinated. The International Students Union and the World Federation of Democratic Youth asked their affiliates to sponsor pro-Cuban demonstrations. Within Cuba the Communists intensified their efforts to gain official recognition from the 26th of July Movement. They would not support the April 1958 strike called by the 26th of July Movement so that they could use the failure of the strike as an argument in favor of collaboration with the Communists. Within the 26th of July Movement itself, pro-Communists such as Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and Raul Castro, increased their efforts to persuade non-Communists, such as Armando Hart and Jorge Almeida (currently the Minister of Education and the Chief of the Air Force respectively) to accept Communist views and support. Guevara, an Argentine who became one of the most important guerrilla commanders, is now Director of the Cuban National Bank and Director of the Industrial Department of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). Raul Castro, Fidel Castro's younger brother, is now Minister of the Armed Forces.

One of the principal coordinators of Communist Party aid to the Castro movement was Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chief of the Cuban Communist Peace Movement, Secretary of Press and Propaganda of the PSP, and currently Director of Hoy, the PSP newspaper. Rodriguez, a known Communist Party official, holds no government position at the present time, but since 1956 has developed into one of the closest political advisors of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Guevara. He has even been considered, as of December 1959, as a possible replacement for the present Minister of the Treasury within the Cuban Cabinet. Such an appointment has not materialized because Raul Castro and other government leaders feel that the public is not yet prepared to accept "unity" on the governmental level. However, it is apparent that Communist and pro-Communist newsmen are constantly testing public opinion on this subject.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

In early 1958, Rodriguez explained the policy and strategy of the Cuban CP toward the guerrilla movement of Fidel Castro, which the Communists had criticized as being bourgeois and "putschist". Rodriguez now revealed, in meetings with foreign Communist leaders, that the Castro movement had become a "movement of the masses", and that "unity of action" (i. e. inclusion of Communists) had been achieved "at the base" on the basis of opposition to the dictatorship. He stated, however, that because the time was not yet ripe for propounding a truly Communist-inspired "National Liberation Front", the Communists were making but limited suggestions to the Castro movement which did not involve "profound changes".

In accordance with their new strategy the Communists began, about May 1958, to organize small guerrilla units or to join the 26th of July Movement as individuals opposed to Batista who made no attempt to bargain for recognition, asking only that they be allowed to fight with the Castro forces. As fighters, these individuals or small groups were accepted. The Communist Party, however, continued to bargain for public recognition as part of the anti-Batista coalition. Such recognition was rejected by the various non-Communist revolutionary groups which signed the Caracas "unity" agreement with the M-26-7 in July 1958. In August, however, reports from within the Communist Party indicate that a separate agreement was worked out between the PSP Youth Organization (the Juventud Socialista) and certain leaders of the 26th of July Movement, though not at the highest levels. This agreement was with Raul Castro who the Communists have claimed was once a member of the Juventud Socialista. It was worked out, or revealed, after he had broken out of the Sierra Maestra to form the "Second Front Frank Pais", a separate command. From this time on, evidence of Communist influence increased rapidly, particularly in the Second Front, as did provocative actions and allegations against the United States. These provocations and allegations were quickly given world-wide

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

publicity through the Communist fronts and press, revealing an organized pattern of cooperation between Raul Castro and the Communists. Under Raul Castro's guerrilla command, the groundwork was laid for the reorganization of the peasants, though the Communists among the organizers concealed their Party affiliation. Significantly, Jose Pepe Ramirez, appointed by Raul Castro as Secretary of Peasant Organization of the Second Front in the early summer of 1958, finally identified himself as a Communist Party member a year later. According to the Communist Party organ Fundamentos for May 1959, a Regional Peasant Congress was held on 21 September 1958 in the Second Front with the aid of Raul Castro. Subsequently, in response to the "demands" of the peasants, Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra headquarters promulgated the "Agrarian Law" concerning the right of the peasants to the land. According to Fundamentos, by the time the victory was won there existed "hundreds" of peasant organizations in the various rebel commands, created with the help and protection of the rebel authorities.

Immediately before and after the victory of the Castro movement, the main concern of the party was to develop the guerrilla force into a "people's army" -- that is, a politically-indoctrinated force imbued with a basic Marxist and anti-United States ideology.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez went to the Sierra in July or August, and remained for seven months. His task was that of preparing and coordinating the work of political indoctrination being carried on by Communists within the guerrilla movement, including the influencing of Fidel Castro himself. The Communists developed, and then exploited, educational programs within the armed forces. From positions within the rebel movement, some close to important commanders, they encouraged political discussion in an attempt to discredit reports and discount opinions which might reflect favorably on

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

United States policy, while advancing the theme of "national liberation" as the solution to all Cuban problems, economic as well as political. Among themselves, the Communists studied the works of Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, and other Communist revolutionary leaders.

3. Communist Infiltration of the Armed Forces since the Rebel Victory.

Shortly after the victory of the Castro forces, on 1 January 1959, political indoctrination classes were instituted at La Cabana fortress in Havana. This indoctrination was carried on under the protection of "Che" Guevara, who had been made Commander of La Cabana, and under the direction of Captain Antonio Nunez Jimenez (a crypto-Communist) and Captain Luis Mas Martin (a known Communist) as well as other Communists and M-26-7 leaders who had received some indoctrination in the Sierra and were known to be sympathetic to Communist ideology. These included Captain Pablo Rivalta Perez, a Communist teacher from Santa Clara who fought under the name of Moises Perez, and Luis Alberto Lavandeyra Brama, who had been indoctrinated in Marxism by "Che" Guevara while in the Sierra de Escambray. Some of the students were members of the Communist youth (Juventud Socialista) who had been sent to the Sierra to join the guerrilla movement in the last days of the campaign or who had been enrolled in the army after its victory, such as Orestes Quintana Marquez (Secretary General of the Guanabacoa regional JS committee).

As a result of such controlled assignments, La Cabana became the center for the concentration of Communist and pro-Communist personnel who were to become the agents for spreading Communist propaganda throughout the armed forces. Luis Fajardo Escalona, a Communist Party member, was made Chief of the Military Police of La Cabana. While in this

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

strategic position he was secretly responsible to the Party for the administrative control of the Communist youth who joined the army and were assigned to indoctrination courses. These youths when ordered to join the army were sent to a certain recruiting office where their identification as PSP members was noted and confirmed by an officer who was a Communist. These recruits, unlike the non-Communists, were then sent to receive Party instructions from Fajardo. They were told that the Party does not now consider it wise to establish "cells" in the army, but that Party members should operate individually and make themselves "outstanding" through hard work and discipline. They were told that they should contribute five pesos monthly to the Party, read Hoy daily, and instigate political discussions whenever possible, following the line suggested in Hoy but never deviating from the positions taken by Fidel Castro and high M-26-7 leaders. Each was informed that, after his military assignment, he would soon be approached by a Communist Party member who would be his Party contact, bringing him propaganda and training literature and carrying back reports, suggestions, and complaints to the National Committee of the Party.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was again directly involved in the organization and teaching of the political indoctrination within the army. Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa were given special privileges and entree to all military establishments. Other Communists were assigned, through the influence of Raul Castro, to the "cultural department" of the Armed Forces. These included Alfredo Guevara, who had been custodian of the bank account of the M-26-7 in Mexico, and Oscar Ortiz, who became an instructor at Campo Libertad in Havana. Elsewhere in Cuba, particularly in Oriente, Communists were appointed to key positions in the Army. Although not appointed to the highest commands, they could control educational and propaganda activities, or report on officers who were actively or potentially anti-Communist. For example, Anel Escalante Colas, a close

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

relative of Anibal Escalante, the editor of Hoy, was made adjutant to the Chief of Information of the rebel army in Oriente Province. Other Communists, who had not participated in the fighting, but who had worked in the Communist fronts, such as the cultural organization Nuestro Tiempo, were called on to aid in the educational work of the army. An example is Amado Palenque y Sainz de la Pena.

Cuban Communist leaders have reported to foreign Communist parties that the political indoctrination given within the army is controlled by Communists. The purpose of this indoctrination has not been to emphasize or identify the role of the Communist Party or to train Communist Party members, but rather to develop a cadre of pro-Communist and crypto-Communist instructors and propagandists who accept the elementary principles of historical materialism and its associated beliefs which make up the so-called "science" of Marxian socialism. These principles include the inevitability of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" and "imperialism", and the development of Socialism and Communism in the image of the Chinese and Russian systems. The emphasis in the political indoctrination course has been on the development of extreme nationalism, hatred for the United States based on "evidence" (dating from the nineteenth century to the present) of outrages and injuries suffered by Cuba as the result of United States political and economic "interference" in Cuban affairs. The courses also deal with the need for agrarian reform and other generally progressive measures, again with the emphasis on the "liberation" of Cuba from foreign controls rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and other measures are being executed.

As a result of the Communist-controlled indoctrination courses, the preferential appointment of Communists and pro-Communists to controlling positions in the army, and the elimination of anti-Communists, non-Communists, and

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

suspected nonconformists through a variety of devices, the new Cuban army is rapidly coming under the control of the Communist fraction established within it.

Cuban Communist leaders have stated, in secret sessions, that their success is due to the influence over Fidel Castro of his brother Raul -- whom they consider to be the "brains" of the revolution -- and "Che" Guevara. The Soviet political specialist on Latin America, B. Ermolaev, went even further in a speech delivered in Moscow in May 1959. Ermolaev stated that Cuba is the "revolutionary center of Latin America", and that although Fidel Castro's government contained many "unreliable elements" from the petite bourgeoisie, Raul Castro is, "speaking among ourselves", a Communist. Raul Castro currently holds the key position of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and has been designated by Fidel, who is the "maximum leader", as the latter's successor in event of his death or incapacity.

Neither Raul nor "Che" have ever admitted being Communist Party members, and even within the Party this is denied. However, Raul's "former" membership in the Communist youth organization has been acknowledged, on occasion, within the Party, and as long ago as 1953 he held a responsible position on the preparatory commission for the Communist-front Congress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna. During and since the revolution he continued to work closely with the Communist youth in Cuba. His wife, Vilma Espin, is active in several Communist fronts. It has been Raul Castro who has most actively supported the coordination of international Communist youth activities in the Caribbean area and has called for a "Latin American youth congress" to be held in Cuba in mid-1960, and has supported the convocation of a Latin American "peoples' congress", which has been a Communist objective since 1956. In view of the evidence, it is not unlikely that both Raul and his wife are, in fact, secret members of the Communist Party at the present time.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

It seems less probable that "Che" Guevara is a Communist Party member. However, his close association with Communists goes back many years, and it is known that he was a member of the Mexican-Russian Cultural Institute when in Mexico. After he joined Fidel, his wife, Hilda Gadea (a Peruvian), acted in a liaison capacity between Soviet military advisors in Mexico and various Latin American revolutionaries in exile. She also worked closely with persons identified as Soviet international intelligence agents. (Gadea, now divorced from "Che", is currently employed in the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute.) "Che" was one of Fidel Castro's small group which invaded Cuba in December 1956. As an advisor to Fidel and later the commander of his own column, he encouraged the study of Marxism among the guerrilla forces and defended the Communists, though with emphasis always on "national liberation". Subsequent to the victory, he was charged by Fidel to organize Cuban aid to the foreign revolutionaries who flocked to Cuba (including those with whom his wife had worked in Mexico), and used his authority in an effort to force these groups to accept Communists as equals in "unified" movements. Guevara's activities as commander of La Cabana fortress, the nature and activities of his appointees, the character of his trip to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and his policies as Chief of Industrial Development of the Agrarian Reform Institute all attest to his desire to use the Cuban revolution to support Soviet foreign policy, which seeks to promote the "national liberation struggle" in Latin America and elsewhere as a means of attacking the United States and developing a neutralist bloc which is susceptible to Communist penetration. Although Guevara has relied on known Communists as bodyguards, adjutants, and appointees, and has favored Communists among the foreign revolutionists asking for Cuban aid, his denials that the Cuban revolution is Communist-influenced or supported indicate strongly that he wishes to exploit Cuba as the model of a justifiable, popular, nationalist movement

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

which will generate enthusiasm in other Latin American countries and underdeveloped countries where Communism is weak or discredited.

4. Communist Influence within the Agrarian Reform Institute.

Following the initial drive to infiltrate the revolutionary army and control the political indoctrination and loyalty of its members, the Communists shifted their attention to the next important objective -- the infiltration and control of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). The Institute was officially established in June 1959 under the Agrarian Reform Law drafted by Antonio Nunez Jimenez with guidance and advice from Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara. Foreign Communists were also consulted, such as Dionisio Encina of the Mexican Communist Party, possibly because of his experience in the organization of communal farms in Mexico during the Cardenas presidency. Nunez Jimenez, who has worked publicly for the Communists since 1949 and is reliably reported to be a "secret" member of the Party, was appointed the Executive Director of the Institute.

The INRA, both in theory and practice, is a government in itself. It expropriates, manages, and disposes land and other property, it undertakes public works, creates schools, issues publications, carries on "cultural activities", operates stores, and negotiates for economic aid and trade with foreign firms. Nunez Jimenez has told his high INRA chiefs, in private, that they are in fact subservient to no other agency of government. These INRA chiefs are, in practice, considered to be "commisars" in the Soviet sense, and have authority over military and civilian officials within the districts they control. The chiefs include some known and some suspected Communists, and in the lower levels of the bureaucracy are numerous known Party members. Waldo Medina, the INRA's general counsel, is a Communist, as are a number of others on the INRA staff. Thus planning and administration of the INRA is Communist-influenced

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

at the very highest levels by Communists and sympathizers, who rely on advice from the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties in an attempt to bring the functions of INRA into closer agreement with the Communist theory of state control. For example: since its formation, INRA has concentrated, not on the distribution of land to landless peasants, but on the organization of peasants into collectives or cooperatives where they are to receive "profits" rather than "wages". There is no direct tribute paid to Communist Party inspiration, nor does the PSP claim credit for INRA's activities. However, in practice, the Communists have been the only group among Castro's trusted followers in Cuba who have the experience and organization to draw up draft programs, draft regulations, or "studies" which appeal to the government. They have been careful to leave the initiative in Fidel's hands, but to guide Fidel's revolution so that it will, in time, openly rely on Communist advice. Thus, after the formation of cooperatives under INRA had been approved, the Communist theoretical organ Fundamentos, for November 1959, published an article concerning the nature and function of cooperatives, supplemented by a translation of the "Reglamento Modelo para Cooperativas Avanzadas de Productores Agrícolas" (Model Regulation for Advanced Agricultural Cooperatives) of the Chinese People's Republic. These comments allegedly were offered in a "disinterested" manner, though some had already been accepted. They present an ideal picture, but the voluntary and democratic aspects which they pretend to favor are invalidated by concessions to the "present stage of the revolution". Fundamentos states that the success of the cooperatives will depend on the quality of administration by INRA, and suggests that "in this first stage, it would be advisable for each of the cooperatives to have an assessor general, appointed directly by the INRA, who, even though he might not possess technical knowledge, would be politically prepared to orient the workers and the cooperative itself along the paths laid out by the Revolutionary Government." This suggestion, which has become a matter of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

practice, is the basis for the appointment of Communists or Communist sympathizers to control the cooperatives, inasmuch as they pose as the most faithful supporters of the revolution and are "politically prepared", despite ignorance of agricultural practices.

The INRA is only one of the government agencies which the Communists seek to control, but it is the most important one for their purpose, as it will allow control of Cuba's economic wealth through a centralized bureaucratic system. Through INRA they will also be able to organize Communist control over the peasantry, thereby preventing the development of a successful rural counterrevolution.

The Castro government has planned other agencies, such as the National Institute of Urban Reform (INRU), to extend control over other sectors of the population. The INRU is to be established in February 1960, and reportedly will have confiscatory powers over all urban land, houses, buildings, and personal property attached to real property. Owners of confiscated property are to be nominally reimbursed, INRU will develop or sell buildings or dwellings on the basis of popular or individual need, and tenants will be allowed to purchase their dwellings through payments equal to their former rent (which the government has already reduced). Through the reallocation of urban property, the INRU will be in a position to control the urban bourgeoisie and to buy the loyalty of the urban proletariat. It is believed that Communist infiltration in the INRU will follow the pattern set in the INRA, though this remains to be seen. It is already apparent, from remarks made by Fidel Castro in private, that the true pattern of "democratic" government which he plans to establish is a bureaucracy controlled by representatives of the Army, the INRA, the INRU, and other autonomous agencies, rather than one controlled by popularly elected officials. It is also apparent that the bureaucracy which is now developing under Castro will be largely controlled by the Communist Party or its

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

sympathizers and that elected officials and political parties may, as in the Soviet Union and China, play but inconsequential roles in government.

5. Communist Influence on Cuban Foreign Policy.

After initiating their drive to infiltrate the Army and INRA, which were their first priorities, the Communists and their sympathizers turned to control of Cuban foreign affairs. In this, they have been more concerned with concealing direct Communist participation than in other fields, but their influence has steadily grown. They have obtained the support of high officials of the Cuban government - Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, "Che" Guevara, Armando Hart, and Raul Roa (the Foreign Minister) for various international projects which are known to be Communist inspired, some having been formulated in Moscow.

The purpose for which the Communists are using Cuban foreign policy becomes evident from a review of Soviet Communist Party objectives in Latin America, and specifically, Soviet efforts to promote a Latin American "peoples' congress".

The broad objectives of current Soviet policy toward Latin America were suggested in an article in Kommunist (an important CPSU theoretical organ) in February 1956, signed by M. Danilevich. This article attacked the United States as controlling Latin America in the interest of militarism and profit, and noted the applicability to Latin America of the communique, issued by the Bandung Conference, regarding the "subordination of nations to foreign enslavement, domination, and exploitation". Further on it claimed that "the working class, headed by the Communist parties, was emerging as the most consistent defender of national interests, political and economic independence, peace and democracy." It reported, with approval, the formation of "broad coalitions of patriotic forces" and noted that the development of relations between the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

"Socialist countries" and Latin America will "facilitate the cooperation of these states in matters concerning the supporting and strengthening of peace." The article was, in effect, both a directive to the Communist parties and an offer to nationalist elements of Soviet support.

Coinciding with the publication of the Kommunist article, a special secret conference of Latin American Communist delegates to the XX CPSU Congress was held in Moscow under Soviet auspices. This conference emphasized coordination of Communist activities in Latin America, and proposed the holding of a "peoples' congress" which would be "anti-imperialist" in nature and inspired by the Communists, though attended mainly by democratic personages not linked with international Communism. It is apparent that this "peoples' congress" was designed to circumvent the generally favorable attitude of Latin American governments toward the United States by gaining the support of prominent persons for "anti-imperialist" resolutions or demagogic proposals compromising to United States policies.

The Communists were unable to organize or find sponsors for this "peoples' congress" in 1956 or 1957, and in December 1957 were reprimanded in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party officials charged with Latin American liaison. The Soviets insisted that the "peoples' congress" had become a matter of high priority, and requested further action. Consequently various Latin American Communist party representatives met privately at the Argentine Peace Congress in May 1958 to discuss the organization of the congress, which was mentioned publicly (for the first and only time) in the Bulletin of the World Peace Council later in the year. A tentative date for the Congress (4-7 December 1958) was set, but again the Communists had difficulty in finding non-Communist sponsors and, as the Argentine government became increasingly anti-Communist, the Congress was postponed. Subsequently, it was decided to hold it in some other country, where conditions would be more favorable.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

In February 1959, the CPSU again sponsored a secret conference of Latin American Communist party delegates in Moscow, at the time of the XXI CPSU Congress. The subject of the "peoples' congress" was again discussed, and it was decided that the main theme should be the "defense of national resources." As before, the Soviets indicated that "anti-imperialist" language should be avoided in gaining support for the congress, although the final resolutions should be exploitable for the anti-imperialist campaign. The Communist initiative in calling the congress should be concealed, and leaders such as Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and Jose Figueres of Costa Rica were suggested as persons who might be "used" to convoke the meeting, thereby assuring it of popular support. Finally, it was decided that "fraternal delegates" from Africa and Asia were to be invited.

As Communist influence in the Cuban government increased, responsibility for the organization of the "peoples' congress" was transferred to the Communist Party of Cuba. The anti-Communist statements and actions on the part of Figueres and Betancourt, otherwise relatively favorably disposed toward the Castro government, probably have eliminated them from consideration as possible sponsors of the Congress. However, a new spokesman has been found in Armando Hart, the youthful Cuban Minister of Education who had already revealed his pro-Communist tendencies by appointing Antonio Nunez Jimenez to a commission charged with rewriting the history of Cuba for use in the public schools. Hart was acting as interim Foreign Minister in July 1959, prior to the appointment of Raul Roa, and used this position to greet foreign delegates to the "Agrarian Reform Forum". He told these delegates that, as Minister of Education:

"I have the intention of convoking in Cuba a congress of political leaders and Latin American personalities,

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

among whom will be intellectuals, not specifically government delegates, representatives of institutions, universities, and the workers. In that congress it will be possible to trace the lines of the political future of Latin America. ... It is necessary to establish the fact that it is not only the governments and their armies which determine the policies of countries. "

In advancing this project (which foreign Communist parties quickly identified as the "peoples' congress" planned in Moscow) Hart revealed himself as the instrument of the Communists, who through "unity from below" are seeking to circumvent and subvert legitimate governments in the conduct of their national and foreign affairs.

Subsequently, when Foreign Minister Roa went to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Santiago de Chile in August 1959, Education Minister Hart went also as head of a special mission to meet with leaders of opposition groups from various countries. These included representatives of various Communist and Socialist parties, members of labor organizations, youth movements, and political opposition fronts. Hart was accompanied by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of the Cuban Communist Party, and was joined later by Raul Castro. These leaders met unofficially, independent of the Foreign Ministers, in order to examine (according to Radio Peiping) the problem of strengthening the "national and democratic movement" in Latin America. Subsequently, the National Action Front (FRAP) of Chile, which played host to the meeting, announced its adherence to Hart's proposal for holding a "congress of democratic personages, representatives of political parties and social and cultural organizations." Raul Castro, who went to Santiago to meet with youth representatives, announced his support of Hart's proposal in September, at which time he also proposed publicly that the Latin American youth congress be held in Havana.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Paralleling the unofficial meetings attended by Hart and Raul Castro, the representatives of the various Communist parties met secretly at the headquarters of the Communist Party of Chile. Each leader reported on conditions in his own country, the problems which faced the Communists, and the discontent which might be exploited by them. The Cuban representative, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was appointed to visit various Latin American countries and to prepare a study on the social and economic situation which would be used in preparation for the "peoples' congress". Subsequently, Rodriguez visited Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries where he conferred with various Communist leaders, asking them to prepare material and to visit Cuba to further discuss the matter. In October, therefore, representatives of the Communist Parties of these countries met in Havana, during the plenary session of the Central Committee of CP Cuba. They set a tentative date for the Congress in early 1960 and planned an agenda which would stress the economic development of underdeveloped nations, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and the struggle against "dictatorships". It was also decided that the congress should be formally convoked through a manifesto signed by well-known non-Communists, probably including Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Salvador Allende of Chile, Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, Wolfgang Larrazabal of Venezuela, and others described by "Che" Guevara as forming the "possible nucleus of a unified position" which might lead Latin American countries to develop the "enviable cohesion maintained by the Afro-Asian countries since the Bandung Conference." Although the sponsors of the conference have not as yet issued their manifesto, and some have not even been approached on the matter, the various Communist parties involved in planning the congress already have special representatives in Havana forming a permanent organizing committee.

The Latin American "peoples congress", as planned by the Soviet and Latin American Communists, is clearly the type of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

non-governmental Communist-controlled "popular" meeting which the International Communist Movement desires prior to (or as a substitute for) action on the official level. It will, if held, be similar in purpose to the "Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions" which was held in April 1955, just prior to the Bandung Conference, and which gave rise to the Asian Solidarity Committee. It will be similar to the second "Arab Peoples' Conference", which, when united with the Asian campaign, gave rise to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, at which was established the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The campaign in Latin America to unify anti-imperialist and nationalist elements, to the detriment of the United States and the advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus follows the pattern set in Asia. The organizers have been a small group of professional Communist party members aided by reliable sympathizers already active in front activities. As in Asia, the Communists want to follow up the "popular" congress with action at an official level; thus Danilevich, writing in Kommunist in 1956, set the Bandung Conference as a model for Latin American anti-colonial action. At that time, Danilevich noted that "political development" in Latin America was not as "advanced" as in Asia, obviously referring to the anti-Communist orientation of the governments, and not to their long history of political independence. The Communist infiltration of the Castro government in Cuba has changed this picture, however, and has now given the Communists an opportunity to operate at the official diplomatic level. This has been done, apparently, largely through the influence of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and the medium of Raul Roa, the Foreign Minister, who recently called for a "congress of underdeveloped nations" to be held in Havana.

The tour of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara to the Afro-Asian countries (June-September 1959) initiated the Cuban policy of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

attempting to draw Latin America closer to these countries in defense of a "neutralist" policy. Official formulation of the policy, however, and the accompanying reorganization of the Cuban Foreign Ministry apparently awaited the return of Guevara from his trip. The nature of the new policy was first outlined, informally, by Guevara on his arrival at the airport on 8 September. It was next described by Raul Castro on 11 September, at which time he approved the Communist-inspired plans for youth and peoples' congresses in Cuba. Guevara further defined the policy on 14 September, and finally, Foreign Minister Raul Roa officially delineated the new policy at the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September.

The new Cuban policy emphasizes sovereignty and independence; neutrality with respect to the capitalist and Communist blocs; and solidarity with the "underdeveloped nations" of Asia and Africa. Cuban officials have particularly emphasized the "third position". Guevara firmly states that he is not a Communist, and that he believes Cuba does not need a Communist system "at this moment". Roa has called capitalism and Communism "twin evils". Yet in practice, Cuban "neutralism" is used as a means of attacking the United States to the benefit of international Communism. Moreover, it is apparent that foreign policy, as carried on by the Foreign Ministry, is supplemented at all levels by government-approved activities designed to circumvent foreign governments by appealing directly to certain groups who are opposed, or potentially opposed, to their governments. Thus the Cuban government, largely through "Che" Guevara, is known to have provided training, supplies, advice, and propaganda support to revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and certain other Latin American countries. Communist or pro-Communist groups have been particularly favored. Representatives of youth and student organizations, labor organizations, and other groups in foreign countries are given subsidized trips

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

to Cuba where they are subjected to propaganda and indoctrination. Cuban diplomatic officials, as well as non-governmental representatives, are used to facilitate organizational activities abroad. For example, Cuban Ambassador Rene Rayneri Parla in El Salvador has been actively involved in Salvadoran labor and student affairs, and reportedly supplied Cuban funds to help the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Salvadoran Labor organize a congress to which other Central American leaders would be invited. In another instance, the Guatemalan government specifically accused the Cuban Ambassador, in conjunction with other high Cuban officials, of complicity in an oppositionist plot against the government. In November 1959, the Venezuelan government rejected Cuban Ambassador Pividals' efforts to have Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara visit Venezuela.

As part of its unofficial foreign policy, and to promote "unity from below" the Cuban government has encouraged and subsidized Cuban participation in Communist-front congresses, such as the World Youth Festival in Vienna (attended by 140 Cubans) and the Communist-organized Latin American Women's Congress in Santiago de Chile. It has encouraged the holding in Cuba of international meetings, often of a Communist-front character, and the participation of foreign "observers" (including Soviet representatives) at Cuban meetings, such as the congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor. On occasion, Cuban officials use such meetings as platforms for the exposition of Communist-line views on foreign affairs. Thus Antonio Nunez Jimenez, Communist Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute, used the "Inter-American Radio Announcers' Congress" in Havana as a forum for attacking the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.

The decision of the Cuban government to organize a "conference of underdeveloped nations" in Havana in late 1960 is one facet of the new foreign policy. It is apparent that the Communist parties in the various Latin American countries, through

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

the research undertaken and the non-Communist support acquired in preparation for the "peoples' congress", will be prepared to offer arguments in favor of various "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonial" views or to levy demands on the "imperialist" or "colonialist" powers. It is probable that the Communist parties in Asia and Africa, through their fronts, will also seek to encourage official participation in the congress and to influence the delegations. Under the conditions existing in Cuba, the congress, if held, will certainly be used as a forum for the presentation of demagogic appeals and denunciations based, in all probability, on the preparatory work done by the Communist parties. It is even more certain that the activities of the congress, regardless of the true outcome, will be propagandized as a victory for the unity of "hungry nations" against imperialist and colonialist oppressors. This will be possible through the controlled Cuban press, now almost completely at the service of the Castro government, and the Communist-dominated Prensa Latina, which now has working agreements with TASS, the New China News Agency, and various Satellite or Communist-infiltrated agencies in other parts of the world.

As with the "peoples' congress", it is probable that the Communists wish to avoid direct participation of known party members in the "underdeveloped nations conference". Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, has been closely associated with Communists and Soviet agents, but is not believed to be a Communist Party member or necessarily a sympathizer. Eugenio Soler Alonso, new Cuban Ambassador to India who is visiting the Middle and Far East to seek Asian support for the congress, was well known as a Cuban Communist Party member between 1933 and 1951. He published a column in Hoy, the CP newspaper, until 1945, and has been Cuban correspondent of the Daily Worker, the organ of the CP of the United States. As of 1951, however, he was referred to in Hoy as an "expelled" Communist Party member who had joined the Autentico Party of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

President Prio. As is the case with many "expelled" or "former" Communists, it is not known whether he has, in fact, broken with the Party, or whether he remains a crypto-Communist who has been assigned, in the words of Liu Shao-ch'i, to "gain power in the organizations and institutions in which he works for as long as necessary, without revealing his party affiliation."

6. Conclusion

In review, it is evident that after the increasing military strength and popular support enjoyed by Fidel Castro became apparent in early 1958, the Communists decided to take advantage of the movement's democratic nature and the youth and political inexperience of its leaders. With the aid of Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara, they infiltrated the guerrilla forces and later gained control over the political indoctrination and personnel assignments in the armed forces. They then put their organizational experience to work in the Agrarian Reform Institute, using concepts supplied by the Chinese as a means of diverting Fidel Castro from a policy of aid to individual peasant families to the organization of large-scale "cooperatives" controlled by appointed officials. Next, in the field of foreign relations, Communists sought to inspire or control government policy. Covertly, Cuban Communist Party leaders have conferred with foreign Communist leaders, including those of the USSR and China, and have drawn up plans and undertaken studies for execution by the Castro government. Overtly, Communist sympathizers in the government have encouraged participation in Communist-front congresses and have aided foreign groups in opposition to the established governments in Latin America. Finally, on the official diplomatic level, Communists have apparently provided the inspiration for an attempt to develop unity among the "underdeveloped" nations, using "anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism" as a basis for common action, while claiming that such unity will promote neutralism and independence.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

That such neutralism and independence is regarded by Communists only as a step toward international Communist domination is evidenced in the words of the Cuban Communist Party program, which are paralleled in Communist party programs throughout the world. The ultimate goal is that of leading Cuba to "Socialism" under the guidance of the Communist Party, which signifies the incorporation of Cuba into the "Socialist Bloc" headed by the USSR and China and controlled by the international Communist party apparatus.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



Bundy
P
1 May 1963
B. J. [unclear]

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence.

SUBJECT : Interview of U.S. Newswoman with Fidel Castro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States

1. On 30 April 1963 Liza Howard, U.S. newswoman associated with the American Broadcasting Company, returned to Miami from Cuba where she had interviewed a number of high-ranking Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Vilma Espin de Castro, Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her conversations with Fidel Castro totaled about ten hours and included one session on 22 April which lasted from 12:45 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. Following is an account of those conversations and Liza Howard's observations concerning the present Cuban situation.

2. It appears that Fidel Castro is looking for a way to reach a rapprochement with the United States Government, probably because he is aware that Cuba is in a state of economic chaos. The October blockade hurt the Cuban economy. Liza Howard believes that Castro talked about this matter with her because she is known as a progressive and she talked with him in frank, blunt, honest terms; Castro has little opportunity to hear this type of conversation. Castro indicated that if a rapprochement was wanted President John F. Kennedy would have to make the first move. In response to the statement that Castro would probably have to make the first move, Castro asked what the U.S. wanted from him. When a return to the original aims of the revolution was suggested, Fidel said that perhaps he, President Kennedy,



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

and Premier Nikita Khrushchev should discuss this. Liza Howard said that she thought it was a more likely topic for Castro to discuss with President Kennedy. Castro said that he doubted that President Kennedy would talk with him without Khrushchev being present. When Howard pressed Castro for further information on how a rapprochement could be achieved he said that steps were already being taken. Pressed further, he said he considered the U.S. limitation on exile raids to be a proper step toward accommodation. It is Liza Howard's opinion that Castro wants to pursue the discussion of rapprochement with proper progressive spokesmen. Based on her discussions with the following persons Liza Howard feels that Guevara, Raul Castro, and Vilma Espin oppose any idea of rapprochement; Roa and Vallejo favor these discussions.

3. Castro asked Howard, who had previously interviewed Khrushchev, for an appraisal of him. When Howard said that Khrushchev was a shrewd politician who would break and dispose of Castro when the Soviets no longer needed him, Castro made no comment but only nodded his head as if in skeptical agreement. Liza Howard had no insight or advance notice on Castro's travel to Moscow.

4. Castro appears healthy, has no visible nervous twitches or tics, and was calm, rational, humorous, and non-argumentative during all discussions. Vallejo, Castro's personal physician, also acts as secretary, interpreter, and confidant.

5. Castro is in complete control in Cuba. No major decision is made without him. Neither Guevara nor Raul Castro would be able to rule Cuba if Fidel were assassinated.

6. In discussions with Castro about terror and secret police methods Liza Howard received the impression that he was not completely aware of the extent to which terror has gripped Cuba.

- 2 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

7. Castro refers to Soviet troops in Cuba as "technicals" and indicated that they have a training mission in Cuba. He made the point, however, that if an internal revolt takes place in Cuba Soviet "technicals" would fight with Castro to put down a counterrevolution.

8. Liza Howard said that Emil Stadelhofer, Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, is an overworked, timid man who does not have Castro's ear. She believes that the Swiss need a larger staff in Habana and that Stadelhofer needs recognition for a job well done. Howard also said that in her opinion the Western diplomatic community in Habana has no influence on Castro or his government.

9. While discussing a possible rapprochement Castro asked for full assessments of President and Mrs. Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy, and wanted to know if Adlai Stevenson had power in the U.S. and if his voice was heard in President Kennedy's councils. Castro commented that James Donovan was a good man; it was Liza Howard's impression that Donovan had not talked politics with Castro but that Donovan had a platform from which he could launch political discussions on the philosophy of revolution.

10. Liza Howard said that she was willing to undertake further discussions with Castro concerning a possible rapprochement. Other possible candidates whom she suggested were Edwin M. Martin, Adlai Stevenson, and Luis Munoz Marin. She also mentioned Donovan but was not quite certain that he was progressive enough. Liza Howard is willing to arrange a meeting for any U.S. Government spokesman with Castro through Vallejo, who will be the point of contact.

11. Liza Howard definitely wants to impress the U.S. Government with two facts: Castro is ready to

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

discuss rapprochement and she herself is ready to discuss it with him if asked to do so by the U.S. Government.



Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

CSDB-3/654,439

Orig: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Attorney General
The Department of Justice

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

- 4 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

NIE 85-63
14 June 1963

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-29
Document # 3

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-63

(Supersedes NIE 85-2-62 and SNIE 85-3-62;
Supplements SNIE 85-4-62)

Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
14 JUNE 1963

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

MAR 2000

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Nº

2

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

~~WARNING~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-63

Situation and Prospects in Cuba

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	4
I. CURRENT SITUATION	4
Military Situation	4
Political Stability	7
The Economic Situation	8
Castro and Latin America	10
II. OUTLOOK	11
Shorter Term Prospects	11
Military Prospects	12
Long-Run Political and Economic Prospects	14
Latin American Policies	15
Soviet-Cuban Relations	16
ANNEX: ESTIMATE OF MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA	

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

CONCLUSIONS

A. After a period marked by bitterness on Castro's part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (*Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31-32, 41*)

B. Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime's leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro's ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (*Paras. 15, 42-43*)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (Paras. 2, 5, 12-14, 35, 37)

D. With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (Para. 36)

E. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (Paras. 8, 12-14)

F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the So-

~~SECRET~~

viets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (Paras. 38-40)

G. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communique held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (Paras. 46-48)

H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (Paras. 49-51)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT SITUATION

1. Significant policy differences between Castro and the Soviet leaders were apparent during the missile base crisis of October 1962 and for three or four months afterwards. Castro's visit to Moscow indicates that these differences have been submerged, though some basic tensions in the relationship are likely to continue. Various indications accumulating over the last several months suggest that there is now agreement on a common policy aimed primarily at consolidation of the Castro regime. A corollary of this policy is some measure of restraint toward the US to minimize the danger of US intervention. Recognition by both the Soviets and Cubans of the necessity for taking steps to reduce the constant threat of a crisis with the US probably led to the current strategy. Two of its manifestations have been the further withdrawals since February of Soviet personnel from Cuba and the toning down for the moment Castro's inflammatory appeals for violent revolution throughout Latin America.

Military Situation

2. The Soviet military picture is in a state of transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate most of them. The limited capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces are gradually improving as a result of their experience and increased training since last fall and their growing familiarity with Soviet equipment. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis.

3. In the months preceding the October crisis, the Soviet Union accomplished a very substantial buildup of its own military power in Cuba and made sizable deliveries of arms and equipment for the Cuban Armed Forces. As a result of the crisis, the Soviets removed 42 MRBMs and related equipment, IRBM-related equipment, 42 IL-28 jet light bombers and associated personnel, but the rest of the equipment and a substantial Soviet military presence remain. (See Annex, "Estimate of Major Soviet Military Equipment in Cuba.")

4. Identifying Soviet military personnel entering Cuba and estimating their number has been a problem of great difficulty from the start of the buildup in 1962. Their entry was achieved in a manner compatible with the Soviets' desire to hide the arrival of strategic weapons; they wore civilian clothes, in many cases debarked at night at remote ports, and moved quickly to guarded and isolated encampments. To arrive at our estimates of Soviet troops in Cuba, we have used a synthesis of all

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

available evidence, including refugee and in-place sources of varying degrees of reliability. In addition, we have closely measured the passenger and troop capacities of Soviet ships to and from Cuba and have undertaken functional analyses of the Soviet weapons systems in Cuba to determine the personnel required to operate and maintain them. As a result of this examination, the estimate of the number of Soviets assigned to the air defense system, KOMAR boats, cruise missile systems, and MIG fighters was considered to be relatively firm. However, the number derived for ground forces personnel, particularly those at the four armored camps, was based on less firm evidence and could have varied in either direction.

5. *Soviet Forces.* Given these limitations on the evidence, we estimated just prior to the troop withdrawals that began in mid-February 1963, that 17,500 was the most probable figure for Soviet military personnel in Cuba, but did not exclude the possibility that it could have been several thousand more. A careful evaluation of reports indicates that since that time a conservative minimum of 5,000 Soviet personnel have been withdrawn. Most appeared to be military rather than civilian. We have no reliable evidence that more than a few hundred military personnel have arrived in Cuba since mid-February. Those departing since mid-February probably included personnel associated with the armored camps, MIG fighters, and some elements of the air defense system, although we cannot determine with any degree of certainty the number withdrawn from each weapons system or installation. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more.

6. We believe that there has been a reduction in the Soviet personnel at the four armored camps. Some Cuban military personnel are present and undergoing training at all four of the camps, and a reliable report presents good evidence that one has been evacuated by the Soviets and partially occupied by the Cubans. However, the equipment remains at all the camps.

7. Four full shiploads of military equipment have been identified coming into Cuba since the crisis as against some 100 which arrived between July and October 1962. In addition, other ships have carried material which might be used by the military. This includes the shipment of six helicopters, commercial explosives, parts for IL-14 aircraft, and large quantities of trucks and other vehicles. In sum, the recent shipments appear to have been resupply deliveries composed of munitions, vehicles, replacement parts, and maintenance equipment.

8. *Cuban Forces and Capabilities.* The numerical strength of the Cuban ground forces has been estimated at 175,000, of whom some 75,000 are in the standing army and 100,000 in the ready reserve. In addition there are some 100,000 home-guard militiamen, of little combat signifi-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

cance but useful as a police reserve. The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been enhanced by new equipment, and by further training and experience including the mobilization during the missile crisis. A few divisions may now be capable of tactical operations, although the battalion combat team remains generally the basic tactical unit. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. Their ability for defense against invasion has been enhanced by the organization of an armored brigade and 11 combined arms "anti-invasion shock defense" battalions. Cuban capabilities are still severely limited by lack of training and experience in combined operations and by their general lack of organic transport and logistic support. In the event of US invasion they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type.

9. The Cuban Navy is estimated to number 4,000-5,000 men. Its capabilities have been enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment, principally motor torpedo boats and submarine chasers, and by increased training in its use, but remain limited essentially to coastal defense and to operations in shipping lanes adjacent to Cuba. The KOMAR missile boats and coastal defense missiles remain under Soviet control.

10. In the field of air defense the Cuban Air Force, with 3,000 men, has a small but increasing role. The most important air defense equipment, the SA-2s, and MIG-21s, is still Soviet controlled. The Cubans operate a jet fighter force composed of more than 60 MIG-15/17/19s and a considerable quantity of antiaircraft artillery.

11. Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely limited by shortage of the requisite airlift or sealift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a scale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. However, Cuba has sufficient resources for paramilitary operations in the Caribbean area to upset a situation in precarious balance.

12. *Training of Cubans.* The reduction in Soviet military personnel in Cuba since February has been accompanied by increasing indications of Cubans training in the operation of Soviet equipment and systems, which suggests that the Soviets plan a turnover of part or all of these systems to the Cubans.

13. Cuban pilots are flying the MIG-21 aircraft, which are equipped with air-to-air missiles, and some will soon be able to fly them operationally. One class of 22 pilots began training in March 1963, and a second of about the same size is scheduled to begin in September; Cubans are also almost certainly being trained in ground control and maintenance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Cuban Air Force could man the MIG-21 system by mid-1964. The Soviets are also carrying out a sizable training program for the Cubans in the operation of KOMAR boats and cruise missiles. Cubans are being trained at a number of sites in the operation and maintenance of Soviet ground equipment.

14. We believe that Cubans are also being trained on the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and may soon begin to operate some equipment at a few sites on a routine basis. In view of the complexity of the system, it would require approximately another year of training before the Cubans could take over the bulk of the maintenance work. Even after Cubans learn to operate the system, the Soviets will probably have to provide training and technical assistance for some time.

Political Stability

15. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel. To an important extent the forward drive of the Cuban revolution depends on Castro's charismatic appeal. His personal indispensability has enabled him to surmount both a challenge from old-line Communists in Cuba and a crisis in his relations with Moscow. It has also enabled him to absorb some economic setbacks without serious risk to his regime. While no serious challenge to his power and control seems likely to emerge for some time, the regime's dependence on his person continues to be a major vulnerability.

16. Castro is still suspicious of the leaders of the prerevolutionary Communist Party (PSP) and of their relations with Moscow. However, they appear to have accommodated themselves to his leadership and some occupy important positions. In present circumstances, it is unlikely that the "old" Communists will attempt to challenge Castro, as they did in early 1962, or that Moscow will want them to. It is more likely that they will work for more power in the apparatus of the new party (PURS) which is coming into being. Castro seems alert to this possibility and the selection of members of the new party appears to reflect some effort to prevent domination by the old PSP leaders. The completion of this party organization might provide Castro with another means of control and an important instrument for political indoctrination and exhortation of the populace. But over the longer run the existence of a stable and organized party apparatus could reduce the indispensability both to the Cuban regime and to the Soviets of Castro's personal leadership.

17. Popular attitudes will be a factor affecting the stability of the regime. We have no way of measuring these reliably, but we believe that an important minority of the Cuban people now gives positive support to Castro, and that the majority passively accepts his regime. Resistance continues, but it is on a small scale and is ineffective against the regime's security forces. It cannot be either excluded or predicted that larger numbers of people will eventually be willing to take the risks of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

joining or surreptitiously supporting an opposition struggle. The fact that Cuba is now Communist should not lead to the conclusion that security measures there will be as effective as in other Communist States. Should resistance assume a larger magnitude, it might cause disagreement and factionalism within the regime. Ultimately this could lead in turn to a disruption of the security apparatus and the defection of armed elements. In this way, and probably only in this way, a breakdown or significant change in the regime might be brought about. At present, such developments seem unlikely.

The Economic Situation

18. The Cuban economy declined sharply during 1960-1962, and there is almost certain to be some further decline in output during 1963. Nevertheless, the Cuban economic situation is not a critical source of weakness for the Castro regime and is unlikely to become one.

19. The decline in Cuban production has been partially offset by the substantial volume of economic assistance from the Bloc, particularly the USSR. During 1962, the Bloc extended an estimated \$200 million in balance of payments assistance. In addition, the Bloc provided some developmental equipment on credit. Goods delivered on these terms probably accounted for one-third of total Cuban imports. As a result of Bloc assistance, Cuban imports rose substantially in 1962, in spite of a sizable decline in export earnings. Whatever the level of Cuban export earnings in 1963, Bloc assistance probably will permit the maintenance of essential imports—foodstuffs, fuels, industrial materials, and machine parts—at about the 1962 level. Meanwhile the political effects of economic decline have been mitigated by the radical change in the pattern of distribution of available consumer goods and services.

20. Cuba's production of sugar has declined in 1963 and its volume of exports probably will be more than one-third below that of 1962. On the other hand, the impact of reduced supplies will be largely, and perhaps more than completely, offset by the sharp rise of world sugar prices to the highest levels in many years. The 1963 sugar crop amounts to a little less than four million metric tons. This compares with a 1962 crop of 4.8 million metric tons and crops averaging well in excess of five million tons in the pre-Castro years. Cuba has already contracted to ship about 1.0 to 1.2 million tons to the Free World this year; the larger figure would be only 240,000 tons less than in 1962. We cannot predict how much foreign currency this will produce, however, because prices may vary greatly depending on the date and terms of the sales, some of which were made before the sharp rise in prices. Nevertheless Cuba's earnings in the Free World will be greater than last year's.

21. The Soviets agreed during the Castro visit that they would pay six cents a pound instead of the four cent price which they paid last year and which had been the contract price for this year's shipments. In

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

order that Cuba could fulfill contracts it has been concluding since the end of 1962 with Free World countries, the Soviets agreed to Cuba's diverting one million tons of sugar from the USSR trade agreement quota. These seeming concessions put a better face on Soviet-Cuban relationships so far as the Cuban people are concerned. The new terms had been sought by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on a mission to Moscow in late 1962 and their announcement during Castro's visit seemed largely intended to give Castro something to take home plus providing a camouflage for Cuba's economic deterioration.

22. The Soviets have thus removed a major irritant in the Soviet-Cuban relationship caused by the great rise in world sugar prices. They did this at a reasonable cost. In fact, the two cent differential will go to pay part of Cuba's accrued debt to the Soviets, so that the granting of a higher price represents only a juggling of barter and credit accounts and will not reduce Cuba's need for continued large Soviet balance of payments support this year.

23. In spite of Bloc economic assistance, total personal consumption in Cuba has fallen sharply since 1958-1959, perhaps by as much as one-fifth, although this decline in personal consumption under Castro is partly accounted for by the emigration and impoverishment of the former wealthy and middle classes. Rationing and other distributional controls have fostered a more even distribution of the declining totals of goods and services.

24. There are, nevertheless, many among the lower classes who are worse off than during the pre-Castro period; organized labor in particular has lost much of the wage differentials and other substantial benefits previously obtained. Workers and peasants generally probably are disappointed that the economic improvements expected under Castro have not materialized. Disappointments or increased hardships in regard to personal consumption are somewhat assuaged by the feeling of heightened social status and *dignidad* promoted by Castro's social reforms and effective tattoo of propaganda. Nevertheless, considerable economic discontent in Cuba is reflected in worker apathy, absenteeism, and non-cooperation. These traits have traditionally been manifested by Cuban workers, however; and there has been little evidence so far of more dramatic forms of antiregime activity because of economic discontent.

25. Apathy and noncooperation, nevertheless, do impede Castro's efforts toward economic recovery. So far, Castro has relied on exhortation and on reward for outstanding workers as means of increasing worker effort, but with relatively little success. Should Castro turn to harsh administrative measures to get the Cubans to work harder—and initial steps toward the introduction of work norms have already been taken—there very likely would be an exacerbation of the problem of worker discontent.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Castro and Latin America

26. Those Latin Americans, Communists and non-Communists, who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba (1,000-1,500 Latin Americans received Communist indoctrination or training in guerrilla warfare in 1962) and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. At this time, pro-Castro revolutionaries are persistently active and aggressive only in Venezuela, Castro's priority target for revolution in Latin America. On balance, the revolutionaries have lost ground in recent months in their efforts to weaken the Betancourt government through terrorism and sabotage. There is strong sentiment among old-line leaders of the Communist Party of Venezuela for putting more emphasis on recruitment of peasant support and on guerrilla tactics in rural areas as the best means of promoting a successful revolution over the long term. Extremist elements, however, still are committed to a campaign of drastic action to provoke the military into ousting the Betancourt government. In several other countries there have been preparations for violent activity, and in Peru and Ecuador some incidents of violence by pro-Castro revolutionaries.

27. The sense of urgency created throughout Latin America by the missile base crisis has faded, but a considerable residue remains, especially in Central America. Soviet military intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, Soviet exploitation of the Cuban revolution for its own strategic purposes, and Castro's subordination to the USSR were all made strikingly clear to governments as well as to politically-conscious elements of the population. The strength and appeal of Castro/Communist forces have been weakened, and the state of readiness to combat the extremist threat remains high among those Latin American Governments which see themselves faced by direct subversive attacks.

28. In virtually every country of Latin America Castro's prestige, which had begun to decline well before the missile crisis, remains low. His image has been most seriously damaged in the eyes of non-Communists, particularly among labor groups and leftist-intellectuals and politicians who had sympathized with his anti-US position. In the immediate post crisis period, discussion among some of the revolutionary left tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and *fidelistas*. Among the public at large, many who formerly had been passive were converted by the crisis to hostility toward Castro. Moreover, the crisis caused moderate center and conservative groups, by and large already anti-Castro, to be more aware than before of the fundamental aims of the USSR in this hemisphere and of the threat posed by Cuba as an operational base for the Soviets.

29. Among the small countries of Central America the crisis heightened pressures for a definite solution to the Cuban problem. They have

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

intensified their efforts to control and combat subversive activities. In addition, the Mexican Government is beginning to cooperate in efforts to control the movement of Latin Americans to and from Cuba through Mexico. On the other hand, in most of South America, popular antagonism toward Castro for conniving in the introduction of Soviet strategic power in the hemisphere has subsided more quickly and their governments tend now to regard the affair as ended by the US show of resolve.

30. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro's policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which follow a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has in the past shown himself ready to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties or to work with dissident elements within them. Some of the regular parties, particularly in Brazil and Chile, strongly resent such tactics. Developments in recent months suggest that Castro, at least for the moment, has accepted a less violent position.

II. OUTLOOK

Shorter Term Prospects

31. We believe that Castro and the Soviets are probably convinced that time can be made to work in Cuba's favor, providing the US is not presented with a pretext for direct intervention or drastic measures such as some form of quarantine. The Soviets have probably argued that the Cubans should concentrate on the solution of important domestic problems in order to consolidate the regime, demonstrate that a Communist revolution cannot be reversed by the US, and prepare for future breakthroughs in Latin America. In short, the USSR and Cuba probably intend to play for time, avoid provocations likely to lead to US intervention, withhold unnecessary concessions, and repair the damage to their prestige. Each will continue to employ flexible tactics in Latin America varied according to the political situation in particular countries. We expect that both the Soviets and Castro will adopt aggressive tactics whenever presented with tempting opportunities, and their appreciation of what constitutes a tempting opportunity will probably differ as time passes.

32. If we assume no major circumstantial changes, such as Castro's death, a blowup of Castro-Soviet relations, or decisive intervention by the US, we would expect the Castro regime to be more firmly established a year hence than it is today. We believe it unlikely that economic difficulties or internal political opposition will cause the collapse of the regime. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he and the Revolution are here to stay and as his regime gains in experience.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

33. A decision to avoid major crises with the US would not mean compliance with US wishes or lack of response to provocation. There is a wide range of unpredictable contingencies. US overflights, which are galling in view of Castro's preoccupation with demonstrating Cuban sovereignty, could produce an incident. Account must be taken of the possibility of a clash with the US over the question of the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba. A revolutionary eruption in Latin America might break the present pattern of restraint in Soviet and Cuban behavior. The present Soviet and Cuban emphasis on consolidation may be diverted by other new opportunities for aggressive actions. There will also remain the possibility of a breakdown of Soviet relations with Castro that could lead to internal conflict within Cuba, or an attempt on Castro's part to carry out an aggressive policy on his own.

34. There have been fragmentary indications of an interest on Castro's part in an improvement in relations with the US. We believe that he has probably considered this as one of a variety of alternatives. Its appeal to Castro, as to the Soviets, probably lies in the hope of lifting the US embargo and otherwise normalizing Cuban contacts with other Latin American countries. They may also feel that a limited rapprochement would reduce the danger of US intervention and permit greater freedom for the consolidation of the Communist regime in Cuba. At present we doubt that either the Cubans or the Soviets have much hope for an adjustment of Cuban-US relations, but it is an option that for their own purposes they will wish to keep open.

Military Prospects

35. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there.

36. With respect to the SAM system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risk involved. The Soviets are probably apprehensive that Cubans might be tempted to shoot down a US overflight if Castro had control of the SAMs. The Soviets cannot rely merely on Castro's assurances not to do so and it is likely that they would make serious efforts to resolve the question of US overflights before giving the Cubans complete operational control of the SAMs. It is possible that they will announce in advance an intended turnover to Cuba and use the interim period to seek a termination of overflights either through some agreement with the US or some dramatic action at the UN, claiming that the reduction of Soviet forces has removed any pretext for US surveillance. They might

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

also hope that the passage of time and the possibility of an eventually calmer atmosphere might cause the US to desist from overflights. It is also possible that the Soviets may come to regard the risks involved in a turnover of the system as preferable to the political cost of either withdrawing the system or trying to keep it indefinitely under their own command.

37. The turnover of other weapons systems now under Soviet control would greatly increase Castro's independent military capabilities. The 42 MIG-21 aircraft, which are armed with air-to-air missiles, would increase the total number of jet fighters in Cuban hands to nearly two-thirds. These fighters also have a theoretical capability to intercept a US high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In practice, however, a successful interception would require a great amount of skill and luck. Although Cuban pilots, and probably ground controllers and maintenance personnel, are receiving training from the Soviets, the operational effectiveness of these aircraft will be reduced for a time by the relative inexperience of these personnel.

38. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons in Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance would still be a major deterrent even if it were discontinued as a daily routine. We believe that the Soviets could have no solid assurance that they could deploy major weapons into Cuba without detection. We have no evidence that Khrushchev has reappraised the risks of US counteraction to such a venture, and we think that his experience of last October has considerably reduced the chances of a second dangerous misjudgment.

39. However, we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles. Despite increased US alertness to the possibility of reintroduction, the chances of detection might be less than those during the original operation. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible for them to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying upon.

40. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. They might calculate that under certain circumstances the introduction of submarines might be effected in a way not to confront the US with such a clear and unmistakable challenge as produced the strong reaction of last October. They might also consider it possible to introduce a limited number of light bombers as replacements for obsolete B-26s in the Cuban inventory on the grounds that they were needed for patrol against raiders. But in such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Long-Run Political and Economic Prospects

41. We believe that the current situation favors the further consolidation of Castro's Communist regime in Cuba. Security forces will probably continue to be highly effective. Internal resistance forces are likely to suffer cumulative attrition. Resistance fighters lost by capture, death, or flight are unlikely to be effectively replaced. As time passes with Castro and the Communists in power, the hope that they can be overthrown becomes dimmer. Exile raids, sabotage, dropping of equipment and supplies can improve the morale of those Cubans who are opposed to the regime, but are unlikely of themselves to produce an uprising capable of overthrowing it.

42. However, despite the odds against it, the possibility of a significant uprising should not be excluded from consideration. If something should happen to damage Castro's ability to command the loyalty of the Cuban people, for example, as a result of ill-judged measures to discipline workers, the situation could get out of control. In such circumstances a leader or a group with an appealing program might appear and succeed in rallying forces of opposition. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops.

43. If Fidel Castro were to die, members and supporters of the regime, including the armed forces and security forces, would probably rally together to maintain the revolution and to defend it against any US intervention. After a short time, however, such solidarity would be likely to weaken. We do not believe that Raul Castro, the designated successor, could hold his brother's position without a struggle for power with other personalities and groups in the regime. It is unclear who would win in such a struggle. On balance we feel that the successor would probably be one of the top leaders of the regime; he would probably be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro, because he would lack Castro's special claim to indispensability—his power to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of the Cuban people. It is also possible that the struggle for power would lead to a chaotic civil war in which the whole present political pattern in Cuba would be changed.

44. We believe that economic recovery in Cuba will be slow; it will take at least several years before the 1958 level of production is regained. There has been little noticeable improvement so far in the key areas of economic organization, managerial efficiency, and worker incentives—notable weaknesses in Bloc countries generally. Also, the Soviet Union

~~SECRET~~

probably considers assistance to Cuba in the form of balance of payments credits as an emergency measure, and it is likely that any recovery in Cuban production will be partly counterbalanced by reductions in such credits.

45. On the other hand, the Soviet Union probably is prepared to provide developmental assistance to Cuba for a prolonged period. The Soviets apparently have backed away from some of the more ambitious industrial projects talked of previously, such as a large steel plant and a petroleum refinery; but a number of more modest industrial projects are moving ahead, as are projects for expanding agricultural production and for mineral exploration. Considering Cuba's favorable balance between resources and population, and assuming some improvements in efficiency, and continued Bloc aid, Cuba could in time regain its position as one of the leading Latin American countries in per capita gross national product.

Latin American Policies

46. Many areas in Latin America are vulnerable to revolutionary upheavals because popular aspirations for social programs are not being met. Castro still hopes to convince dissatisfied Latin Americans that the Cuban revolution is a model for them to follow. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communique held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. In part, this is because of Castro's disillusionment with the lack of revolutionary fervor among Latin American Communists, with the notable exception of Venezuela. More important, he probably feels that he has no choice but to bide his time and build up subversive assets for the future. Such a position has probably been strongly urged by Moscow and leading Latin American Communists (e.g., Prestes in Brazil) who fear Castro will upset their own strategies. The tenor of the joint communique of 23 May would suggest that Castro has accepted, at least for the present, a more cautious and flexible line with respect to revolution in Latin America.

47. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures, with Brazil as the principal target. Subversive training and support will, of course, continue in Cuba. Castro probably still has high hopes for the ultimate success of armed revolution in Venezuela, especially after the end of Betancourt's term in 1964. However, the Soviets still have predominant influence among Latin American Commu-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

nists and do not contemplate turning over their controls to Castro. Nevertheless, they have given Castro a certain weight by describing him as the forerunner of Communist advance in Latin America, and therefore his views may tend to be more influential with other Latin American Communists.

48. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. He would probably prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents. The danger will remain, however, that a few aircraft or guns supplied by Cuba might determine the outcome in a contest between insurgents and an established government.

Soviet-Cuban Relations

49. While we believe that the Soviets and Cubans have come to grips with some of their problems and have probably resolved the more immediate ones, the Cuban situation is clouded by many uncertainties and Soviet-Cuban relations are far from permanently stabilized. Among these uncertainties is the question of US policy. The impact of the Cuban revolution in Latin America has lost much of its force, if only temporarily, because Castro has appeared as a pawn in the struggle between the Great Powers. The Soviets are apparently convinced that this setback can be overcome provided the crisis with the US can be controlled. They probably believe that they possess still some degree of deterrence against direct action by the US to overthrow Castro and that in any case the political inhibition against such a course remains strong. They probably calculate that avoidance of provocation will deprive the US of a pretext for direct action. In addition, they recognize that the US effort to isolate and harass Castro will continue to contain certain dangers, but they probably hope to limit these by careful handling of any incidents, arguing that his interest as well as theirs will be best served by gradual consolidation of his regime.

50. Castro, while in the USSR, showed a willingness to accept the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence and to recognize the Soviet Union's leadership of the Communist movement. On the other hand, some of the more sensitive points of dispute between the Chinese and the Soviets (e.g., Yugoslavia and the charges of dogmatism versus revisionism) were not mentioned in the communique of 23 May. Nevertheless, Castro did take a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received from the Soviets a strong boost to his own ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution as well as the generalized pledge to give Cuba "the necessary aid" in the event of a US attack; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed.

51. We do foresee, however, varying degrees of friction in Soviet-Cuban relations, particularly over the long run. Castro wants all the benefits of Soviet economic and military aid but insists upon a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Despite the harmonious tone of the joint communique, the partners probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America. As time passes and new conditions develop, they will probably again find themselves in disagreement over the proper course of action to follow. The future level of Soviet economic aid to Cuba is also likely to become a bone of contention between the two countries. For the present, however, we believe that both the Soviets and the Cubans hope to stabilize the situation and gird for a long-term effort in Latin America.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX

ESTIMATE OF MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

Tanks

T-54 tanks and self-propelled guns at the four Soviet Camps and Torrens*	200
Tanks and self-propelled guns in Cuban hands	400-500
Field Artillery and AT Guns	1,300
AAA Guns	700
FROG Rockets*	30
Military Vehicles	20,000
SAM Sites*	24
SAM (SA-2 Guideline) Missiles*	500
Cruise-Missile Sites*	4
Cruise-Missiles*	150
Air Defense Radars*	200
Jet Fighters	
MIG-15/17 (FAGOT/FRESCO)	55
MIG-19 (FARMER)	11
MIG-21 (FISHBED)*	42
Helicopters	100
KOMAR Cruise-Missile Boats*	12
Kronstadt Subchasers	6
Motor Torpedo Boats (P-6)	18

* Equipment now under Soviet control.

~~SECRET~~

30 OCT 1996

(When Filled In)

3. [REDACTED] CASTRO'S ONLY PURPOSE IN CUTTING OFF THE WATER SUPPLY WAS TO PROVE TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS, THAT HE COULD INSULT THE U.S. AND GET AWAY WITH IT. IN THIS HE WAS SUCCESSFUL, AND AS A RESULT INCREASED HIS PRESTIGE BOTH INSIDE CUBA AND THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

NIE 85-64
5 August 1964

INTELLIGENCE
Mandatory Review
Case # N.I.E. 85-64
Document # 1

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-64

Situation and Prospects in Cuba

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
5 AUGUST 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
MAY 1999

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

19

2

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

The applicant's proposed work is in the field of biochemistry and is of a basic nature. The project is not of a commercial nature. The project is not of a commercial nature. The project is not of a commercial nature.

2000

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-64

Situation and Prospects in Cuba

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	4
I. INTRODUCTION	4
II. THE ECONOMY	4
Current Situation	4
Economic Outlook	7
III. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE	9
Current Situation	9
Security Machinery	11
Outlook	12
IV. THE MILITARY FORCES	13
Current Situation	13
Outlook	16
The Soviet Military Presence	16
Chances of Reintroduction of Strategic Weapons	17
V. FOREIGN POLICIES	17
Cuban-Soviet Relations	17
The Problem of SAMs and U-2s	19
Overtures Toward the US	20
Latin American Policies	20

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the Cuban situation and the outlook over the next year or two.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Though the downward trend of the Cuban economy seems to have slowed and perhaps levelled off, we believe the economic situation will be stagnant over the next two years. Inept management and low labor morale will persist. Living levels are likely to become slightly lower, and shortages of foodstuffs, housing and many types of consumer goods will continue. Slight gains in industry are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agricultural sector. (*Paras. 3-7, 9-13, 17-19*)

B. Export earnings in 1965 and 1966 are likely to be below 1964 levels, because of lower sugar prices and poor prospects for substantially larger production of sugar and other export commodities. The value of total trade with the Free World can be expected to decline during the period. We believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide sufficient credit assistance to prevent a seriously damaging drop in total imports. In these circumstances, Cuba's heavy economic dependence on the Communist world will continue. (*Paras. 8, 14-16*)

C. Depressed levels of consumption, the imposition of work norms, and forced labor and security duties will tend to narrow the regime's popular support. However, the huge security apparatus will almost certainly prevent popular dissatisfaction from bringing down the regime. We think it likely that a number of military officers have lost sympathy with certain of its policies, but we doubt that there is

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

military disaffection on a scale sufficient to threaten Castro. Major deterioration in the internal situation or serious difficulties within the government could alter the picture, but would be unlikely to undermine Castro's power position in less than several years. We believe his death would lead, in fairly short order, to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome. (*Paras. 30-36*)

D. The Cuban armed forces are much the best-equipped in Latin America and, except for Brazil, the largest. Their capabilities have continued to improve, chiefly as a result of the delivery of additional weapons from the USSR and Cuban acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The compulsory military service program, introduced last November, will probably cause an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency, but will permit improved selectivity of recruits for the active forces, and will eventually produce a much larger trained reserve. (*Paras. 37-43*)

E. There are almost certainly no Russian combat units still in Cuba. Upon completion of current withdrawals, a Soviet MAAG-type presence, mostly technical and maintenance personnel, of about 2,000 will probably remain so long as the Cuban armed forces remain dependent on the USSR for technical and material support to maintain their complex Soviet equipment. (*Paras. 44-45*)

F. During the period of this estimate, the Soviets are highly unlikely to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba, though they have the technical capability to do so clandestinely. They might use Cuba for support of their submarines, but so long as they calculate that the risk would be high, they would not push such a venture very far. (*Paras. 46-47*)

G. The Cuban-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions have continued. Castro, though willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute, has refused to join in any formal condemnation of Peiping. He is concerned lest a further improvement in US-Soviet relations leave his regime more isolated and exposed. Though the Soviets almost certainly consider Castro to be erratic and undependable, they have little choice but to continue to support him. (*Paras. 48-52*)

H. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as well as between Castro and the US, is the continuation of U-2 overflights. Castro and Khrushchev have conducted a program of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

warnings, threats, and compromise suggestions to induce the US to desist. It is almost certain that Cuba now has full control over the SAM system—and consequently the capability to shoot down a U-2. Thus we believe that the Soviets can only give advice, backed up by their political and economic leverage, though we cannot wholly exclude the possibility that they have retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Nevertheless, we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seek UN action. If this fails, there is considerable danger that he would order a shootdown, calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by Castro or even an unauthorized shootdown is always possible. (*Paras. 44, 53-56*)

I. Castro has a serious interest in improving relations with the US, as a means of reducing the pressures on his regime. He probably also considers that his recent gestures are useful to build a record of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba's appeal to the UN on the U-2 issue. He will probably make further overtures from time to time, but there is little chance that he will accede at any early date to the conditions the US has stated. (*Paras. 57-58*)

J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America have suffered setbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less sanguine about the chances for quick success. Nevertheless, he will almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to potential revolutionaries. He may press for early aggressive action by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chances seem poor, hoping that their repression would eventually produce conditions more favorable for exploitation. (*Paras. 59-62*)

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The appeal of Castro's revolution is wearing thinner, though his own hold on the instruments of power remains firm. During the year since our last general assessment of Cuba,¹ the Castro regime has had more setbacks than accomplishments, more tribulation than triumph. The economic difficulties have been particularly evident; these have brought a further narrowing in popular support and increasing resort to methods of repression and threat. The hopes of the Cuban leaders for rapid gains by sympathetic revolutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America were dealt serious blows, particularly in Venezuela last December and by the Brazilian revolution in April.

2. On the other hand, there have been some important achievements. Cuban forces have considerably improved their overall capabilities, largely through the acquisition of more Soviet weapons and weapon systems. The regime's large-scale effort in technical, vocational, and general education has moved ahead, though at some expense to the quality of education on the professional level. The program of training and indoctrinating subversives from other countries has continued. On the economic side, substantial Soviet aid is continuing and high world prices permitted good earnings from a small 1964 sugar crop, aiding Cuba's effort to expand imports of critically needed equipment from Western suppliers.

II. THE ECONOMY

Current Situation

3. There were contrasting aspects to Cuba's economic performance in 1963. Regarded as a whole, it was another bad year: total production was below that of 1962 and Gross National Product (GNP) remained substantially below that of 1958, the last prerevolutionary year. On the positive side, however, the rate of economic decline, which has been rapid in recent years, seems to have slowed or levelled off. Data so far available suggest that stagnation at a low level will continue through 1964; slight gains in industrial output are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agriculture sector.

4. We estimate Cuban sugar output in 1964 at approximately the same level as in 1963—3.8 million metric tons—the smallest crop in 18 years.² The regime had hoped for a larger harvest, and the replanting of cane undertaken in 1962 and 1963 might have made this possible. However, Hurricane Flora damaged some cane and intensified transport and supply difficulties. The regime's nationalization of middle-sized farms in October (the Second Agrarian

¹ NIE 85-63, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 14 June 1963. Secret.

² The 1962 crop was 4.8 million tons, crops in the pre-Castro years were typically over 5 million tons.

~~SECRET~~

Reform) also created new problems in sugar production. Moreover, despite an early start at the harvest, the organizing of civilian "volunteer" brigades, and the use of army units, the regime once again failed to lure or drive an adequate labor force into the grueling work of the cane fields. Harvesting was also adversely affected by military alerts, especially the large-scale mobilization undertaken in May. Increased use was made of cane loading machines, but this seems to have made only a marginal difference. Consequently, some cane remained uncut when the harvest season ended in June.

5. The regime's general inability to manage agriculture is also evident in lower output of most other crops. Hurricane Flora, the nationalization decree, and the diversion of land from food and industrial crops to cane have been other depressing factors. The regime is trying to institute more intensive farming methods and increased application of fertilizer, but it is probable that production in nonsugar agriculture this year will be even lower than the unimpressive level of 1963.³

6. There has probably been a slight increase in industrial output since early 1963, resulting largely from an improvement in the supply of imported fuels and industrial raw materials and from the opening of some new plants, most of them built with Soviet Bloc aid and under the supervision of Soviet Bloc technicians. Nevertheless, Minister of Industries Che Guevara continues to express dissatisfaction with the slow pace of industrial expansion and the low productivity of industrial labor.⁴ None of the longer-range, Soviet-financed mining or power projects have yet come into operation. Plans for large-scale industrialization have been shelved for the indefinite future.

7. By and large, the Cuban construction industry is still in the doldrums; its performance in 1963 dipped below that of the previous year, and the plan for 1964 calls for no increase. Cuban officials have publicly admitted that construction on a number of plants, some where the machinery was delivered long ago, has lagged behind schedule.

8. Cuban trade data for 1963⁵ show an increase of \$25 million in exports over 1962, a rise attributable to higher prices for sugar. Imports in 1963 rose to their

³It is worth noting that the Cuban economic plan for 1964 calls for only a 1.3 percent increase over 1963 in the total amount of food available for consumption including imports. Even if this goal is fulfilled—and the Cubans have seldom met plan goals in the past—it would not be enough to keep up with the annual population growth, and per capita consumption would decrease.

⁴Guevara, in February of this year, discussed the unimpressive performance of the economy during 1963 and, in calling for new efforts, said, "We cannot rest on our laurels. Our industrial laurels are so tiny that they are not enough to rest on, not even to rest one finger on. We must at least create some laurels. That is our task."

⁵The 1963 trade figures are taken from a recently acquired document. This source appears accurate in many of its details, and we are disposed to give it more credence than our earlier projections. Those projections were, nevertheless, based upon a considerable body of evidence; they placed Cuban exports at \$475 million and imports at \$730 million for 1963. Further light will be thrown on the issue when Soviet trade statistics for the year are available, but this will not be for a month or so.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

highest level since 1955. This increase was almost entirely in imports from the Communist countries and much of it was deliveries of machinery and equipment financed by development credits. For 1964 the value of Cuban exports will again increase, largely because of the high sugar prices which prevailed when most of the crop was sold. Imports as a whole may go up slightly in 1964; a rise in imports from the Free World is likely to be largely offset by a decline in imports from the Communist countries. The level of Soviet assistance in 1964 will probably be appreciably below the \$350 million level of 1963.

CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE 1957-1964

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	(in millions of dollars)	
							1963	1964
							(preliminary)	(estimated)
Exports (FOB)								
Communist countries	40	15	15	150	480	405	350	350
Free World	805	720	625	470	145	115	195	250
Total	845	735	640	620	625	520	545	600
Imports (CIF)								
Communist countries	negl.	negl.	negl.	125	515	640	705	630
Free World	900	850	750	430	190	120*	130*	225
Total	900	850	750	555	705	760*	835*	855

* Excluding US ransom payments of \$13 million in 1962 and \$35 million in 1963.

9. The Castro regime has given considerable attention to the problem of obtaining the parts and other production requisites needed to maintain Cuba's capital plant, largely of US manufacture. The Soviets have not provided this material in adequate quantity, and Cuba has had to divert scarce skills and funds into uneconomic efforts to make parts by hand and to use substitute material and equipment. Costly improvisation has been necessary to establish new foreign suppliers, who have exacted maximum prices for vitally needed supplies.

10. In these circumstances, the Castro regime has intensified its efforts to expand trade relations with Western nations. By these means it hopes not only to mitigate the adverse effects of the US economic denial program but also to reduce its own political isolation. Because the Soviets and other Communist countries allowed Castro to reduce his shipments of sugar to them during 1963 and 1964, he has been able to capitalize on high sugar prices temporarily obtainable in the Free World and to increase his earnings of convertible currency. Convertible currency reserves now stand at about \$75 million, and prospects for foreign exchange earnings this year are reasonably good. Moreover, Castro has been able to secure from the UK and France some \$30 million of medium term credits for urgently needed transport and construction equipment. Some of this is being delivered in 1964; some is to be shipped in 1965.

11. The most glaring weakness of the economy has been the regime's own extraordinary mismanagement and ineptitude. After the revolution, the regime

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

launched an ill-considered program of forced-draft industrialization and agricultural diversification; the most important result of this was to undermine the established basis for sugar production. Now the regime has completed the circle: sugar is again the watchword and the goal for 1970 is 10 million tons. Expanded cattle production for food and industrial supply is another primary goal of the administration. Following rapid nationalization of the great bulk of the island's economic activity, the regime adopted a doctrinaire Marxist approach toward the managerial function: in its pursuit of centralized control, more and more economic establishments were made part of large and unwieldy "consolidated enterprises," with all major decision-making authority concentrated in Havana. But so time-consuming and bureaucratic has the decision-making process become that Castro himself has damned the system and called for decentralization and the exercise of much more responsibility at local levels.

12. Cuban officials have been frank to say that their economic statistics are not accurate enough for sound planning—but they plan and plan and plan. The loss, through defection, of skilled labor and managerial talent has had a cumulative adverse effect. Not many of the new managers seem to be cost conscious; during 1963 the state industrial enterprises fell short by almost 250 million pesos of the 687 million pesos that they were supposed to turn over from their incomes to the Cuban budget. Perhaps most serious of all is the regime's continuing failure to provide meaningful material incentives for workers and farmers. The imposition of work norms and an extended work week have contributed to the decline in labor morale.

Economic Outlook

13. The latest in the regime's series of efforts to improve administration of the economy is the assumption by President Dorticos of the roles of Economic Minister and director of planning. But Cuba's problems of inept management and low labor morale are not quickly solvable; they represent a very basic limiting factor on the performance of the economy for the short-run future at least. Also of prime importance in appraising overall prospects for the next two years is the outlook for Cuban earnings from sugar exports.

14. Recent sharp declines in sugar futures make prospects much less promising for 1965, and probably for 1966 as well. World spot prices, which had hit a peak of 13 cents a pound a little over a year ago and were still as high as 12 cents last November, are now below 5 cents; sugar futures for 1965 indicate a further decline. Assuming prices on this general level for sales to non-Communist countries, the Castro regime would have to expand sugar production by about 20 percent to earn as much in 1965 as in 1964; moreover, it would have to sell the entire increase to the Bloc at the agreed price of 6 cents per pound.*

*During Castro's visit to the USSR last January, the Soviets, in effect, extended to 1970 their commitment of mid-1963 to pay six cents per pound for Cuban sugar. The January agreement also calls for increasing Soviet purchases: 1965, 2.1 million tons; 1966, 3 million tons; 1967, 4 million tons; 1968-1970, 5 million tons per year.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

15. Such an expansion of output is possible but unlikely. Although the regime is moving gradually ahead with its program of devoting additional land to cane production, it probably will not be able to overcome the serious labor shortage which has characterized the last three harvests. The regime appears now to be convinced that a solution can be found only through mechanized harvesting techniques. Soviet machinery thus far has been a disappointment. Cuban use of harvesting equipment is still at the experimental stage, and we doubt that mechanization will provide more than marginal relief during the next two years.

16. During the rest of 1964 and the first part of 1965, the *Castro government* will almost certainly obtain additional credits from Western European firms contracting to supply equipment to Cuba. Thereafter the availability of such credits will depend to a considerable degree on Cuban earnings from the 1965 sugar crop and on the prospects for exports in 1966. The outlook for both is unfavorable, and there will probably be some decline in the total value of Cuban exports. In this case, imports would almost certainly decline also, especially from the Free World, as Cuba's suppliers began to have doubts about Cuba's credit-worthiness. At least by 1966, and perhaps as early as 1965, Cuban foreign trade is likely to be below the 1964 level. However, we believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide Cuba sufficient credit assistance to prevent a seriously damaging drop in total imports.

17. The outlook for development of the industrial and construction sectors of the economy is closely related to the prospects for imports. With total imports likely to be no higher—and perhaps lower—than in 1964, there will be little opportunity to increase supplies of building materials, industrial raw materials, spare parts, and fuels. Any increases in industrial production and construction in 1965 and 1966 are likely to be small.

18. The regime's emphasis on technical education in the secondary schools and universities will tend, over the long term, to aid growth, especially in the industrial sector. This factor is not likely to have a major impact during the next two years, however. The program is still relatively new, the shortage of trained teachers is serious, and the regime has so far succeeded in carrying out only part of its planned massive shift of students to technical training.

19. In sum, we believe that the Cuban economy will operate at a low level for the next two years. Because of population growth, the individual living standard is likely to become slightly worse. Shortages of foodstuffs, housing, and many types of consumer goods will persist. The regime's prolonged failure to deliver the economic benefits it promised, together with its probable need to introduce additional belt-tightening measures, will be likely to narrow further its base of popular support.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

III. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

Current Situation

20. As the revolution has lost impetus, the regime has been shifting increasingly to methods of compulsion and repression in pressing ahead with its socialization program. The Cuban leaders are applying some measures borrowed from the Soviet Bloc without successfully adapting them to Cuban characteristics; they are not putting enough Latin flavor into a system which the Swiss ambassador in Havana has referred to as "Marxism cha-cha-cha." The regime has absorbed small industrial, service, and retail businesses into the massive government-run sector of the economy and has taken a number of steps in the socialization process. It has proclaimed three new laws in the past year: the Second Agrarian Reform, the Work Norm and Wage Classification Law, and the Obligatory Military Service Law. If fully implemented, the three laws will have a profound effect on practically all Cubans. They strike not only at the interests of those already disenchanting with the regime but also at the peasants and students, who make up much of Castro's strongest support.

21. The Second Agrarian Reform of October 1963 expropriated most farms over 165 acres. Some 7,000-8,000 farms have been affected, and state ownership of agricultural land has increased from approximately 40 percent to 70 percent. This, in itself, was a tremendous blow to Cuba's conservative rural sector; moreover, many smaller farmers are convinced that their turn will come soon, despite Fidel's repeated assurances to the contrary. The regime has been attempting to force the small farmers to sell all their products to the government collection agencies; but black marketing continues on a considerable scale. Within the last few weeks, the party newspaper *Hoy* has warned peasants who work on state farms that they must no longer keep cows or grow vegetable gardens of their own.

22. The work norm and wage scale system currently being introduced throughout Cuba will apply to agricultural as well as industrial labor. The regime has been moving cautiously in this field, seeking to strike a balance between the political desirability of keeping workers reasonably satisfied and the economic need to increase output and reduce cost through reallocation of workers on a major scale, and through improvement of the performance of the individual worker. The regime launched its work norm program on an experimental basis more than 18 months ago, and it has been sharply expanded this year. Workers are being fitted into eight salary classifications. The norms themselves are not high, but those who fall below them will lose pay and the regime plans gradually to raise norms. Already the traditional Christmas and vacation bonuses have been eliminated, the typical work week has been extended from 40 to 44 hours, and some holidays have been abolished. Regimentation of the labor force has been increased by the issuance of work cards to employed and unemployed.

23. The Obligatory Military Service Law is designed in part to provide a cheap labor force which the regime can use wherever it sees fit. Popular reaction has

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
- g. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 91-385
~~S-E-R-E-T~~ Document # 74

Smith 2617
S

Cy #2 to Bowdler

74

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

24 March 1966

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 4-66

SUBJECT: Castro, Model 1966

SUMMARY

Things have not been going well for Fidel or for the "revolutionary camp" with which he identifies in world affairs. In particular, he has been shaken by the overthrow of several heads of revolutionary government elsewhere and by the recently-uncovered assassination plot against him in Cuba. We think that his attitude in the face of these developments, together with his frustration over Cuba's continuing economic difficulties, is causing him to lose a measure of his rapport with the Cuban populace. This does not mean that his hold on power is imminently threatened, but it probably does mean that he will become gradually more vulnerable over a considerable period. There will, at the same time, be a somewhat greater chance that he might undertake risky or belligerent actions abroad.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
26 AUG 1992

~~S-E-R-E-T~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

1. In seven years of power Castro has changed a good deal. He has tended more and more to exaggerate his own importance and that of the Cuban revolutionary example in world affairs. He has, at the same time, been losing part of his charisma within Cuba, for the revolution he commands has aged but not prospered. He clearly finds himself under unusual pressures at the present time; his reactions to these are likely to move him further out of rapport with the Cuban populace.

2. Frustrations are not new for Fidel; his flamboyant career has been full of them. But the talents that brought victory in his revolt against Batista have not proved well-suited to the day-to-day business of political administration and economic decision-making. His regime has, for instance, been set back by its tendency to apply all sorts of theoretical principles in dogmatic, impractical fashion. As we pointed out some time ago, the leaders of the regime have failed all along to put enough Latin flavor into their "Marxism cha-cha-cha."* This has had a particularly strong limiting effect on Cuban economic progress as the regime has initiated, and then failed with, one

* See NIE 85-64: Situation and Prospects in Cuba, dated 5 August 1964.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

fine-sounding scheme after another. Cases in point are the original crash program of industrialization, the expropriation of land from many of the country's most productive farmers, an ineffectual schedule of work norms, and the reliance until a year ago on moral, rather than material incentives to stimulate worker productivity.

3. Of course many other things -- a large proportion of them outside his control -- have combined to hold Fidel's fortunes at relatively low ebb. The US economic denial program continues to exacerbate the regime's internal economic difficulties; low sugar prices hurt Cuba badly last year; bad weather has reduced the size of this year's crop. Communist China's refusal to supply promised quantities of rice this year is a further major irritant. Perhaps most serious of all as an impediment to Cuba's progress has been the continuing exodus or defection of many of the country's most talented and best trained people.

4. Prospects for parallel revolution elsewhere in Latin America are dim, at least for the short-run; Castroism as a political force in the area is virtually moribund. Try as Castro will to breathe fire and spirit into prospective

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

revolutionaries of other Latin American countries, he finds that the number actually willing to go to the barricades remains disappointingly small. And even while he declares his determination to aid and abet those who dare to take up arms, the Soviets warn him to keep risks low and the Chinese call him chicken for not doing enough.

5. To an increasing extent, Castro has come to picture the world as divided into two important parts. One is the revolutionary camp led by Cuba, the USSR and the other Communist countries; it also includes most newly-independent and in-between nations. The other is the counter-revolutionary camp led by the United States and including the other "imperialist" countries. Long and sincerely distressed by the Chinese-Soviet split, Fidel has felt that this hampers the progress of the revolutionary camp as a whole; prior to the time when the Chinese turned their wrath on him too, he had made a number of clumsy and unsuccessful offers to try to bring the two big Communist powers back into harmony.

6. While he continues to expound about the inevitable forward movement of the revolutionary camp, Fidel is obviously aware of the beatings taken recently by a number of his fellow

~~S-E -E-T~~

revolutionary-campers. For Castro, Ben Bella was friend as well as fellow revolutionary figure. Nkrumah was a leader with whom he had more than a little in common. The displacement of Sukarno in Indonesia, along with the mop-up of Communists there, came to Fidel as a nasty shock. He has expressed outrage, moreover, at the introduction of US military power to oppose the Communist advances in Vietnam; in recent months, he has repeatedly proclaimed that he would be willing to supply military equipment and volunteers from Cuba to aid Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

7. So far, however, Fidel has stopped short of any actions that might bring him into armed conflict with the US. He has not attempted to interfere with US U-2 overflights of Cuba. Moreover, his adherence to caution was notably evident in the case of the fighting in the Dominican Republic last year; with a classic opportunity to provide assistance to a leftist insurrection, Castro chose instead to avoid any risk of provoking US military response. We think the chances are that he will continue to exercise this same kind of prudence. However, in view of his growing discouragement over the reverses suffered by the revolutionary camp and his perturbation

- 5 -

~~S-E -E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

about the number of its leaders displaced by counter-revolutionaries, there will be a somewhat greater chance that Castro might resort to a risky or belligerent move. Such a move could take the form of a campaign to stop US overflights of Cuba or a renewal of pressures on the US naval base at Guantanamo; it might, on the other hand, involve direct provision of weapons or men from Cuba to assist an active insurgency -- perhaps in Vietnam, perhaps closer to home.

8. The recent assassination plot against Castro has obviously added to his worries. This conspiracy showed at least a modicum of sophistication and apparently stood an appreciable chance of success. Moreover, investigation by Castro's security officials has indicated that certain of Fidel's old military comrades, if not directly involved in the plot, appeared at least to be susceptible to the same kind of subversion. The regime's reaction has not, however, stopped with a thorough roll-up of the plotters and of suspect individuals on the fringes; it has gone on to set new standards of behavior, applicable to all Cuban officials. Unfortunately for Castro, however, purging Cubans for conspiring with imperialists, for lack of revolutionary militancy, or for flagrant corruption is

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

one thing; purging them for telling dirty stories or for civilized intercourse with pretty girls is quite another.

9. This moralistic attitude on Fidel's part is not entirely new, though it clearly is becoming more extreme. From the beginning his revolutionary credo has had a certain puritanical note out of tune with the general Cuban habit and temperament. Until now, however, most Cubans were able to forgive him his moral preachings because they knew Fidel was willing to rise above those occasionally in his personal life. A new moral rearmament approach, especially if long sustained, might antagonize considerable numbers of people who have so far remained backers of the regime. Indeed, Fidel could become so upright as to cause his eventual downfall.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 7 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

LEJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-29
Document # 80

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

8 MAR 1967
NIE 85-67
2 March 1967

8a


NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-67

(Supersedes NIE 85-65)

Key Issues and Prospects for Castro's Cuba

Submitted by


DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
2 MARCH 1967

Authenticated:


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Nº 459

MAR 2000

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Dr. Edward W. Proctor, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~WARNING~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE "EXPORT OF REVOLUTION"	3
II. THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP	5
III. CASTRO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US	8
IV. THE ECONOMY	8
Performance and Short-Run Prospects	8
Education and the Longer Run	10
V. CASTRO'S HOLD ON POWER	11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

KEY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR CASTRO'S CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the outlook over the next two years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Castro revolution has survived adversity, but it has not prospered. Increasingly the regime is keying its hopes for major material progress to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale education and long-term economic programs to be felt.

B. The level of the economy in 1966 was only slightly above that reached in 1958, the last prerevolutionary year; per capita private consumption was down nearly 25 percent, though favored groups in the population were better off. Economic gains in 1967 and 1968 will probably be minor, with little or no improvement in living conditions.

C. Fidel will almost certainly persist in providing encouragement and training support to "anti-imperialist" and insurgent movements abroad, and in extending material aid to a few of them. Poor prospects for success in Latin America help to account for his increased support to revolutionary elements in Africa, where there are more opportunities and fewer risks.

D. Differences about Communist revolutionary tactics and the amount of aid required by Cuba will continue to produce frictions in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. But Cuba remains important to the Soviets; they have little practical choice except to keep backing Fidel.

E. Castro has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution and has talked of sharing more responsibility with his inner circle.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of colleagues. We believe that he will remain clearly preeminent, however, and his hold on power will remain strong.

F. In the unlikely event of Fidel's death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; at some point it would probably give way to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

1. Castro's regime has survived for eight years, but much of the original impetus and appeal of his revolution has worn away. Castro has been forced to modify or stretch out a number of plans and goals set in the early years, and to settle back to a more prosaic and longer range approach. Though Castro retains his personal magnetism for many people, his government also relies heavily on repressive measures and elaborate security machinery. These patterns, along with Fidel's espousal of Marxism-Leninism and his dependence on the Soviet Union, have alienated many Latin Americans who once found the Cuban leader attractive.

1. THE "EXPORT OF REVOLUTION"

2. Generally speaking then, there has been little ready receptivity for Fidel's revolutionary exhortations in his natural target area, Latin America. Despite the persistent failures of the revolutionary groups he has supported in Latin American countries, he is clearly determined to provide selective support for such efforts. He has proclaimed that he would help "anti-imperialist" revolutionary movements anywhere in the world; he has sent teams of Cuban military personnel to several African countries; and he has pledged to send regular military units to North Vietnam if Hanoi requests them.

3. Castro's behavior in advocating and assisting revolution is not always logical and realistic. In the past few years, he has been canny enough to keep his risks low, but the fact is that he is a compulsive revolutionary. The form and extent of his efforts, vocal and material, vary with changing circumstances but the central theme remains constant. He insists that revolutionary violence is necessary to bring about any meaningful political change. He claims that when boldly led guerrilla units can take to the field and sustain themselves there, they will precipitate the conditions which will assure their eventual success.

4. These views have brought Castro into disagreement with Soviet leaders and into conflict with leaders of most of the principal Communist parties in Latin America. In November 1964, the Soviets helped to work out a compromise which called for support to insurgency efforts in a few Latin American countries, but specified that in all cases the local Communist Party should determine whether violent or peaceful means were to be pursued. Fidel soon began chipping at the edges of this agreement, and at the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966 in Havana he issued a more general call for insurgency in Latin America. This proved to be counterproductive: on the one hand, it failed to evoke discernible revolutionary response; on the other hand, it helped to precipitate counter-subversive moves by various Latin American governments.

5. Cuba's efforts to stimulate revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere have nonetheless continued; they have included Castro's own verbal proddings, the formation in Havana of a Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) to provide encouragement, the regular propaganda outpourings of Havana radio, and some

~~SECRET~~

Cuban training and material support.¹ Even so, insurgency movements in Latin America have lost, rather than gained, ground during the past year or two. The insurgency undertaken in Peru in mid-1965 was defeated and the organization largely destroyed. Guerrilla groups in Colombia remain small and fragmented and become active only sporadically. While the action of insurgents in Venezuela picked up in late 1966, it has not reached the menacing level of 1963. The insurgency in Guatemala, which broadened in 1966, has now slackened somewhat, and the Guatemalan military have become more effective in their efforts to deal with it. In other Latin American countries, despite Castro's urgings over the past year that revolutionists take up arms, none took up any. Fidel himself has increasingly complained that Latin Communist leaders spend all their time theorizing and debating instead of going out to fight.

6. In Africa, Castro's government has considerably expanded its assistance to various "anti-imperialist" regimes and organizations over the past two years. This has ranged from support of the Massamba-Debat regime in Congo (Brazzaville)² to helping movements directed against Portuguese African colonies. Castro has clearly felt that he could send teams of Cuban personnel into a number of African countries without running any particular risks.³ These

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

The number of Africans coming to Cuba has been steadily increasing. Some arrive for higher education and technical training. A small number are receiving guerrilla indoctrination and training in insurgency tactics; this is under the auspices of the Directorate General of Intelligence—the external operations branch of the Cuban Ministry of Interior.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cubans are evidently selected, in part, for darkness of skin so that they may be less conspicuous and more assimilable during their sojourn in the host countries.

7. Cuban propaganda to Africa has also increased markedly; indeed, the primary change since late 1965 in Radio Havana's international service has been to provide regular daily broadcasts to Africa in French, Portuguese, Spanish, and English. The Cuban Government has plans to begin broadcasts in Swahili, for up to eight hours daily, in 1968. The Soviets, in contrast to their notable differences with Castro on tactics in Latin America, seem reasonably content to have him undertaking these engagements with mutual friends in Africa.

8. We believe that during the next two years Castro will continue his activities in support of Latin American revolutionaries, waxing hotter on some occasions and cooler on others. In part because of the improving capabilities of Latin American security forces, and in part because of the waning appeal of Castroism, we do not think this will prove to be a serious threat. In several small countries of the Caribbean area, however, the political fabric is so fragile that turmoil brought on by other forces might lead to a situation which Fidel could exploit.

[REDACTED] With respect to Africa, we anticipate a gradual further build-up of the Cuban presence. In certain circumstances, a small Cuban force might again affect the outcome of a political crisis in one African country or another—as in Brazzaville in 1966. In any case, an increasing Cuban presence in Africa plus the return of Africans now training in Cuba are likely to give Castro a larger role in the African liberation movement.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(6)(c)

9. Of all the revolutionary movements he would like to help, Castro seems to have the strongest sentiments toward the National Liberation Front (and the North Vietnamese forces) in Vietnam. He has been deeply perturbed that the US has been able to carry out its military build-up and operations on the present scale without major counteraction by the Soviets. For many months, his government has been pressing the Soviet Union and other Communist governments to provide more effective military support for North Vietnam. He has implied that the Soviets lack fortitude, and has made repeated public pledges that if Hanoi requested them, he would send Cuban volunteers of whatever sort specified, even including regular military units with their equipment. We believe that if Hanoi did ask, Castro would try in one way or another to fulfill this promise.*

II. THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

10. For the Soviets, having Fidel on their side is hardly an unmixed blessing. Certain of the hopes they once had must now be dimmed—e.g., that they could use Cuba to enhance their offensive posture vis-à-vis the US; that the island

* There are already some Cuban military personnel—observers and perhaps a few technical or support personnel—in North Vietnam, but there almost certainly are no regular combat units present. Evidence on numbers is inconclusive.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

could become an effective distribution point for the dissemination of their doctrine in the hemisphere; that Cuban development could advertise the Communist way for other small countries. Castro's Cuba nevertheless remains important to Moscow: it represents one of the few victories for the Communist camp in recent years; it provides the only breakthrough in the Western Hemisphere. In terms of more immediate political considerations, the Soviets find it helpful to have the Cuban Government more or less with them—or at least not against them—in their moves to isolate China within the Communist camp. Finally, the Soviets almost certainly realize that they could not abandon Cuba without sustaining great damage to their prestige, especially vis-à-vis the US, and to the credibility of their commitments, especially within the Communist world.

11. The divergencies that have developed between Havana and Moscow are, however, as apparent as their common interests. They relate not only to their differences over Vietnam and about revolutionary tactics toward Latin America; they also have to do with what economic programs are suitable to Cuba and with the related problem of continued economic aid. Despite the Cuban economy's extraordinary dependence on Soviet assistance, Fidel has gone out of his way during the past year to stress that Cuba is developing its own Communist approach in the light of its own special circumstances. He has criticized the Soviets for impure Marxism-Leninism in their resort to "capitalist" material incentives in their own economy. And he has accused them of helping the enemies of the Cuban Revolution through extending economic aid to Chile and other Latin American governments.

12. When the Soviets accepted Fidel's embrace in 1961, they probably did not realize how expensive it would prove to be. Cuba has become the largest single recipient of Soviet economic aid. Over the span of 1962 through 1966, Cuba has used up nearly \$1.1 billion in economic credits and grants from the USSR. (This compares with Soviet disbursements of economic aid in the same period of \$518 million for India, \$331 million for Afghanistan, and \$251 million for the United Arab Republic.) In addition to providing credits and grants to Cuba, the USSR has been purchasing sugar from Cuba at prices considerably higher than world prices for most of the period since 1961.^{*} The cumulative value of the Soviet sugar subsidy has amounted to about \$350 million. Soviet military aid provided to Cuba since 1961 has amounted to an additional \$700 million.

13. We believe that the Soviets are resigned to continuing enough aid to keep the Cuban economy at least at its present level, and to provide some opportunity for growth. During the past five years, Soviet exports to Cuba have ranged from \$410 million in 1962 to \$470 million in 1966. Soviet credits to Cuba now seem to be keyed to making up the difference between a ceiling at about this 1966

^{*} The USSR paid 4 cents a pound for Cuban sugar in 1961 and 1962; it has paid 6 cents a pound since then. In January 1964, the Soviet Government agreed to buy the following amounts of Cuban sugar at the 6 cent rate: 2.1 million tons in 1965, 3 million in 1966, 4 million in 1967, and 5 million annually in 1968, 1969, and 1970.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

figure and the level of Cuban exports to the USSR. These credits probably will be reduced in 1967 and 1968 as a result of the expected increase in Cuban sugar production and consequently in exports to the USSR. The overall reduction in Soviet aid to the Cuban economy will be moderate, however, as lower aid in the form of credits will be offset in large part by what amounts to an increased Soviet subsidy for Cuban sugar. It is likely that the world market price for sugar, at least through 1967, will remain less than one-half the price paid by the USSR.

14. About 80 percent of Cuba's trade is now with Communist countries. The USSR in 1966 accounted for more than 50 percent of total Cuban imports and some 45 percent of total Cuban exports. We believe that the Soviets will continue to encourage Castro to trade somewhat more with non-Communist countries, but, for reasons noted in paragraphs 22, 23, and 24, we do not expect more than a marginal change in the pattern during the next two years.

15. Soviet provision of military equipment to Cuba is no longer large in volume, particularly in comparison with the high levels reached in 1962 and 1963. Some step-up in deliveries began in the last quarter of 1966, however, and continued in early 1967. We believe this is a phase of a continuing Soviet replacement and resupply program, designed to replenish the stocks used up and worn out by the Cubans. In a few cases, the new items are more advanced than those which were already in Cuba, and the result will be to strengthen some Cuban units. For example, at least 11 Mig-21D jet fighters (limited all-weather capability) have been delivered to Cuba since October 1966. Also new for Cuba, though a standard ground-support weapon in the USSR since 1954, is the 200 mm multiple rocket launcher; there are now 25-30 of these in Cuba. We have also noted certain additions to Cuban holdings of naval equipment—six more KOMAR cruise-missile boats, making 18 altogether, and two more SO-1 subchasers, giving Cuba eight of this class, as well as six older ones. Further replenishments and some other new items will probably be delivered over the next two years; indeed, the rate of resupply may pick up slightly because a number of items in the Cuban inventory have reached or are approaching a nonoperational condition.*

16. We do not believe that the Soviets will again try to turn Cuba into a strategic base of their own, as in 1962. We think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. We recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability clandestinely to reintroduce the components of a strategic weapon system. But the build-up of strategic forces in the USSR in recent years would make the installation of strategic weapons in Cuba of less significance to the Soviet strategic posture than in 1962. In any event, we believe that the risk of another grave confrontation with the US would be unacceptable to the Soviets.

* Examples of such items are: trucks and prime movers for artillery which simply wear out, Mig-15 and Mig-17 jets which are sometimes cracked up before they wear out, and surface-to-air missiles which have definite, limited operational lives.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17. While the Soviets could derive a limited practical advantage from using Cuba as a base for logistical support to submarine patrols, we think that in this case too they would see the risk of adverse US response as outweighing the potential benefit. The Soviets might, on the other hand, consider making defensive use of Cuba by installing a strategic warning facility on the island. Theoretically at least, certain types of over-the-horizon radar could cover most of the continental US from Cuba, and possibly improve by some 15 minutes the USSR's present warning time of missile attack—provided, of course, that the data could be reliably passed to the Soviet Union. Such a facility might be publicly announced as a space-tracking station.

III. CASTRO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US

18. Castro has a deep and abiding animosity toward the US. To begin with, he has a full measure of the anti-Yankee sentiment instinctive with so many revolutionary Latin Americans. Added to this are resentment over the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis and the continuing US economic denial program, and a strong feeling against US policy in Vietnam. To Fidel, recent developments in Vietnam have been a source of particular indignation: he views the war there as a test of his doctrine of guerrilla revolution against "imperialist" powers and "reactionary" governments, particularly the US and those it supports. He is also doubtless aware that his stance on Vietnam attracts favorable attention to him in many quarters of the world. And the Vietnam situation probably gives him some inner personal concern about how far the USSR will go to support a small Communist state if doing so risks conflict with the US.

19. All things considered, we believe the chances are remote for any significant improvement in Castro's attitude toward the US in the next year or so—particularly if the Vietnam war goes on. Even if it were settled, his underlying fear of, and hostility toward, the US—as well as his interest in fostering revolutions abroad—would remain strong obstacles to any major betterment of US-Cuban relations.

IV. THE ECONOMY

Performance and Short-Run Prospects

20. The Cuban economy has made little progress since Castro took power. Though the gross national product has moved slightly beyond the level reached before the revolution, on a per capita basis it has declined about 10 percent, and living conditions are generally lower. Total goods available for private consumption have remained about the same since 1961, and the increase in population has meant that per capita private consumption has been steadily falling. In 1966, per capita private consumption was nearly 25 percent below the prerevolutionary level. By no means all Cubans are worse off, however. Many in the party and military, among the students, and among those who had been extremely poor now undoubtedly find their economic lot better.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21. The year 1966 was one of economic setback because of the poor sugar harvest—less than 4.5 million metric tons compared to more than 6 million in the previous year. The primary cause of the reduced crop was a severe drought in 1965, but the application of less fertilizer was also a factor. No net gains were made in the industrial and construction sectors. In spite of the drought, there was a significant improvement in nonsugar agriculture, reversing the downward trend evident since 1961. This improvement was not enough, however, to offset the fall in sugar production. The supply of goods and services available to the economy in 1966 was about the same as in 1965 because of increased assistance from abroad. While there was no evident decline in overall availability of foodstuffs in Cuba during 1966, a sharp cut in supplies of rice (an important Cuban staple) caused the rice ration to be reduced by half and produced irritation among consumers. The rice problem resulted from the cut in Communist China's exports of rice to Cuba from 250,000 metric tons in 1965 to 135,000 in 1966. A number of other basic foodstuffs are also still being rationed.

22. Cuba's total trade deficit in 1966 was about \$265 million, or some 45 percent larger than in 1965. Most of the foreign credits obtained by Cuba during 1966 came from the USSR; drawings on credits from other Communist countries were negligible. Cuba's total debt to all Communist countries now runs to some \$1.3 billion. Cuba's drawing against credits provided by non-Communist countries amounted to about \$70 million during 1966. Its holdings of convertible currency at the end of 1966 were some \$50 million, and its total indebtedness to non-Communist countries was close to \$100 million, largely accumulated within the past three years.

23. The Castro government will continue to obtain credits from non-Communist countries during the next several years. But it cannot long continue to build up its indebtedness to these countries at the pace of 1966. Therefore, Cuba will need to hold down imports from non-Communist countries in the next two years, even though Cuban export earnings in the free world may increase somewhat, particularly if the world price of sugar rises. In any case, there will be little shift in Cuba's trade pattern away from its strong orientation to the Communist camp—and especially the Soviet Union.

24. The output of the Cuban economy will probably rise somewhat in 1967 and 1968, primarily as a result of a rise in sugar production. The sugar harvest in 1967 will be on the order of six million metric tons—perhaps more. Given reasonably good weather and fairly effective operation of the new cane collection centers, the harvest will again increase in 1968. Even so there will probably be little improvement in the total supply of goods in Cuba. Cuba's capacity to import from non-Communist countries is not likely to improve much, and, for reasons noted in paragraph 13, increased Cuban sugar exports to the USSR in 1967 and 1968 will probably not mean an increase in the present level of Soviet exports to Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25. Cuba's limited ability to increase imports will continue to restrict its supply of industrial raw materials, semifinished goods, and building materials. Consequently, we expect little change in either industrial production or construction activity during the next two years. The outlook for nonsugar agriculture is not so clear; on the basis of past performance we think gains will be moderate in 1967 and 1968. In sum, the general economic outlook is for only minor gains in 1967 and 1968, and little or no improvement in living conditions.

26. Despite this prospect, we do not expect the Castro administration to make major changes in economic policy during the next two years. Various Cuban officials have spoken about a return to greater emphasis on the development of industry, as opposed to the current emphasis on agriculture, but they also note that this is out of the question before 1970. Fidel has recently been criticizing material incentives as un-Communist as well as ineffective; for all his talk about these in earlier years, however, his government never relied much on them in practice. Castro has long been pressing, though without notable success, to remove employees from the swollen bureaucracy and make them available for more productive work. The administration's hopes to correct the economy's low productivity seem to center on the application of better technology, increased use of fertilizer, and some improvement in management and in the mobilization of labor; efforts in these fields are unlikely to have significant effect for some years.

Education and the Longer Run

27. Increasingly, the Castro regime is having to key its hopes to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale programs of primary education to be greater. A major tenet of Castro's revolution from the outset has been to stress the role which the younger generation would some day play—an emphasis of special importance in a country where 40 percent of the population is now under 15 years old. Some 2,000,000 full and part-time students are enrolled in Cuban educational institutions. Many of them are in the basic program to teach peasants and laborers to read and write. But the full-time enrollment of young people has also sharply increased compared with prerevolutionary years; and the government presently furnishes scholarships to more than 150,000 of these. Perhaps 30,000 are now studying at the universities; this number is to expand substantially over the next few years. The government has also been putting increasing emphasis on technical education; there are now, for example, nearly 20,000 taking training in agrarian technology.

28. These Cuban programs have many weaknesses, one of the most glaring being the quality of the teaching. Nevertheless, because the beginning point for much of the population was so low and the scope of the effort has become so large, we think the effect on Cuba over the next decade or two is bound to be significant. On the economic side, in particular, we believe this will gradually bring enough gain in technical competence to improve productivity. We are more inclined to doubt the long-run effectiveness of the ideological indoctrina-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

tion, even though it permeates the whole educational system. We suspect there is much more parroting of Marxist phrases than there is absorption of doctrine; we doubt that the magnetism of communism would be strong to Cubans if it were not coupled with *Fidelismo* and its accompanying revolutionary mythology. The system is probably effective, however, in closing the minds of the younger generation to political systems other than the one they know.

V. CASTRO'S HOLD ON POWER

29. The Cuban Government is still very much a one-man show; Fidel's flamboyant personality continues to dominate the scene. He remains a superb demagogue and an effective political tactician. He is capable of inspiring loyalty or fear in his chosen subordinates and of whipping up enthusiasm among the Cuban masses. It is true that, over time, this mass appeal has diminished considerably as various popular hopes have been disappointed.

[REDACTED]

30. Now 40 years old, Castro enjoys exceptional energy and stamina, and is in reasonably good health.

[REDACTED]

1.5(a)(d)
3.4(b)(6)(c)

31. The Castro regime's security organizations have become increasingly proficient; there is no longer any significant organized opposition within Cuba. Those Cubans who become thoroughly dissatisfied think it more prudent to find means, legal or illegal, to go into exile than to stay and try to work against the regime.⁷ The number of political prisoners in Cuba has steadily grown; it is

⁷ When in October 1965 Castro announced his "open-door" policy for refugees, some 250,000 Cubans hurried to put their names on the eligibility lists. Probably several hundred thousand more Cubans would like to depart and would sign up were it not for the regime's penalties against them. In its first year the US refugee airlift carried about 45,000 to the US, and there remains a backlog which would take the airlift years to transport.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

now on the order of 25,000 to 50,000. The regime also has a relatively new system of forced labor camps; called Military Units to Aid Production, these are made up of conscripts, 18 and over, who are considered "undesirable elements" by the regime and judged unreliable for induction into the regular armed services. Probably 25,000 to 30,000 men are now serving in these camps, generally under degrading conditions.

32. [REDACTED]

33. [REDACTED] Fidel has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution. He has set up a Communist Party framework along the classic lines—and then put his own faithful Fidelistas in the controlling positions. The eight-man Politburo, which Fidel heads and which is composed entirely of men who were associated with his 26th of July Revolutionary Movement, is clearly the power-wielding group of the party. It was members of this group whom Fidel recently named, one by one, when he spoke of sharing additional responsibilities with other leaders.⁸ By contrast, the Old Communists—those who belonged to the party when Castro fought his revolution—have no representation in the Politburo, and have been gradually phased out of key cabinet jobs as well.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(i)(ii)

34. The Cuban Communist Party *per se*, however, is far from being an effective organization for the exercise of power. Neither it, nor any one entity among the military and security organizations, provides a single, sure mechanism

*Members of the Politburo:

Fidel Castro	Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and President of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform.
Raúl Castro	Vice Prime Minister, Second Secretary of the Communist Party, and Minister of the Armed Forces.
Osvaldo Dorticós	President of the Republic and head of the Economic Commission of the Central Committee.
Juan Almeida	First Vice Minister of the Armed Forces.
Ramiro Valdes	Minister of the Interior.
Armando Hart	Secretary of Organization for the Central Committee and Chairman of the Education Committee of the Central Committee.
Guillermo García	A member of the Army General Staff and former Commander of the Western Army.
Sergio del Valle	Vice Minister of the Armed Forces.

Except for Dorticós and Hart, each of these men holds the rank of major (comandante), the highest rank in the Cuban military establishment.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for running the country. Fidel holds the pieces together; his control of all the reins of power is at once the strength and potential weakness of the government.

35. In the unlikely event of Castro's death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós, and perhaps including other members of the present Politburo or top military commanders, would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; sooner or later it would probably give way to some form of power struggle. The outcome of such a contest for power in Cuba is unpredictable.

[REDACTED] The effect on Cuba's foreign affairs is beyond useful speculation.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~
50



BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM

Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba

~~SECRET~~

21 November 1967
No. 10-67

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

12 FEB 1997

Over

~~WARNING~~

~~This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~



~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 November 1967

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 10-67

SUBJECT: Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba *

INTRODUCTION

Brezhnev thinks that Castro is some kind of idiot, and Castro probably isn't very fond of Brezhnev either. This is still supposed to be a secret, but other symptoms of serious strain in the Soviet-Cuban relationship have become publicly conspicuous. The bonds which join them still seem to be much stronger than the issues which divide them; nevertheless, the Soviets may now be close to losing their patience, and the Castroites never had very much to begin with.

* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research.

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Bolsheviks have always proceeded from the fact that socialist revolution is not ... a conspiracy of a group of heroes Experience shows that ... manifestations of national insularity inevitably weaken the positions of communists in the face of the class enemy Marxists-Leninists have always understood that socialism cannot be transplanted from one country to the other by means of armed force

-- Brezhnev, 3 November 1967

1. The mixed blessings of alliance with Castro's Cuba have never been so dramatically demonstrated as during the events surrounding the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations. For one thing, the Cubans directly affronted the Soviets by appointing a member of Castro's third team to head the Cuban delegation to the Moscow festivities after the Soviets had officially announced the planned attendance of Cuban president Dorticos. For another, either because of Soviet insistence or Havana's resistance, this worthy did not even deliver the customary congratulatory address to his Soviet hosts. Next, the Cubans compounded the insult by boycotting the traditional diplomatic reception in Moscow presided over by Soviet chief of state Podgorny. And finally, lest anyone miss the point, the Cubans were the first to leave Moscow after the celebrations were over (presumably racing the Rumanians to the airport for the honor).

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

2. The Soviets for their part demonstrated little of the restraint that has heretofore characterized the public handling of their recalcitrant Caribbean ally. Just prior to the anniversary gathering in Moscow, Soviet publications carried obituaries of Che Guevara, and also articles by two of Moscow's more obedient Latin American communist party leaders, that seemed to challenge the value of Castro's revolutionary philosophy and to convey -- concerning Guevara's death -- more of a smug "we told you so" than an expression of sympathy to the bereaved. In any case, the Soviets reacted to the Cuban diplomatic snubs during the anniversary celebrations with a measure of acrimony. For example, in his lengthy discourse on the achievements of the "Great October," Brezhnev took an oblique but unmistakable swipe at Castro's support of rebellions elsewhere in Latin America and even at Castro's personalized and heroic style of revolution (see quotation above).

3. Clearly, a low point has been reached in the relationship of the two communist partners. The question thus arises as to whether the divergencies that have been accumulating over the past few years and have now broken more blatantly into the open augur any fundamental change in Moscow's support of the Cuban regime.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

4. Although Castro himself has in the past alluded to attempts by Moscow's supporters in Latin America to persuade the Soviets to join the "economic blockade" of Cuba, apparently he has long judged that Moscow could not afford to suspend or curtail its economic assistance. In fact, Castro has evidently felt so confident of the USSR's inability to abandon support of Cuba that his spokesmen have in effect endorsed Albanian criticism of Soviet assistance as a "yoke on the shoulders" of recipients, thus demonstrating Cuba's ability to defy the hand that feeds it. True, Castro has at times displayed some sensitivity to Soviet views on one issue or another, but Moscow's official positions are rarely an overriding consideration in his pursuit of causes either at home or abroad. Indeed, the modest Cubans have specifically criticized the USSR's management of its own affairs, its interference in Cuban affairs, its handling of the Vietnam war and the Middle East crisis, its aid to Latin American governments, and its attitude toward revolutionary tactics in the Third World.

5. A number of reports suggest that -- in the face of all this -- the Soviet leaders are now prepared to get tough if Castro does not mend his ways. One of the more interesting and

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

reliable reports cites a Brezhnev conversation with leaders of a European communist party during the height of the Middle East crisis. Brezhnev is said to have launched into an emotional tirade against Castro's domestic and foreign policy "fantasies." He claimed that the Soviet Union has never had such an "expensive friend" as Cuba, and then threatened that if Castro did not soon come to his senses Cuba "cannot last," since the Soviets were unprepared to keep the Cuban leader "afloat" indefinitely. At one point in the conversation, Brezhnev went so far as to compare the Cubans unfavorably with the Chinese -- a line that was recently echoed in Pravda by a Latin American communist party leader.

6. This is not to say, of course, that the Soviets do not see some advantages in their alliance with Cuba. Surely, they are pleased to point to their sponsorship of a socialist "beacon" in the Western Hemisphere, and they are well aware that Cuba stands as a symbol of Soviet willingness and ability to provide support even to remote allies. They recognize that their relationship with Cuba serves as a reminder of the USSR's status as a global power and as a propaganda device with which to taunt the US. They are also happy at times with Castro's nuisance value vis-a-vis the US.

- 5 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

7. By now, however, the Soviets must be increasingly impressed with the liabilities associated with their support of Castro's Cuba. They are painfully aware that their economic aid alone has cost them an average of roughly \$300 million annually since 1961 (a figure including drawn credits and grants as well as the sugar purchase subsidy). They know that Cuba's importance as a model for other fledgling nations has greatly diminished. More important, they have found that Cuba does not afford them a good foothold for incursions into other Latin American states. Castro's alienation of a majority of Latin American communist party leaders, his insistence on the need for revolutionary change through violent tactics, and his refusal to cooperate with less militant and non-communist forces of the left in Latin America have created more difficulties than opportunities for Moscow.

8. The Soviets' relationship with Castro thus provides them with a continuing demonstration that the burdens imposed by commitments to small allies can exceed the benefits. But how to disengage when the political and economic costs of a commitment exceed the returns? Specifically, how could the Soviets pull out of Cuba and look at the world or themselves in the morning? It would be a confession of monumental failure -- the first and

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

only socialist enterprise in the New World abandoned -- and it would seriously damage Soviet prestige and be widely interpreted as a victory of sorts for the United States.

9. It is true, however, that the Soviets have had some considerable practical experience in these matters -- in Yugoslavia, in China, and in Albania. A special set of circumstances governed Moscow's actions in each of these cases, but there were some similarities in Soviet behavior. In each instance, the Soviets sought through subversion or economic pressure or both to bring the other party to heel. In each instance, of course, the Soviets failed and then withdrew. Public disclosure of the seriousness of the situation and an open exchange of insults did not occur until the relationship had already passed the point of no return. The Soviets, of course, insisted in each case that their withdrawal had been compelled by the sins and crimes of the other side. Finally, in each of these cases, the Soviets were willing to withdraw even at the risk of great harm to their national prestige and the unity of the communist movement at large.

10. Cuba is, of course, a special case and poses different problems. Moreover, times have changed, Khrushchev no longer reigns in Moscow, and the present Soviet leaders are surely more

- 7 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

cautious than he. Then too, given his personal peculiarities and enthusiasms, there can be no assurance that Castro's upset will persist. Relations between Castro and the USSR almost reached the name-calling stage after the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba in 1962, but in May 1963 Castro journeyed to the Soviet Union and there proclaimed that he had received a "magnificent impression of Comrade Khrushchev without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects I have ever known." Thus, Castro in 1967, having just snubbed the 50th anniversary ceremonies, might conceivably travel to the USSR in 1968 and put his fickle arms around Brezhnev. The Soviets for their part could swallow their pride and accept the embrace. For that matter, assuming no effort to make up, it is conceivable that the Soviets and the Cubans could maintain their alliance in some kind of repair for the indefinite future, even if their quarrels should break completely into the open.

11. Given the strong motives of each side to maintain their relationship, we do not believe that Soviet-Cuban difficulties will come to a head in the near term or that Soviet-Cuban ill-will is likely to lead to a break in relations comparable to, say, the Sino-Soviet split. But with each side apparently believing that

- 8 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

the other cannot afford to become really obstreperous, either or both could easily make a major miscalculation. The emotional content of the quarrel, obviously intense on the part of the Latins, now seems to have assumed considerable proportions on the Russian side as well. The effects of this emotionalism cannot be predicted, but symptoms of stress should be watched for. If the quality of Sino-Soviet polemics is an indication, then it would appear that, once exposed, Communist nerves are as raw as everybody else's, maybe rawer.

12. If the Soviets should threaten to curtail their economic support unless the Cubans behave themselves in Latin America -- and perhaps Kossygin dropped a hint of this when he visited Havana last June -- Castro's reaction might be unrestrained. The Soviets, in turn, might not be of a mind to humor any such lack of restraint. Perhaps indeed, they have already entered just such a process of moves and countermoves made in hurt and rage. Perhaps in the end, if the Soviets really do get tough, Castro might feel impelled to make important concessions. That,

- 9 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

at any rate, would seem to be the way to survival. But a high faith in his own skill and rectitude might blind Castro to the costs and risks of defying the Soviets.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 10 -

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

- ROUTINE

14

PAGE 1 OF 71PAGES

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

Abstract

CITE

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

DIST 28 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOJ DECEMBER 1967

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT VIEWS [REDACTED] 3.4(b)
CONCERNING FIDEL
CASTRO AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA; THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA; AND CUBAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET THEORIES
OF REVOLUTION.

ACQ

FIELD NO.

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL

TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH; NAVY DNI,
ADMIRAL FLUCKEY; AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

TO FBI: FOR MR. S. J. PAPICH

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY:

CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT RIPE FOR ARMED

• ~~SECRET~~

clarification:

© 2000 Blackwell Science Ltd

1.5(e)

3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
12 FEB 1997

IN

PAGE 2 OF 11 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

REVOLUTION ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN LATIN AMERICA IS SELF-DEFEATING BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VARYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH COUNTRY, IT SEEKS TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER INDIGENOUS REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, AND REFLECTS THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY FAULTY PLANNING AND POOR EXECUTION AND HAVE BEEN DAMAGING TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA HAS SHIFTED FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE. IT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND HOPES IN A FEW YEARS TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IT REJECTS THE CUBAN SUPPORTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY OF THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER, DOUGLAS BRAVO. WHILE THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION BOTH CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE, THE SOVIET THEORY IS MORE FLEXIBLE. THE SOVIET LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS CANNOT TRY TO ELIMINATE CASTRO, HOWEVER, FOR WITHOUT HIM THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THE UNITED STATES COULD BE TOLERATING CASTRO BECAUSE HE AIDS IMPERIALISM BY DESTROYING LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

FIDEL CASTRO, CUBA, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMED REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. ARMED REVOLUTION IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA BECAUSE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST. FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE HAVE PROVED THIS CONCLUSIVELY. CONTINUED ATTEMPTS AT ARMED REVOLUTION WOULD RESULT IN THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND LEADERS. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF PERMANENTLY ABANDONING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, ONLY OF ADJUSTING TO CURRENT REALITIES. IF SOME DAY ARMED REVOLUTION BECOMES AN APPROPRIATE FORM OF STRUGGLE, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) WILL RESORT TO IT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE PARTY IS WORKING DILIGENTLY ON CREATING A NEW ARMED ENTITY CAPABLE OF MOUNTING AN INSURRECTION. THIS PARAMILITARY ARM WILL OPERATE MAINLY IN THE CARACAS AREA. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE MADE THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENT AND HAVE SHIFTED THE STRUGGLE TO THE POLITICAL ARENA. IN GUATEMALA THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ARE BETTER THAN ELSEWHERE, BUT STILL ARE NOT GOOD. CHILE IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE A COMMUNIST REGIME COULD COME TO POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5 2. FIDEL CASTRO'S POLICY OF EXPORTING VIOLENT REVOLUTION TO
4
3 THE LATIN AMERICA IS BASED ON FANTASY, NOT REALITY. THIS IS PARTLY
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 4 OF 11 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [REDACTED] (classification) (dissem controls)

BECAUSE CASTRO GETS ERRONEOUS INFORMATION FROM LATIN AMERICANS WHO HAVE PERSONAL AND SPECIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS TO ADVANCE. THE UNAVOIDABLE RESULT HAS BEEN A SERIES OF REVERSES AND DISASTERS. CASTRO HAS THUS BECOME A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO ALL LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. THE OVERRIDING PROBLEMS THAT CASTRO POSES FOR LATIN AMERICA ARE PROBLEMS OF "CONTROL" AND "INTERVENTION" BY HIS INSISTENCE ON CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS HE SUPPORTS. CASTRO SEES THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS A CONTINENTAL REVOLUTION BUT ACTUALLY THE FACTORS AND FORCES IN THE FUNDAMENTAL SITUATION ALL HAVE NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE DIFFERENT IN EACH COUNTRY. THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN EACH COUNTRY MUST CONTROL THEIR MOVEMENTS AND ARE BEST ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS.

3. AGGRAVATING THE PROBLEM IS THE FACT THAT CASTRO IS FACING A SERIOUS INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS STEMMING FROM HIS ONE-MAN RULE. SINCE CASTRO MAKES ALL THE DECISIONS, MANY OF THEM ARE INEVITABLY WRONG AND THE WHEELS OF GOVERNMENT MOVE SLOWLY. ANOTHER RESULT OF HIS PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP IS THE FAILURE TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE REGIME. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1...

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

[REDACTED] IN SPITE OF CASTRO'S DOMESTIC FAILURES, HE STILL HAS POPULAR SUPPORT IN CUBA BUT HOW LONG HE CAN CONTINUE WITH UNFULFILLED YEARLY PROMISES OF BREAD IS VERY UNCERTAIN. SHOULD HE BE SUCCEEDED BY HIS BROTHER RAUL, THE ENSUING RULE BY VIOLENCE AND TERROR WOULD NOT LAST LONG, FOR WITHOUT FIDEL THE REGIME WOULD FALL.

4. AS AN HISTORICAL FIGURE CASTRO IS IMPORTANT TO ALL LATIN AMERICA, AND SO IS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, BUT ONLY AS AN INSPIRATION, NOT AS A MODEL. LATIN AMERICA MUST BE GRATEFUL FOR CASTRO'S SHOWING THAT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION IS POSSIBLE JUST NINETY MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES, EVEN IF HIS REVOLUTION WAS NOT A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION. CASTRO WAS NOT A COMMUNIST THEN. IN FACT, HIS REVOLUTION FOUGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. TODAY, WHO KNOWS WHAT CASTRO IS? PERHAPS HE IS AN "IRREGULAR COMMUNIST."

5. THE FAULTINESS OF CUBAN PLANNING IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE AND THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA, FOR WHICH BOTH CASTRO AND GUEVARA ARE RESPONSIBLE. WHILE GUEVARA'S DEATH WAS A GREAT DISASTER AND A WORLD TRAGEDY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW GUEVARA COULD

5
4
3
2
1

SECRET [REDACTED]

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 6 OF 11 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

COMMIT SUCH A BLUNDER AS TO GO TO BOLIVIA AND PERSONALLY LEAD THE ARMED STRUGGLE. HE WAS ACTUALLY A FOREIGNER IN BOLIVIA AND NEEDED AN INTERPRETER TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE. ONE CUBAN INSTRUMENT TO CONTROL REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA IS THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LASO IS A NEGATIVE FACTOR AND AN ELEMENT OF DIVISION; IT WILL NOT LAST LONG.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA AND DOUGLAS BRAVO, LEADER OF THE DISSIDENT ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) SEEKS TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES AND ADVANCE ITS INTERESTS BY POLITICAL MEANS THROUGH A LEFTIST FRONT AND WITHOUT TERRORISTS. IN SHIFTING TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE THE PCV LEADERSHIP IS UNQUESTIONABLY RIGHT. ALL PLANS OF THE PCV ARE BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IS STABLE AND SUCCESSFULLY REFORMIST IN NATURE. THIS IMPORTANT "TRANSFORMATION" HAS CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO CHANNEL DISCONTENT ALONG THE LINES OF ARMED STRUGGLE THE PCV PREFERS SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND JUDGES THAT WITHIN A FEW YEARS THERE IS THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PARTY MAY BE ABLE TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE PARTY WILL

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 7 OF 11 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

CERTAINLY PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND WILL HAVE CANDIDATES. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO PERMIT THIS SINCE IT WILL BE CONVENIENT FOR IT TO DO SO. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PCV IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE MAIN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN VENEZUELA ARE THE PCV, THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF NATIONALIST INTEGRATION (PRIN), THE PRIETO WING OF THE RULING DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (AD), AND THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE (FDP).

7. DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS DISSIDENT COMMUNIST FALN DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING FORCE. BRAVO REPRESENTS STRICTLY A CUBAN EFFORT AND IF CASTRO WITHDRAWS HIS SUPPORT, BRAVO'S EFFORTS WOULD COLLAPSE IN "TWO MINUTES." [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN MAY 1967 BRAVO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FUNDS FROM CHINA THAT WERE BEING HELD UP BY THE CUBANS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] WHILE BRAVO IS BRAVE AND DARING, HIS IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL IS LOW. A MEASURE OF HIS STUPIDITY IS THAT HE STILL VIEWS THE REVOLUTION AS A MILITARY PROBLEM. IN ACTUAL FACT, BRAVO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE ONLY ISOLATED TERRORIST ACTS. ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZES

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 8 OF 11 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

OPERATIONS IN RURAL AREAS, FOR EVERY TERRORIST ACT HE CARRIES OUT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE ARE NINETEEN IN THE CITY. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCORD BETWEEN THE PCV AND DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS GUERRILLA FORCES.

8. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CUBAN PROBLEMS, CASTRO IS DESPERATE FOR A FOREIGN VICTORY AND IS PRESSURING BRAVO TO GO INTO ACTION AND ACHIEVE SOME VICTORIES. BRAVO, HOWEVER, IS UNABLE TO DELIVER THE VICTORIES THAT CASTRO WANTS AND NEEDS. TENSION IS MOUNTING BETWEEN BRAVO AND HAVANA BECAUSE BRAVO IS NOT SO STRONG AS HE HAS LED CASTRO TO BELIEVE AND, IN FACT, IS GETTING WEAKER.

COMMENT:

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

FRICITION

EXISTED BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND THE VENEZUELAN IN BRAVO'S FORCES AND THE CUBANS INTENDED TO INFORM FIDEL CASTRO THAT BRAVO HAD GROSSLY EXAGGERATED THE SIZE OF HIS FORCES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS FEATS.

CUBAN, CHINESE AND SOVIET THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

9. THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION ARE SIMILAR, BOTH CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, CALL FOR A LONG WAR BY THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEASANTS. THE CHINESE HAVE NO

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 9 OF 11 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

INFLUENCE OR IMPORTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA. THE CUBAN THEORY CALLS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE BY SMALL GROUPS OF GUERRILLAS USING SMALL ARMS, NOT HEAVY WEAPONS. JULES REGIS DEBRAY IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE. WHILE DEBRAY IS NO DOUBT THE AUTHOR OF REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION, HIS BOOK IS BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE, TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, AND IRRELEVANT TO LATIN AMERICA. INTEREST IN THE BOOK WILL DIMINISH TO JUST NOTHING.

10. THE SOVIET THEORY OF REVOLUTION CALLS FOR ALL FORMS AND METHODS OF STRUGGLE. THERE IS NO SINGLE FORM THAT CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. TO FAVOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE ALONE IS PURE DOGMATISM. THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE A SINGLE LINE OR POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA. THEIR LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF A SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS ARE PROVIDING NEITHER FINANCIAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PCV AND ARE NOT DICTATING WHAT THE PCV POLICY SHOULD BE. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PCV AND MOSCOW ARE "FRATERNAL EXCHANGES."

COMMENT:

THE PCV RECEIVES A SUBSIDY FROM ABROAD. IT IS BELIEVED THIS SUBSIDY COMES FROM THE USSR.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 10 OF 11 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

12. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT HAS, OF COURSE, ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. IN LATIN AMERICA, HOWEVER IT HAS ALSO HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT. IT HAS ENCOURAGED THE COMMUNIST LEADERS TO SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTION AND HAS PROMOTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE. PRECISELY ONE OF THE BAD EFFECTS OF CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TO "PUT LEADERS TO SLEEP" BY ATTEMPTING TO DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT TENDS TO COUNTER THAT.

13. CASTRO POSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT IT TOO IS DANGEROUS FOR THEM TO TRY TO ELIMINATE HIM. WITHOUT CASTRO, THE REGIME WOULD SOON FALL, AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO THE VIEW THAT CASTRO IS AN UNWITTING COLLABORATOR OF IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA FOR CASTRO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS DISASTERS OF SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA AND THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE. IT COULD WELL BE THAT THE UNITED STATES TOLERATES CASTRO BECAUSE CASTRO AIDS "IMPERIALISM" BY DESTROYING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, THUS DOING GREAT DAMAGE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO COMMUNIST PARTIES. SECURITY LEAKS IN CUBA COULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH DISASTERS AS THE GUERRILLA LANDING ^{AT} MACHURUCUTO ON

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1
1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES

[REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

THE COAST OF VENEZUELA, THE ARREST OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
COURIER BELTRAMINI, AND THE BOLIVIAN FAILURE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED] DISSEM: [REDACTED] SOUTHCOM ONLY, CINCLANT ONLY:

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5
4
3
2
1

[REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-31-2004 BY 60322
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 95-364
Document # 31

Secret

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America: 1959-1968

Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW

Secret

No 1

16 February 1968
SC No. 00757/68A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

12 FEB 1997

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

WARNING

The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

THE SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~No Foreign Dissem~~

CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: 1959-1968

The essence of the Castro regime's policy on armed rebellion in the hemisphere was established in the early months of the regime's existence and has not materially changed since then. The record shows that "export of the revolution" has been a dominant ambition of Castro's next to maintaining his own firm grip on power at home. Indeed, the Cuban leader is a "compulsive revolutionary"; a man who sees himself as another Simon Bolivar, destined to bring a new "freedom and unity" to Latin America.

Castro has been consistent in this dream, although he has pursued it with varying degrees of intensity since 1959. Moreover, he has shown himself capable of modulating his overt and covert support for revolution in Latin America, depending on his assessment of the factors governing the situation. The evidence is overwhelming that Cuba made special adventurist efforts in 1967 to establish "other Cubas and Vietnams" in Latin America.

Castro has been singularly unsuccessful, however, in achieving any real breakthroughs in the hemisphere. Despite nine years of effort, no guerrilla group in Latin America constitutes a serious threat to any government today. The demise of the Guevara-led venture in Bolivia proves that even when Cuba puts its "first team" into a country, it will be doomed to failure in the absence of real popular support for the guerrilla cause. On the other hand, while these harassments are minor and containable, they pose expensive challenges to the Latin American governments involved, and force them to tie up resources that are badly needed elsewhere.

Early Years

Castro waged his revolution during 1957 and 1958 as an indigenous Cuban movement. Once he assumed power, however, it

became evident that he had set for himself the goal of "liberating Latin America from US domination." The earliest public manifestations of this revolutionary mission were the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

armed expeditions that set forth from Cuba to such Caribbean countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months of 1959.

In private statements during this period, Castro made it known that he looked upon his success in Cuba as merely the first stage in a continent-wide effort. Former Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt said that Castro came to Caracas in January 1959--scarcely three weeks after assuming power--to enlist cooperation and financial backing for "the master plan against the gringos."

Castro sounded the keynote for Cuban subversion on 26 July 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." The following September, he issued his ringing "first declaration of Havana," which unmistakably showed that he looked upon the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of a general Latin American political upheaval.

The Cuban subversive effort gradually became a more carefully organized endeavor far different from the first hastily organized and ill-conceived raids of 1959 and early 1960. By 1961-1962, Cuban support began taking many forms, ranging from inspiration and training to such tangibles as financing and communications support as well as some military

assistance. Mechanisms for conducting subversive operations were established at home and abroad. Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day 1961, and has beamed an increasing stream of propaganda to the Americas ever since.

During this period, the Cuban agency for foreign espionage and subversion, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), was established within the Ministry of Interior. The DGI benefited from the advice of at least five Soviet intelligence experts from the very beginning. This organization sent over \$1 million in US currency to the Venezuelan insurgents alone between 1961 and 1964, and over US\$200,000 to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa in Guatemala in 1963.

From late 1961 through 1963, the Cuban regime stepped up the tempo of its foreign operations. The most spectacular event during this period was the discovery of a cache of three tons of weapons on a Venezuelan beach in November 1963. The weapons included light automatic rifles and submachine guns definitely identified as among those shipped to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and ammunition of US manufacture. The motor of a small boat found near the cache site was one of several Cuba had earlier acquired from Canada.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~No Foreign Dissem~~

Communist documents seized by the Venezuelan authorities shortly after the discovery of the cache indicated that the equipment was intended for the paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party for Plan Caracas-- aimed at disrupting the presidential elections in December of that year.

During this period, Cuban-trained guerrillas also tried to initiate operations in southern Peru and in Argentina. Cuban agents in La Paz tried to stimulate Bolivian groups to take up armed action against the Paz Estenssoro government. Finally, Cuban financial assistance was sent to Brazilian subversive elements seeking to establish guerrilla training camps in the state of Goias, as well as to peasant leader Francisco Juliao and then-governor Leonel Brizola. After Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's son, Raul Roa Kouri, was appointed ambassador to Brazil in April 1963, he served as a channel for Cuban funds and guidance to Brazilian subversives. At one point Roa described Brizola as "the Brazilian with the greatest revolutionary potential. Two Cuban couriers were on their way to Brazil with clandestine funds earmarked for Brizola and his associates when President Goulart was overthrown in April 1964.

In short, during this peak period of Cuban subversive efforts, Castro encouraged in an almost haphazard fashion a wide variety of extremist groups in many countries to begin the armed struggle.

At least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans received either guerrilla warfare training or political indoctrination in Cuba between 1961 and 1964.

Disagreement with the
USSR, 1964

By 1964, Castro's indiscriminate subversive efforts had brought him into disagreement with Soviet leaders and into conflict with leaders of most of the principal orthodox Communist parties in Latin America. During a secret meeting in Havana in November 1964, the Soviets helped to work out a secret compromise agreement which called for support to insurgency efforts in a few Latin American countries, but specified that in all cases the local Communist Party should determine whether violent or non-violent means were to be pursued.

As a result of this meeting and setbacks in Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil during 1963 and 1964, Castro muted his revolutionary exhortations for about a year and narrowed his focus to three countries-- Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where bona fide guerrilla bands were in the field and actively engaging government security forces.

The Cubans began chipping away at the edges of the agreement with the Soviets during 1965. At the Tri-Continent Conference in January 1966, Castro issued a more general

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

call for insurgency in Latin America. Cuban propaganda returned to the more strident pitch noted in 1963. The operational emphasis, however, in comparison with the earlier years, changed to the selected list of target countries--Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia. Elsewhere, the Cubans sought more general opportunities that would lend themselves to foreign exploitation.


Current Support Mechanisms

Even in those countries where there is no significant insurgency under way, the Cubans have been developing a support mechanism while they wait for a suitable opportunity and ade-

quate assets. Moreover, there is evidence that Castro has created a special 60-man intelligence and commando unit--an arm of the DGI--to promote and support armed clandestine penetrations in various Latin American countries. Cuba's fishing vessels are apparently at the disposal of this unit, which was first identified following its involvement in a landing last May in Venezuela.

The DGI, which manages all of Cuba's espionage and subversive activities, was formed in 1961 following a general reorganization of Cuba's internal security and foreign intelligence services. Its director general is Manuel Pineiro--known as "Red Beard"--who has been closely

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE



67179 1-48 CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Foreign Dissem~~

associated with Raul Castro since 1957 and has been working with Cuban foreign intelligence since 1959. Under his leadership and the tutelage of several Soviet advisers, the DGI has been molded into a highly professional intelligence organization along classic Soviet lines.

The DGI is divided into three operational units. These are a department of "legal centers," an "illegal" department, and a department of "national liberation." The department of legal centers conducts operations by handling its agents through Cuban diplomatic missions--in Latin America these exist only in Mexico and Jamaica. The illegal department handles agents stationed permanently in countries with which Cuba does not have diplomatic relations. This is done directly from Havana by a complicated system of communications. The national liberation department is perhaps the largest in the DGI and is responsible for promoting and directing revolutionary activity in Latin America and other areas of the world. These three units are backed by various support elements.

The DGI's methods of selecting, training, and assigning foreign agents reveal a high degree of professionalism. There are two basic categories of these agents: one is a deep-cover clandestine group--recruited, trained, and

subsequently "run" by the illegal department--charged with collecting information as well as penetrating local governments. The second group is recruited and directed by the department of national liberation to guide and support revolutionary activities.

Guerrilla warfare training for the latter group is conducted in national units ranging in size from three to 25. Courses usually last three to six months, although in special cases they may last as long as a year. Training covers all aspects of guerrilla warfare, including weapons handling, explosives, sabotage, demolition, military tactics, combat engineering, and means of countering anti-insurgent activities. At least 2,500 Latin Americans are known to have gone to Cuba for such training since 1961.

This number by no means represents a maximum figure for the guerrilla potential. Many of these trainees, for instance, have in turn trained others when they returned to their home countries. Some, however, probably became disillusioned with the difficulties of initiating armed revolution, and left the field to more enthusiastic Castroites. The only international cooperation among these trainees appears to involve those whose countries are neighbors.

In the last year or so, Havana has demonstrated an improved capability to correspond clandestinely with its agents abroad. This ability has not yet been translated into a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Foreign Dissem~~

noticeably more successful subversive effort, at least partly because the Latin American governments have become increasingly aware of the danger. Presumably for the same reason, there has been less evidence of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba for training, and there have been fewer and fewer reports of Cuban efforts to fund Latin American revolutionary groups.

Other support and propaganda mechanisms include Radio Havana, which today is beaming approximately 170 hours a week in Portuguese, Spanish, and even Creole, Quechua, and Guarani to Latin America. It also transmits open code messages to Cuban intelligence agents. Cuba's literature distribution apparatus provides the glossy magazine Cuba, the theoretical monthly Critical Thought, speeches by Cuban leaders in pamphlet form, and the economic review Panorama Latinoamericana. Havana's official press service Prensa Latina has stringers and reporters throughout the world. Its employees function as an intelligence gathering and support mechanism. At the present time, Cuba is also supporting several local Communist newspapers and periodicals--the most recent example being the Uruguayan radical left daily newspaper Epoca.

In addition to the construction of this support mechanism and the growth and improvement of its clandestine

service and propaganda machine, Cuba has been able to bring about limited international cooperation of national movements and parties in some areas. This has helped to create or strengthen infrastructures upon which future revolutionary activities may be built, by making it easier to channel funds, move agents and leaders, transmit communications, and obtain false documents.

Two groups providing such support to the Venezuelan movements were uncovered in Colombia in 1966, and one of the Colombian movements has chosen the Venezuelan border region as its area of guerrilla operations. Thus it can support Venezuelans moving either way across the border, and its members are in position to cross into Venezuela themselves. The Salvadoran Communist Party has provided Salvadoran documentation to Guatemalans for travel to bloc countries, and also provided sanctuary for Guatemalans and Hondurans.

The Current Situation

As is evident, Castro's behavior in advocating and assisting revolution has not always been logical and realistic. He usually has been canny enough, however, to keep his risks low. The form and extent of his efforts, vocal and material, have varied with changing circumstances but his essential theme continues. He insists that revolutionary violence is necessary to bring about any meaningful change in Latin

~~SECRET~~

America. Moreover, he claims that guerrilla units, when boldly led, can take to the field, sustain themselves there, and precipitate the conditions that will assure their eventual success.

"Che" Guevara's ill-fated efforts in Bolivia and Cuban involvement in the insurgent landing in Venezuela last year are excellent examples of Castro's theories in action. His activities during 1967 and his oft-repeated pledges--as recent as 12 January 1968--to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries throughout the world, clearly demonstrate his determination to spread his revolution.

Despite his declaration of November 1964 that he would not support would-be insurgent groups which were not under the control of the orthodox pro-Moscow Communists, Castro has continued to give moral, material, and financial support and training to selected groups. Furthermore, he made it clear in speeches during 1967 that he does not feel bound by the 1964 agreement and repeated his persistent thesis that violent revolution is necessary to bring about any meaningful political or social change.

Furthermore, on two occasions he flung accusations of cowardice and betrayal at the orthodox Communist parties in Venezuela and Colombia, which do not give full support to dissident guerrillas. He appeared particularly irked that a Soviet delegation had been trying to improve

relations and expand trade in Colombia and Venezuela. He complained that members of the Communist camp--obviously the Soviet Union--who deal with oligarchies in countries where insurgents are active are betraying the revolutionaries.

His statements during 1967 reflected his intense disillusionment with the urban based pro-Moscow Communist parties in general. This same theme was propounded by his theoretical adviser, Jules Regis Debray, who is now languishing in a Bolivian jail for his role in the insurgency there. Debray's thesis, which merely reflects Castro's and Guevara's own thinking, is that Latin America needs a dynamic, offensive, rural-based guerrilla action in which the basic guerrilla group takes precedence over the urban-based party and, in fact, becomes the "authentic" party.

In his speech in March 1967, Castro keynoted these ideas by stating: "If, in any nation, those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who--even though they do not call themselves Communists--behave like real Communists in the struggle." Again, on 12 January 1968, Castro referred to the Latin American parties by implication when he spoke of some parties being in the "rearguard" of the anti-imperialist struggle.

The Significance of LASO

The first Latin American Solidarity Organization conference

~~SECRET~~

~~Foreign~~

(LASO) closed on 10 August 1967 with a major ideological statement on Cuban foreign policy and a blueprint for solidarity with Latin American guerrillas by Castro. Although he made an effort to pay homage to pro-Soviet Communists by stating that "in some countries violent revolution may not be an immediate, but a future task," he left no doubt that Cuba views "armed struggle" as the only valid course to achieve "national liberation." He also indicated that Cuba was prepared to advance this doctrine.

The conference and Castro's return to a militant foreign policy widened still further the policy differences between Cuba and the pro-Soviet Communist parties, and caused discontent among the Soviets themselves. This challenge to Soviet influence in the Latin American Communist movement and Castro's calculated affronts to Moscow, however, have not prompted the Soviets to retaliate by economic aid cutbacks. On the other hand, the Soviets will probably continue to give private encouragement to their friends in the Communist world to persuade Castro to change his radical policies. They can also be expected to continue efforts to build diplomatic, commercial, and other contacts with Latin America, despite Castro's rantings.

Current Targets

For the past year, therefore, Havana's effort has been to lay

a solid foundation for future revolutionary action, to attempt to unite feuding factions of the extreme left under one leadership, to extol revolutionaries who are willing to take up the fight, regardless of whether they are bona fide Communists, and in Venezuela and Bolivia actually to send in trained Cuban Army officers and central committee members to advise and lead insurgents.

In Bolivia, the Cubans made a real effort to translate their revolutionary theories into practical guerrilla action by sending Ernesto "Che" Guevara and other high Cuban officials to dominate the guerrilla movement and to begin a continent-wide armed movement to start "other Vietnams." The all but complete annihilation of the insurgents by the Bolivian Army, and the death of "Che" Guevara, however, have severely damaged the myth of Cuban guerrilla invincibility and will probably dim the enthusiasm for the time being of some Latin American revolutionaries who have been considering guerrilla activities.

In Venezuela, Cuban funds, training, propaganda support, and some advisers are going to two separate dissident groups, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Douglas Bravo's group. Last May, Venezuelan guerrillas, escorted by Cuban military personnel, landed near the coastal village of Machurucuto. Four Cubans involved in the landing were later captured by Venezuelan authorities. There are indications

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

that other landings took place during 1967, and at least one important landing occurred in July 1966.

Venezuelan guerrillas are now being hard pressed by government forces. In August, their urban terrorist organization was paralyzed by the arrest and capture of a number of its leaders. There is also information indicating that friction has developed between the Cuban and Venezuelan members of the guerrilla groups. The Cubans are not satisfied with the revolutionary enthusiasm of their Venezuelan compatriots, and the Venezuelans resent the "advice" the Cubans are giving them--the same type of friction that developed in Bolivia.

In Guatemala, where Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to guerrilla and terrorist groups for more than three years, recent army operations against the insurgents and the formation of rightist vigilant groups have played havoc with guerrilla activities. The rebels, however, are regrouping and are still capable of harassing the government. Terrorist attacks on Guatemalan officials on 16 January clearly demonstrate the rebels' tormenting capabilities. Two US officials were also killed during these attacks.

Havana radio quickly publicized the shooting incident and indicated that "Che" Guevara's death was instrumental in uniting the Guatemalan guerrillas. In view of the often repeated Cuban

offer to help active guerrilla groups, the Guatemalan rebels can probably count on more training and financial assistance from Havana.

In Colombia, there was renewed and intensified guerrilla activity during 1967. The Cubans are giving assistance and training to several groups, some of which are remnants of bandit gangs that have operated in the country for years.

The group which has received by far the most Cuban aid is the Army of National Liberation (ELN). Some of its members were recently arrested while trying to slip back into the country carrying small arms, ammunition, and radio transmitters. They reportedly told Colombian intelligence officers that they and a number of other Colombians had just completed a guerrilla warfare course in Cuba and that the weapons had been given to them there. The ELN stepped up its activity with at least two raids in January, including the ambush slaying of three members of an army patrol. Follow-up action by the military resulted in the killing of five ELN guerrillas.

The pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCC) is reportedly trying to convert its guerrilla arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), into inactive "self-defense" groups. This follows a request from the Soviet Union to avoid any incidents that might complicate its newly established diplomatic

~~SECRET~~

relations with the Colombian Government. It is probable that many FARC guerrillas, rather than lay down their arms, will join forces with the ELN or the newly formed Popular Army of Liberation (EPL).

This new group has established itself in northwestern Colombia, has carried out several isolated attacks and reportedly is making preparations for full-scale guerrilla warfare if the government carries out its threats to move into the area. This group is the guerrilla arm of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Colombia, but may seek assistance from the Cubans if no other source of aid develops. (See maps following text for location of insurgent groups in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia.)

Prospects

Cuba has given ample notice that it intends to continue its propaganda, training, and financial support to selected revolutionary groups--especially those in Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela. Given Castro's goal of

developing and exploiting opportunities for further armed violence, plus the vulnerabilities that exist in many Latin American countries, new outbreaks of Castro-sponsored rural-oriented violence in Latin America can be expected. Such ventures will have little chance of success, however, unless they exploit genuinely popular antigovernment causes and develop a broad peasant base and a charismatic indigenous leader. Guevara's defeat in Bolivia shows that despite Cuba's mechanism for sponsoring guerrilla groups and Castro's willingness to infiltrate key Cuban Army officers into selected countries, these efforts will at best produce only minor harassments of the central governments for the foreseeable future. The danger increases, however, in those countries where political and economic development has been marginal, and where a threat of a split in the usual guarantors of stability--i.e., the military or oligarchy--is a growing possibility. Should this occur, what had been minor disturbances in the countryside could suddenly mushroom into a political force out of proportion to its numbers. ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BOLIVIA: Area of Guerrilla Activity




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VENEZUELA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



Bravo group-40/50

MIR-125

PCV-20/30

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GUATEMALA: Area of Guerrilla Activity




13 Nov. 30 (Yon Sosa)
FAR 200 (Casar Montes)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DATE 11/1/71

COLOMBIA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



ELN-200/220
FARC-250/300

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
59173 1-68

LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 95-364
Document # 25

~~Secret~~

(Handwritten initials)

28



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Political Trends in Cuba

Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW

~~Secret~~

No 1

15 March 1968
SC No. 00761/68A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
12 FEB 1997

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

WARNING

The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

THE SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POLITICAL TRENDS IN CUBA

The strident bellicosity and adventurism characteristic of Cuban foreign policy since early 1966 have obscured a number of modifications in domestic policy that have significantly changed the nature of the revolution and the role of Fidel Castro. With the gradual institutionalization of the regime, he is increasingly dependent on the governing apparatus he has created to implement his policies.

Castro is still unquestionably in charge and is effective in portraying himself as the life force of the revolution. The military and security forces are fervently loyal, and Castro still enjoys a large degree of popular support, especially among the youth, the peasants, and the poor working class. Despite his continued pre-eminence, however, Castro has increasingly isolated himself during the past two years. Meaningful political dialogue has almost ceased, and the regime has become considerably more inflexible. Castro seems to distrust the bureaucracy he has created and has surrounded himself with a "cult of guerrilla heroes" in order to preside over it better.

Castro's contact with the Cuban masses has also been reduced--partially as a result of the barriers imposed by the bureaucracy. He is still obsessively messianic, but his direct appeals to the people have decreased. In 1967 he made only 15 major speeches, fewer than in any year since 1961.

Political discussion has been effectively stifled in the bureaucracy and in the press, and the condemnation of a dissident "microfaction" in January was a reminder of the dangers of questioning Castro. Perhaps realizing that a political vacuum is being created below him, Castro has dramatically emphasized the importance of a small "cult of guerrilla heroes"--confidants from his original 26th of July Movement--who constitute the second rung of leadership.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The New Radicalism

From mid-1964 until early 1966, the regime hewed to an essentially moderate domestic course. Great efforts were made to rationalize the badly mismanaged economy, and material incentives were used in an effort to increase lagging labor productivity. The revolutionary purists, such as the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who argued that only "moral incentives" were necessary, found their advice ignored by Castro. By early 1967, however, it became clear that the regime was shifting back and that "moral incentives" were again in vogue.

Last summer, antibureaucracy drives were widely publicized, and government ministries were forced to reduce their staffs by as much as 75 percent. Special party commissions reassigned excess workers to agricultural production and penalized more than 16,000 administrators who were accused of allowing bureaucracies to flourish. The regime was probably correct in its belief that the burgeoning ministries harbored many surplus workers, but the pervasiveness of Castro's "antibureaucracy" campaign suggests that he saw a potential threat to some of his policies.

Castro continues to be particularly concerned with Cuban youth. During the past two years, vigorous new campaigns have been launched to mobilize them behind the revolution and to expose them to "guerrilla experience." In 1966, a youth brigade was organized to trace "Che" Guevara's 1958 march through eastern and central Cuba.

Last year, Red Brigades were constituted for agricultural work and for military training. These were replaced in November by "Che" Guevara agricultural brigades. The Union of Youth Communists, with a membership of over 100,000, provides leadership and cadres for the regime's efforts among the youth and functions as a testing ground for future party members.

The new regimen is also a result of Castro's concern that low labor productivity is a major cause of Cuba's continued economic plight. With the virtual abolition of "material incentives," workers are expected to volunteer long hours of overtime. In January, private consumers and public transportation systems were affected when gasoline was added to the long list of rationed goods. Castro has emphasized the need for hard work and sacrifice, pointing out that "the revolution is the abolition of the exploitation of human labor but not the abolition of human work."

The Cult of the Guerrilla Hero

Since 1959, Castro's most important power base has been essentially the same small group from his 26th of July Movement who form the top echelon in the military and security forces. Armed forces minister Raul Castro, his vice ministers, the members of the General Staff, and virtually all the top officers, are loyal 26th of July veterans. This is also true of Interior Minister Ramiro Valdez and the other important figures in the security forces. Until the end of 1965,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

however, only eleven 26 July members held posts in the 25-man party directorate. In October 1965, when Castro's "prototype party" was formalized as the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the 26 July group emerged with six of the eight politburo posts and about two thirds of the central committee membership. Servicemen comprise at least one fifth of the party membership, which now totals 60,000.

In addition, about half of the government ministers are military officers whose rank dates from their service with Castro's guerrillas. Politburo member Juan Almeida, a semiliterate former parking lot attendant, frequently served as the acting minister of armed forces in 1967. Following the pervasive antibureaucracy drives last year, it is likely that military officers have assumed larger roles in directing the ministries.

Since late 1967, and especially since the death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia in October, the regime has been taking measures to glorify that 26th July group. Elaborate mythologies have been contrived and folklore has been encouraged to illustrate the "heroic guerrilla" exploits of Castro, Guevara, and the other revolutionaries who fought in the Sierra Maestra against Batista. In November, the Cuban Communist Party daily, Granma, began a series of feature articles extolling the guerrilla doctors who fought in the Sierra Maestra.

Military service continues to be obligatory for males over



CASTRO

16 and is viewed as a required badge of revolutionary valor. Participation in the anti-Batista and Bay of Pigs campaigns are causes for adulation. Some civilian leaders are appearing more frequently in military attire, and even the usually dapper President Dorticos has begun to don fatigues in one of his auxiliary roles as chief of the militia. In his speech on 2 January, Castro declared that 1968 would be known as the "Year of the Heroic Guerrilla."

Political Development

During the past nine years, Fidel Castro has devoted himself with varying degrees of intensity to developing a governing apparatus of total power under his hegemony, durable governing institutions, and a definitive ideology for the revolution. While strengthening his own absolutism, he has institutionalized the regime with the hope that it will survive him.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In pursuing these objectives, Castro initially manipulated and balanced political factions and then slowly united them. In 1961, he was balancing the radicalism of the 26 July Movement with the "orthodoxy" of the "old" Communists. Later, he directed the gradual coalescence of these factions and began constructing a united revolutionary party and a government bureaucracy. This process was often tumultuous, and in March 1962 it was marked by the purge of leading "old" Communist Anibal Escalante and hundreds of his followers. Two years later, Castro resisted the 26 July group, which was pressing for another purge, and forced the pendulum back to the center. By the end of 1965, however, this group emerged in the superior position because Castro invested it with a dominant role in the party.

Through the entire process of balance and assimilation between 1961-65, there was an active and at times violent competition of ideas. Castro profited from the debates that boiled beneath him, but stayed aloof in his role as supreme arbiter.

By so elevating the martial cult of the "guerrilla hero," Castro is excluding from prominence all but his most trusted followers from the Batista struggle and a few others who joined with him at that time.

Press Discussions Muted

During the first seven years of the revolution, many aspects of the process of political develop-

ment were reflected in the Cuban press. For the past two years, however, the regime has insisted that the press should not discuss substantive issues, but should only set forth official policy.

By 1961, ten of the 14 daily newspapers published in Havana before the revolution had been appropriated by the regime. The two major papers to survive were Hoy, which represented the "old" Communists, and Revolucion, the organ of the 26 July group. These two papers were the principal vehicles for the ideological debates between the two groups during the first few years of the revolution. Even after the two groups were joined in the prototype party and after the Escalante purge in 1962, Castro permitted their journalistic fencing to continue.

With the founding of the PCC in October 1965, Granma began publishing as the official party daily, replacing both Hoy and Revolucion. Unlike them, however, Granma is a typical Communist party paper--sterile and largely uncontroversial. It devotes about 40 percent of its coverage to domestic issues, but the bulk of this concerns agriculture, education, and youth activities. Periodically it carries a dull political column.

The theoretical journal Cuba Socialista was published monthly from the spring of 1961 until February 1967. It had an editorial board of five, including three "old" Communist theoreticians. Like the pre-Granma newspapers, it was frequently used by spokesmen of various groups as a vehicle for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

relatively open discussions of domestic issues. It was most dramatically used in this fashion in 1964 when the dispute between "Che" Guevara and his opponents was made public in its pages.

Cuba Socialista was replaced by Pensamiento Critico--a tedious journal that is essentially a "revolutionary's Reader's Digest" of old Castro speeches and tomes by various proponents of Cuba's foreign policy. It has an editorial board of six young militants from the philosophy department at the University of Havana who were associated with Regis Debray. Unlike its predecessor, Pensamiento Critico does not discuss domestic issues.

The "Microfaction" Exposed

The exposure of a dissident "microfaction" in January was the latest example of Castro's efforts to prevent policy discussions from originating in the bureaucracy. From 24 to 26 January, the central committee of the PCC met to hear Raul Castro's elaborate charges against Anibal Escalante and a "microfactionary" group of dissidents, including central committee members Ramon Calcines and Jose Matar. Ultimately, Escalante was sentenced to a 15-year prison term, and 34 minor bureaucrats received lesser sentences. Calcines and Matar were expelled from the central committee, and the former also lost his party membership.

Escalante, who had been exiled to Czechoslovakia and the USSR after his purge in 1962, was allowed to return to Cuba in late

1964 and to retire to a state farm. According to Raul Castro, Escalante was soon busy again, leading an antiparty clique in support of the Soviet line on "all the issues" that have caused the strain in relations between Havana and Moscow. In reality, the group posed no serious threat to the regime, and its members were guilty of little more than daring to question high policy matters. Their trial was probably staged as a warning to other malcontents and dissidents that opposition to Fidel Castro's policies will not be tolerated.

The Party and State Apparatus

By the end of 1965, the party had entered its final stages of organization. It had a membership of 55,000 and an elaborate apparatus extending to all levels. Since then, it has increasingly taken command through its own organization, through the mass organizations it controls, and through the state administration (Poder Local).

Castro envisions the party as a foil and overseer to the rest of the bureaucracy and has endeavored to keep it a small "vanguard" organization. Most of its important posts are occupied by 26 of July veterans, and it has clearly become the political organ of the "guerrilla heroes."

It appears that membership will not be expanded significantly beyond the present 60,000 for the next few years, but eventually the party will probably absorb a large portion of the youths in the Union of Young Communists. The first

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

party congress has been postponed and, according to Castro, it will not take place before 1970.

In August 1967, politburo member Guillermo Garcia was named party chief in Oriente replacing "old" Communist Armando Acosta, who had been political boss in that eastern province since 1962. This past January, former health minister Jose Machado Ventura was appointed as the politburo's representative on the Matanzas provincial party bureau, and, in February, Major Rogelio Acevedo received a similar post in Camaguey. The assignments of these favored comandantes as personal links between Castro and the provincial party organs may be an indication of his cautious approach to the bureaucracy--even within the party.

By the end of 1967, the state administration was finally constituted throughout Cuba as an outgrowth of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), Cuba's largest mass organization with a claimed membership of 2 million. Over 5,000 assemblies were held last September for the "election" of about 22,000 local administrators for Cuba's 43 regional and 321

municipal administrations. About 18,000 of these representatives were elected from the CDRs. The CDR has served as a neighborhood watchdog apparatus and as the regime's basic administrative organ.

Outlook

Castro's first priority is to continue the "revolutionary process" and to "prepare" the youth to join in leadership with him and the "guerrilla cult."

In the meantime, there may be some "rationalists" in the bureaucracy who see advantage in the "liberal" economic and political policies that are being discussed in some East European Communist countries.

Following the exposé of the dissident "microfaction" in January, however, they will be even more reluctant to criticize the regime. In any case, they are disorganized and subject to both party controls and the scrutiny of the security forces. They pose no threat to Castro, and with the muting of political and press discussions, there is little they can do to expound their views.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* * *

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SNIE 85-68

27 June 1968

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-29
Document # 12

Cy # 2 - Powell

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-68

(Supplements NIE 85-67)

Cuba: Castro's Problems and Prospects Over the Next Year or Two

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

27 June 1968

Authenticated:

James D. Lay, Jr.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

~~SECRET~~

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

MAR 2000

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Dr. Edward W. Proctor, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~WARNING~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	2
I. THE KEY PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION	2
II. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE	4
III. THE SOURCES OF CASTRO'S STAYING POWER	6
IV. OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS	7

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CUBA: CASTRO'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO

CONCLUSIONS

A. Castro's problems have taken a turn for the worse over the past year. A severe drought has depressed sugar production and agriculture generally. Living conditions have become more stringent because of reduced food supplies and a variety of other factors, including new attempts by Castro to overcome his economic problems by forcing the population to work harder. There has been an increase in popular discontent and in the number of small, local disorders.

B. Nonetheless, we see little prospect that economic adversity will significantly weaken Castro's position over the next couple of years. A return of more favorable weather, already in prospect, would in itself somewhat relieve domestic pressures. Even if economic conditions were to deteriorate further, Castro would still have the advantages of charismatic appeal, political skill, and ultimately, a formidable military-security apparatus.

C. Although there probably will be fluctuations in the level of future Soviet aid to Cuba, we think it unlikely that the USSR will permit the Cuban economy to approach a critical condition. This will be so even if Soviet-Cuban tensions continue to develop.

D. We doubt that either Castro's economic difficulties or his contentious relationship with the USSR will cause him to turn toward the US. He will, however, seek to expand his trade with other non-Communist countries. There will be an increasing reluctance by such countries to maintain Castro's diplomatic and economic isolation, though his limited financial credit will restrict his trade with them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

1. In our last estimate on Cuba,¹ we noted the ability of the Castro regime to retain a strong hold on power despite economic adversity. Now, in the regime's tenth year, conditions have taken a turn for the worse. There has been a further decline in living conditions and an increase in grumbling and minor manifestations of discontent.

He has placed new demands upon the people, while subtracting from their lives diversions and services which have been part of the Cuban culture. The genesis of these events and the meaning for the Castro Revolution and for US interests over the next year or two are considered below.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1. THE KEY PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION

2. Cuba's current problems stem in large measure from the ragged performance of the economy. In the early days of the Castro regime, the US economic denial policy—particularly the elimination of the Cuban sugar quota and the embargo on spare parts for US-built machinery—was clearly harmful to the Cuban economy. The much-heralded plan for forced industrialization was abandoned, and the swing back to concentration on sugar and agriculture in 1964 lowered and simplified the regime's economic objectives. Nonetheless, continued balance of payments problems, coupled with recurrent problems of bad weather, poor planning and management, shortages of agricultural labor, and low labor productivity, have meant that the economy has grown little since Castro took power.²

3. Production of sugar remains a key determinant of overall growth, but Castro's efforts to expand output have foundered repeatedly. Although he clings to his goal of producing 10 million tons of sugar in 1970, this year's output of a little more than 5 million tons will be well below last year's, and somewhat smaller than the average during the past 20 years. (See Table 1.) The severe drought of the past year, one of the worst in Cuban history, has been the single most important factor limiting current production. But even with the return of good weather, Cuba could probably not harvest enough cane to produce more than 7 to 8 million tons of sugar in 1970, because of labor shortages and the slow pace of mechanization.

4. Agriculture is the foundation of the Cuban economy not only because it supports most other domestic sectors, but also because sugar provides 85 per-

¹ NIE 85-67, "Key Issues and Prospects for Castro's Cuba," dated 2 March 1967, SECRET, CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION.

² We estimate that Cuba's gross national product in 1967 was some 15 percent higher than in 1957, the best pre-Revolution year, but in 1968 it probably will decline nearly to the 1957 level. Cuba's population, which is now about 7.6 million, has grown some 20 percent since 1957.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 1

CUBAN PRODUCTION OF RAW SUGAR
1948-1968

(In Thousand Metric Tons)

YEAR*	PRODUCTION	YEAR*	PRODUCTION
1948	5,577	1960	5,860
1949	5,074	1961	6,765
1950	5,560	1962	4,815
1951	5,760	1963	3,820
1952	7,225	1964	4,400
1953	5,150	1965	6,050
1954	4,890	1966	4,455
1955	4,530	1967	6,100
1956	4,740	1968	5,100*
1957	5,670		
1958	5,780		
1959	5,965		
Average 1948-1959	5,518	Average 1960-1968	5,263

* Crop year ending 30 June of year shown.

* Estimated.

cent of Cuba's export income. In bad crop years, or when sugar prices are low, Cuba's ability to finance through its own exports the purchases of industrial raw materials, semifinished goods, fuels, machinery, and certain foods necessary to economic development and popular well-being is severely limited. Under Castro, export earnings have remained below the 1957-1958 average, and Cuba has incurred at least \$1.5 billion of foreign debt, mostly with the USSR and mostly to finance imports. Agricultural and transportation equipment of US origin has largely been replaced by substitutes from Communist countries or Western Europe, and new power, shipping, and industrial facilities have been added. Shortage of convertible currencies has, however, limited access to spare parts for other US equipment in mining, sugar milling, and industry, and has restricted purchases of desired foods, chemicals, and new equipment. Thus, Cuba's adoption of a radically different economic system since 1959 has not relieved its need for international relationships which guarantee the economic support of the regime. Indeed, a major source of frustration for Castro is his economic dependence upon the Soviet Union: In 1967 the USSR and other Communist countries furnished nearly 75 percent, and the Soviets financed by subsidies and credits nearly 40 percent, of total Cuban imports.

5. The fact of his dependence is doubly frustrating for Castro because he has tied himself to a partner with whom he cannot agree on many issues. He refuses to accept Soviet experience or advice on questions of economic policy, as illustrated most recently by his increasing emphasis upon "moral" rather than material incentives for workers. Furthermore, he tries to equate Cuba's role in Latin America with that of the USSR in Europe and of China in Asia. Castro's denigration of the Communist Party's role in the revolutionary process

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

irritates both the Soviet Union and China. His diehard promotion of violent revolution in Latin America is a major cause of tension with the Soviets, who believe that under present conditions violence is not the most effective vehicle for an expansion of their own influence. Instead, they are trying to increase their diplomatic and commercial ties with Latin American governments and to enhance the respectability of pro-Moscow Communist parties.² They are embarrassed in these efforts by Castro's policy, and by the contentious fashion in which he makes his disagreements known. Castro has bitten the hand that feeds him by declaring that the USSR's tactics illustrate the impurity of its socialism and the insincerity of its interest in the fundamental needs of the Latin American people.

6. Though the Soviets apparently are increasingly bothered by Castro's behavior, total Soviet aid to Cuba (including some refinancing of past deficits) will probably increase substantially in 1968 over 1967. It also appears, however, that they are pressing Cuba to maintain sugar exports to them at a level at least approaching the 2.5 million tons of last year. Probably only about 1 million to 1.5 million tons of this sugar will be used within the Soviet Union. It is not clear how much this demand is motivated by economic and how much by political considerations; yet, at a time when drought has limited sugar production, it will force Cuba to cut significantly its exports to non-Communist countries. Cuban trade will be further restricted by other Soviet actions, such as the reduction of the amount of credit which Soviet banks in Western Europe will extend to help Cuba finance imports from hard-currency areas. Cuban efforts to obtain a three-year aid and trade commitment from the USSR were rejected by the Soviets in early 1968, to Castro's evident disappointment. He almost certainly finds such Soviet pressure oppressive, and it is probably a major factor in his imposition of policies which have the effect of complicating his position at home.

II. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE

7. At first, the Castro Revolution brought an improvement in the living conditions of most Cubans. Though drastic changes in the distribution of personal income deprived the upper and middle classes of their luxuries as well as their privileged status, the poorer classes benefited from such things as improved housing and diet, and a significant expansion of education and medical care. Since 1961-1962, however, population growth and economic stagnation have caused a general decline in the level of living of nearly all Cubans, especially in the towns. Shortages of food and clothing have become common, in part because of production failures and inefficiency of distribution, and in part because of a widespread rise in purchasing power. Campaigns of "volunteer" labor in agriculture have forced the urban population to work harder than ever before, and have proved upsetting to the traditionally close Cuban family life.

²In the past the Soviets supported the violent path to socialism in Latin America when the opportunities looked promising (e.g., in Venezuela and Guatemala), and they may do so again if a future situation seems to favor such an approach.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Yet, at least until recently, many Cubans—certainly the many thousands of students supplied with lodging, food, clothing, and other needs by the state—still were better off than before the revolution.

8. During the past year, a variety of factors has made living conditions more stringent. The drought affected not only sugar, but other crops as well. The production of food may also have been depressed by the reaction of private farmers to new government pressures to sell all their produce to the state rather than reserve some for sale on the private market.⁴ The effects of lower production on the food supply probably have been compounded by some deterioration of the distribution system over the past six months or so. The campaign to conserve fuel, and the increased efforts to draft labor from nonagricultural occupations for farm work, appear to have caused some dislocation of the chronically strained and inefficient transport and distribution networks. The situation may have been affected further by some hoarding and by the scare buying of foods which normally have been freely available. All these factors have added appreciably to Cuba's food shortages, despite the substantial increase in food imports that apparently has occurred over the past year. Thus, more often than in the recent past, Cubans in the towns find that their full ration is unavailable.

9. Since the start of 1968, Castro has launched a series of measures which, coupled with worsening food supplies, have caused some open discontent and small, local disorders. The first of these new moves was the rationing of vehicular fuels, an action which has not only limited the public distribution of commodities, but has also restricted individual mobility. Once again, many thousands of "volunteers" were conscripted to bring in the cane harvest, but this year the campaign seems to have been more disruptive both of family life and of nonagricultural production. More workers were conscripted and sent long distances from home, the working conditions of the harvest have been more onerous, and the pressure for greater revolutionary commitment and sacrifice has intensified.

10. In March, Castro decreed a number of restrictions which he labeled a "revolutionary offensive against the last vestiges of capitalism and materialism." They were, in effect, a continuation of the assault against the traditionally easy-going Cuban style of life. He nationalized some 60,000 small businesses; he then closed some of them (including most bars) which had provided much demanded services and diversions for the populace. In addition, Castro ended cockfighting and the national lottery, charging that they were breeding grounds for greed, and he imposed some forms of military discipline at Havana University, where he had previously tolerated some "mod" habits and laxness of behavior among students. Paralleling these changes has been an increased emphasis upon "moral" rather than material incentives for workers. Although the material incentive program had never been developed so that it had an

⁴ About 40 percent of Cuba's agricultural land still is in the hands of private farmers, who produce the great bulk of crops other than sugar.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

important positive effect on production—largely because of shortages of consumer goods—discussion of its removal has probably made many Cubans feel that something will be lost while more is expected of them.

11. We judge that Castro's new demands are in part manifestations of his "puritanical Marxism," as well as reactions to repeated economic reverses and dependence upon the Soviets. Castro has always proclaimed his belief that harder work and increased sacrifices are essential to the progress of the Revolution. Yet the main effect of his recent actions has probably been to increase the drabness and inconvenience of everyday life rather than to inspire new dedication.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(6)(6)

III. THE SOURCES OF CASTRO'S STAYING POWER

12. [REDACTED] His regime offered the poorer people a sense of personal dignity and a chance to participate in the making of a new, revolutionary society, supposedly for their ultimate benefit. The promised benefits have been painfully slow in coming, and popular enthusiasm for the Revolution has waned. But Castro's personal popularity as a revolutionary caudillo has proved durable even when his regime has used repressive measures against elements of the population. In any case, most Cubans probably see no alternative to the Revolution. The prevailing attitude seems to be one of acceptance, but this may mask all shades of opinion from passive support to helpless resentment.

13. Castro has displayed impressive political instinct in keeping a firm hold on power. He has regularly briefed the Cuban people on the objectives of the Revolution, and on its failures as well as its successes. Thus, he has generally avoided the kinds of outbursts which might have been based on surprise or sudden disappointment. So far he has succeeded in focusing discontent with internal progress on external causes, and in institutionalizing the belief that Cubans are a beleaguered people fighting against malevolent forces. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of these tactics as a diversion from mounting personal dissatisfaction with the fruits of the Revolution probably has begun to diminish.

14. Through the organization of a repressive force which is recognized by all Cubans as proficient, Castro has discouraged both impulsive and organized dissidence. Perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 of the somewhat bolder disaffected are still in Castro's political prisons; some thousands more are in rehabilitation camps. Unlike most Communist dictators, Castro has made no move to prevent large-scale emigration, though the drain on Cuba's qualified professional and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

managerial manpower has been severe. Some 400,000 Cubans, a number equal to five or six percent of the 1959 population, have settled in the US alone, and a large backlog awaits assignment to the two daily flights for Florida. Thus, both the harsh penalties for opposition to the Revolution and Castro's liberal emigration policy have diminished the prospects for resistance.

15. Finally, Castro has surrounded himself in the regime almost entirely with former 26th of July partisans who recognize that they owe their commanding positions and well-being to him. This year he purged the so-called "microfaction" from the Cuban Communist Party for their criticism of his domestic policies and of the "export of revolution." He thereby not only removed a group of relatively ineffective critics, but also warned members of the regime to sustain their loyalty. Thus, to the top echelons of the regime he remains the undisputed leader, and he retains his power to establish both the aspirations of the Revolution and the methods of their achievement.

IV. OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS

16. Some improvement over this year's economic performance is likely. The prospects are that favorable weather, already evident in May-June 1968, will lead to an increase in production of sugar and food over the next year, and this fact alone would somewhat relieve domestic pressures. Gains may also occur in industry and construction, in which there has been no significant recent downturn. Export earnings may improve, especially if an international sugar agreement, which would raise world sugar prices, should be successfully concluded. For the first time Castro is interested in such an agreement, and his demands for a quota on the order of 2.4 million tons have received backing from a number of other exporters. A new Sugar Council meeting may convene in September, and while many obstacles remain, the prospects for an agreement are better than at any time since 1961.

17. Because of Cuba's dependence upon agricultural development, which can proceed only slowly, and upon Soviet aid, which is unlikely to keep on increasing, Castro's Revolution almost certainly will not begin to prosper over the next few years. A successful sugar agreement would improve Castro's prospects for importing from the non-Communist countries, and would lessen his dependence on the Soviets. Failing this eventuality, however, the outlook is for continued severe economic difficulties. If a significant increase in agricultural export did occur, the USSR probably would adjust its Cuban aid slightly downward, as it has tended to do in the past, in order to move toward a trade balance with Cuba. (See Table 2.) In no case, however, is it likely that the Soviets will allow the Cuban economy to approach a critical condition, if only because they wish to avoid being associated with the failure of an enterprise in which they have invested so much.

~~SECRET~~

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(i)(c)

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 2

CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE
1962-1968
(Million US \$)

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 ESTIMATED	1968 PROJECTED
EXPORTS	<u>521</u>	<u>545</u>	<u>714</u>	<u>686</u>	<u>593</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>650</u>
Communist countries ..	<u>407</u>	<u>343</u>	<u>422</u>	<u>536</u>	<u>483</u>	<u>570</u>	<u>540</u>
USSR	(220)	(184)	(275)	(322)	(275)	(370)	(370)*
Free World	<u>114</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>292</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>110</u>
IMPORTS*	<u>759</u>	<u>832</u>	<u>1,019</u>	<u>865</u>	<u>925</u>	<u>985</u>	<u>990</u>
Communist countries ..	<u>629</u>	<u>704</u>	<u>692</u>	<u>858</u>	<u>732</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>810</u>
USSR	(411)	(461)	(410)	(428)	(515)	(540)	(600)
Free World	<u>130</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>180</u>
TOTAL DEFICIT	<u>238</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>340</u>
Deficit with the USSR financed by Soviet aid	(191)	(297)	(135)	(106)	(240)	(170)	(230)

* According to the 1968 Cuban-Soviet trade protocol, planned Cuban exports are about \$400 million. Because of Cuba's poor sugar harvest, however, actual exports will approximate \$370 million.

* These figures include cost of delivery.

18. Castro's failure to reach his unrealistic goal for sugar production would not by itself endanger his hold, particularly if a price-supporting sugar agreement should come into effect. But the continued sacrifice which he will presumably attempt to extract from the Cuban people in trying to meet it might further decrease his popularity. At best, the prospect for the next several years is for additional demands for sacrifice and for the performance of arduous agricultural tasks.

19.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

20.

[REDACTED] Each time the Revolution has suffered some setback, Castro has made new demands upon the population, but his popularity and political skill have mitigated the negative consequences for his regime, and his pragmatism has kept him from pushing the population too hard at any one time. The men around him have a crucial stake in the survival of his re-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

gime. Furthermore, the Soviets probably see no potential alternative to Castro in whom they could have confidence. These advantages will not necessarily endure for many years; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] But the repressive apparatus of the state has been used to silence opposition, and this will certainly continue to the extent Castro considers it necessary. We believe that some combination of these factors—including the possible restoration, albeit under state auspices, of some recently proscribed diversions and services—will prevent the development of any major and threatening dissident movement in Cuba. In short, Castro will probably continue to dominate the Cuban scene at least for the period of this estimate, even though the level of discontent may continue to rise.

21. In the unpredictable event of Castro's death or incapacitation, we believe that the most likely outcome would be some form of collective leadership centered on Raúl Castro. [REDACTED]

22. In recent months, Fidel Castro—perhaps because of the harsh economic developments in Cuba and the loss of his companion Che Guevara in the fiasco in Bolivia—has shown little interest publicly in the "export of revolution" to the rest of Latin America. There is good evidence that would-be revolutionaries continue to receive some training and moral support from Cuba, however, and the propagation of revolution remains a basic tenet of Castro's philosophy. It is possible that he might try to develop a new approach to revolution in Latin America within the next couple of years.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

23. We believe that neither a troubled economy nor Soviet economic pressure will drive Castro toward the US for assistance or trade. Rather, he will seek to expand his trade with other non-Communist countries. Decisions by their governments about trade or diplomatic relations with Cuba will increasingly tend to be based upon their appraisal of Cuba's credit-worthiness or their own direct domestic and international political interests, [REDACTED]

24. Recently a number of prominent Latin Americans have speculated on the possibility of their governments' eventual recognition of Cuba; one notable exponent of this possibility is the Foreign Minister of Brazil. Such talk does not mean that any Latin American government will reverse its policy toward Cuba over the next year or two, but it does indicate that the subject is becoming [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In recent weeks, a number of Latin American countries were influential in bringing about the election of Cuba to a commission of the UN Economic

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and Social Council; this appears to reflect an interest in reducing that country's diplomatic isolation.

25. It seems most unlikely that Castro will unilaterally seek rapprochement with the US, or that he would be responsive to direct overtures by the US on any significant issue except gradually over a long period. One of the possible opportunities for change in the relationship would arise, under certain circumstances, from an international agreement on sugar. Castro will probably continue to be interested in a sugar agreement, and be willing, with a favorable share of the international market and a significant price increase, to sign one.

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: ~~TOP SECRET~~ **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Whitely King file
~~Secret~~

REF ID: A66718
1975-10-10

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Cuba's Changing International Role

~~Secret~~

16 OCT 1975

Copy N° 410

~~Working Copy~~
~~Section Initials, Dates, Sources and Methods Involved~~



~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~
~~Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS



~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2002

NIE 85-1-75

CUBA'S CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ROLE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the National Security Agency.

Concurring:

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, National Security Agency

The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury

The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration

Abstaining:

The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

CONTENTS

	Page
PRECIS	1
DISCUSSION	4
THE REVOLUTION MATURES	4
THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY	7
Cuba and the Third World	7
Cuba and Latin America	8
Cuba and the USSR	9
Cuba and the US	10
The US Sanctions	11
Compensation	12
OUTLOOK FOR US-CUBA RELATIONS	13
ANNEX: The Cuban Economy	17

~~SECRET~~

CUBA'S CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ROLE

PRECIS

During the last five years, Fidel Castro has wrought dramatic changes in national plans, priorities, and methods of governing Cuba. As a result:

- His Revolution has become more institutionalized, with the Communist Party assuming an expanding policy-making role.
- Economic conditions are better than at any time since 1959; however, the economy has recently benefited from exceptionally high sugar prices and remains heavily dependent on Soviet trade and assistance.
- A new governing consensus has emerged which better relates policy and its implementation to current Cuban needs.
- Castro's power and popularity have increased.

These accomplishments—combined with Castro's view that the world power alignment is changing in favor of the Socialist bloc—seem to have persuaded him that the Revolution is secure and successful, and to have reinforced his conviction that Cuba is triumphing over "imperialism."

As a consequence, he has had increasing success in fulfilling the often divergent roles of:

- a leader of the Latin American and Caribbean communities and a spokesman for Third World and revolutionary causes, while remaining a loyal member of the Soviet camp; and

- an intermediary between Third World and communist countries and a catalyst in forging a greater convergence of interests among them.

Castro desires a normalization of relations with the US because he believes it will:

- confirm to the world the legitimacy and permanence of his Revolution;
- give him access to US products and markets; and
- facilitate the accomplishment of his foreign policy objectives.

In maneuvering toward normalization, he will weigh the sometimes divergent views of his leading advisers:

- Hardliners support normalization but with serious misgivings; they are likely to urge Castro to take strong positions and to move slowly.
- Pragmatists in the leadership want to secure the economic benefits that they believe would result from a lifting of the sanctions, and would concede the most to reach a settlement soon.

We believe that Castro is ready to enter into preliminary discussions with the US now, but he probably calculates that a negotiated settlement with the US is unlikely soon, and that a protracted process of negotiation would be more to his advantage than to that of the US. We believe that he will not agree to negotiations on substantive issues without further action by the US to lift its sanctions against Cuba. There is a better-than-even chance that a partial reduction in the scope of US sanctions would be enough to lead Castro to engage in substantive negotiations. He would of course expect that one consequence of the negotiations would be the complete lifting of the sanctions, and he might believe that the conduct of negotiations would of itself improve the climate for trade.

Castro will be prepared to make concessions on some issues. He:

- will probably be willing to pay a small percentage of the claims for compensation for expropriated US properties after a great deal of hard bargaining.
- will probably be willing to curtail some of Cuba's activities in behalf of Puerto Rican independence, but Cuba can be expected to continue lending propaganda support to the Puerto Rican independence movement, though increasingly through international front organizations.

~~SECRET~~

— will be less conciliatory on issues relating to Cuban sovereignty, and is likely to demand a definite commitment by the US to relinquish the naval base at Guantanamo Bay and to terminate overflights.

Castro will be inflexible about negotiating Havana's relationship with the USSR and he will not jeopardize his broader foreign policy objectives in Latin America, the Third World, and the communist camp simply to get quick solution to his bilateral problems with the US. Rather, he hopes that rapprochement will enable him to pursue a more energetic foreign policy in these areas and enhance his prestige as a leading Third World statesman.

3
~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

1. The year 1970 represented a watershed in the development of the Cuban Revolution. Following the disastrous effort to produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1969-70, the Cuban economy was in disarray, Castro was at the nadir of his popularity, both at home and abroad, and his ability to maneuver politically was at a low ebb. Responding to these problems and to pressure from Moscow and elements in the Cuban leadership to steer a more flexible course, he set in motion a sweeping reconstitution of the political process. The result was the increasing institutionalization of the Revolution that for years was an extension of Castro's personality, the emergence of a new and more pragmatic governing consensus, and a radical alteration of national plans, priorities, and methods of governing.

THE REVOLUTION MATURES

2. Until a few years ago, Castro was fearful of any institutionalization of the Revolution that might dilute his own authority, and reluctant to delegate powers of decision. He now seems not only reconciled to institutionalization but persuaded that it is essential to perpetuate his Revolution. He has apparently become convinced that complex bureaucracies can easily be controlled in an authoritarian society, particularly by a strong and popular leader. The evidence is that he is indeed in control



Fidel Castro

of the institutionalization process. The larger and more competent apparatus that he is creating to carry out his programs has become an addition to the two traditional bulwarks of his power—the support he receives from the military and security establishment and his popularity with the masses.

3. The restructuring of Cuban institutions largely reflects Castro's acceptance of Soviet advice and bureaucratic models. Responsibility for managing the economy has been delegated by Castro as he has looked outside of the circle of his trusted former guerrilla colleagues for talent. The authority of the party has been greatly expanded and the influence of the military in civilian affairs has been curtailed. The Cuban Communist Party is scheduled to hold its first national congress in December as an important part of this continuing process.

4. During the last year or two, Cuba's domestic and foreign policies have come closer to fulfilling Castro's aspirations than at any time since he rose to power. As a result, Castro's position as Cuba's maximum leader has been considerably enhanced. Better management and planning, combined with the increased productivity of an expanded work force and high world sugar prices, have resulted in better economic conditions than at any time since 1959.¹ Public morale and support of the government have improved as some of the benefits of economic growth have filtered down and as the mass mobilizations, exhortations, and martial atmosphere of earlier years have been increasingly supplanted by efforts to stimulate production through the use of tangible rewards. Rationed goods are more readily available as a result of Cuba's increased capacity to import and improvements in transportation and distribution. Some luxury goods are no longer rationed and are available in greater quantities.

5. Castro has also achieved a number of successes in the international arena. During the past few years he has been transformed from a virtual pariah to a position of increasing acceptance and even respectability. The rising mood of economic nationalism in Latin America and throughout the Third

World and the increasing spirit of solidarity among the less developed nations have worked to Cuba's advantage. These developments, and the defeat of US policy in Indochina, have added to Castro's belief that the US is on the defensive and that the international balance of power has shifted in favor of the communist and Third World countries.

6. Extremists have long since been removed from positions of influence in Cuba and the leadership is more united than ever before. Nonetheless, disagreements among individuals and groups in the hierarchy arise from distinctive generational perspectives, old rivalries, and different opinions about specific aspects of national policy. Castro remains fully in control, but he has increasingly assumed the role of mollifier and arbitrator in a successful effort to minimize factionalism. As one means of balancing the differences and competing interests of groups in the leadership, Castro has moved to compartmentalize administrative and policymaking functions. The remaining "old" communists are concentrated in the fields of foreign policy and economic planning, while Castro's former guerrilla colleagues control the military and security establishment. A new generation of technocrats is increasingly influential in the party and government bureaucracies.

7. Castro's new outlook and methods reflect his acceptance of much of the advice of the "old" communists—members of the pre-revolutionary communist party who survived the purges of the 1960s. Although few in number and aging (many are in their 60s and 70s), they have acquired considerable influence as the architects of the successful domestic and foreign policies that have been pursued during the last few years. They usually are the first in the leadership to reflect Soviet attitudes and to recommend pragmatic solutions for Cuba's problems. They have survived because of their ability to adjust their views and tactics to prevailing circumstances, their administrative and technical competence, and their commitment to Castro and the Revolution. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the regime's top foreign policy official and one of its ablest planners and theoreticians, is the leading member of the group and probably the most influential Cuban leader after Castro and his brother, Raul.

¹ Statistics on the economy and the outlook for economic performance during the next year or two are at Annex.



Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

8. Loyal associates of the Castros from the guerilla period—most of them in their 40s and 50s—occupy all of the principal positions in the military and security forces and will continue to do so. Castro's control over these forces is exercised through his brother, who is the regime's top military chief, its second in command both in the party and the government, and Castro's chosen heir. A number of other guerrilla veterans who have retired from the military continue to exert considerable influence in their civilian positions. Present and former military officers constitute the "hardline" wing of the leadership on most issues. There is probably some discontent within this group, principally because of its reduced influence as a general policymaking elite. The Castros have gone to considerable lengths to neutralize possible discontent, however, and to ensure prior military approval of major policy initiatives. From all appearances, they have been successful.

9. A third elite group—the emerging generation of technocrats—is believed generally to endorse the pragmatic policies of the "old" communists. They have advanced quickly throughout the party and government both because their scientific, technical, and managerial skills are so badly needed and because, as products of the Cuban Revolution, their credentials are unassailable. In their late 20s and



Raul Castro

30s, they have few memories of the pre-revolutionary period. Their knowledge of the outside world was acquired for the most part in the USSR and Eastern Europe where many were trained, particularly those with advanced degrees or skills. Although information about them is scarce at best, we believe that most of the young technocrats are committed to the decentralization and institutionalization that is taking place and to the new policies pursued at home and abroad.

10. The party and government institutions that will emerge from the Communist Party congress this year will reflect Castro's desire to balance the interests of the principal elite groups as well as his goal of creating a more effective bureaucracy. "Old" communists and young technocrats probably will be represented in larger numbers in the regime's top councils, and together they could constitute majorities in many. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is likely to

be elevated to the Politburo and some of his colleagues, including Blas Roca—the leader of the pre-revolutionary communist party—apparently are slated to gain stature in recognition of their accomplishments. Regardless of how the bureaucracy is staffed, however, Castro's comrades-in-arms from the Sierra Maestra will remain his principal base of support and the most potent political force in Cuba.

11. Buoyed by the increasing coalescence of the Revolution and his enhanced personal power and popularity, Castro has adopted a more relaxed style of leadership. In contrast to the impulsive and exuberant manner that was characteristic through the 1960s, he is now relatively restrained and out of the limelight for lengths of time. His speeches are fewer and shorter, and departing from his earlier spontaneous style of oratory, he often reads from prepared texts or notes. He has less direct contact with the public, and no longer tries to function as a roving ombudsman for the common man. Castro was 49 on August 13, but despite recurring minor pulmonary and intestinal problems, he is in good health.

12. As Castro has matured, he has come to evaluate the state of the Revolution and its standing abroad more rigorously and dispassionately. He is better able to concentrate on immediate priorities rather than his visions of Cuba's distant future and is devoting more attention to the tedious bureaucratic duties required by his party and government posts. His personal sense of security has increased as threats to his rule have diminished and, now that he no longer is continually on the defensive, he seems to have his ego better under control. Arrogant, pugnacious, and boastful conduct has been rare during the last few years, and his behavior and disposition are likely to remain more constant and predictable than in the past. Despite his more subdued style, Castro exudes a degree of confidence and righteousness that is reminiscent of his triumphal mood of the early 1960s.

THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

13. During the past year or so, Castro has been better able to fulfill his principal—and often divergent—foreign policy goals: to be a leader of the Latin American and Caribbean communities and a

spokesman for Third World and revolutionary causes, while remaining a loyal member of the Soviet camp. He has gained prestige within Latin America and the Third World even as he has more conspicuously synchronized Cuba's domestic and foreign policies with Moscow's. Thus, although he has more willingly complied with Soviet urgings to loosen his ties with subversive groups advocating armed insurrection, continued to defend the USSR against charges that it is an imperialist power, and even acted as Moscow's surrogate in several countries of the Third World, it is paradoxical that his standing has improved since the period in the late 1960s and early 1970s when he was widely regarded as a Soviet puppet.

14. Castro has succeeded in juggling his diverse foreign policy goals largely because one of the most basic and long-standing assumptions of Cuban foreign policy has been reversed, as the psychology of the "Revolution besieged" has given way to the belief that it is secure and successful. This has enabled Castro to move away from his characteristic role as the aggrieved underdog in continual confrontation with the US and to assume one as a senior Third World statesman who has triumphed over US "imperialism." Because he has been able to play this new role convincingly, he feels less compelled to demonstrate his credentials by fomenting revolution, asserting his independence of Moscow, or jousting with the US.

Cuba and the Third World

15. Castro seems to be looking ahead to an increasingly prestigious role for himself and Cuba. His forceful and optimistic foreign policy increasingly has focused on the wish to act not only as an intermediary between communist and Third World countries, but as a catalyst in forging a greater convergence of interests among them. This goal has been evident in Latin America, where the leaders of regional communist parties who met in Havana in June announced their intention to join with local leftist and revolutionary groups in united fronts aimed at undermining US influence. In orchestrating the conference, Castro was helping to further the Soviet design of strengthening the pro-Moscow parties in the hemisphere, but he also was motivated by the desire to act as an independent broker be-

tween communist and other leftist interests. This ambition is only a slight variation on a theme that has strongly influenced Castro's thinking since the early 1960s.

16. Castro's ability to play this complex and ambitious role is facilitated, he believes, not only because "imperialism" is in eclipse, but because of Cuba's unique qualifications. One of these is the racial diversity of the Cuban populace and its cultural and linguistic affinities with a number of less developed nations. Also, unlike the leadership elites of virtually all communist and Third World countries, Castro's entourage is composed both of influential members of a traditional pro-Moscow communist party and veterans of a successful guerrilla insurgency. He relies primarily on members of the Rodriguez group to represent Cuba with other communist parties, and on his former comrades-in-arms as emissaries to revolutionary groups and governments. In Portugal and a few other countries, both lines of communication are cultivated simultaneously. Because of these special qualifications, Castro is able to balance the need—urged on him by Moscow—to perform as the USSR's stand-in in certain Third World countries with his fervent desire to maintain his revolutionary image and to enhance his credibility as a bridge between the communist and less developed worlds.

17. The Cubans are active in the Third World, often working closely with the Soviets. The economic, technical, and security assistance that Cuban advisers provide the governments of several countries, including Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tanzania, contributes directly to the fulfillment of both Cuban and Soviet objectives. Military advisers from both nations work with the government of South Yemen to train Arab guerrillas, including members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and members of Palestinian groups. A number of Cubans reportedly also have been assigned to work with the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Cuba and Latin America

18. Castro pursues a more independent line in Latin America and the Caribbean than elsewhere in the Third World. His desire to be a major and repre-

sentative regional leader is so fundamental, in fact, that it has led to his only continuing show of displeasure with Moscow during the last few years. In 1972 he made clear that Cuba was inducted into membership in the Soviet-sponsored CEMA only reluctantly, and he has subsequently rendered only half-hearted support to the organization. Meanwhile, he has publicly expressed his preference for regional economic organizations such as the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and the proposed Central American and Caribbean Shipping Fleet. Havana has emphasized its independent stance in bilateral relations in the region as well. In Peru, the Cubans apparently are continuing to support the pro-government labor movement rather than the pro-Soviet group.

19. Castro has all but eliminated his support for armed insurgency in Latin America, but he continues to maintain contact with some extremist groups. He would probably resume his support for insurgency through such means as propaganda, money, and training if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of succeeding. At the present time, however, he apparently sees no favorable prospects for armed insurgency anywhere in Latin America.

20. Cuban and Soviet objectives and methods in the hemisphere are increasingly compatible, and Moscow now appears satisfied that Castro's aspirations to leadership in the region work to its advantage as well as his. This has been especially true since the meeting of Latin American communist parties in Havana in June when long-standing differences between Castro and the Soviet leadership apparently were resolved. At that meeting the Castro government committed itself not to support groups advocating armed insurrection except in collaboration with the local pro-Moscow communist parties. To create broad leftist fronts, Castro has already begun to urge groups that he once supported in other countries to unite with local communist parties.

delete

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

21. In return, the USSR probably has conceded to Castro a considerable degree of freedom in pursuing the current broad front tactics in Latin America and in assuming more of a leadership role in regional communist affairs. Recent reports indicate, for instance, that the USSR plans to transfer to Cuba the school now located in Moscow which trains Latin Americans in Marxism and Soviet organizational techniques. In certain countries—particularly in the Caribbean basin where Soviet influence is marginal and Cuban interest keen—Moscow apparently is deferring to the Cubans. In Guyana, for example, Castro has developed close ties with the Burnham administration and reportedly has advised the communists—the principal opposition party—to subordinate themselves to the government party. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, Castro also seems to have won Soviet backing for his independent efforts to expand Cuban influence with established governments.

22. Castro's commitment to these new means of pursuing his leadership designs in Latin America has been reinforced, moreover, by recent developments and emerging trends in the region. The legitimacy and permanence of the Cuban Revolution has been widely acknowledged as a result of the recent OAS decision in Costa Rica to end mandatory sanctions against Cuba and the willingness of an increasing number of governments to establish formal relations with Havana. Castro also has been encouraged by the nationalistic attitudes of many governments—particularly those in Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Mexico, and the Commonwealth Caribbean nations—and by their increasing desire to work together and with Havana. Cuba has, for example, broadened its ties with Panama since the resumption of diplomatic relations in August 1974

earliest days of the Revolution—to promote independence for Puerto Rico. Over the past year or so the issue has been pressed with unprecedented intensity at the UN and other international forums. Havana was the site of an international conference in early September to generate support for that cause, and top Cuban officials increasingly have become identified with it. In the keynote address at the Havana meeting, President Dorticos reasserted Cuba's long-standing position that Puerto Rico "is a Latin American nation subjugated to colonial domination and is not a domestic problem of the US." On September 28 Castro lent the weight of his prestige to the issue. In remarks apparently intended as a response to what he labeled "strong statements" by US officials, he implied that Cuban solidarity with the cause of Puerto Rican independence is a matter of principle and that it will not be renounced in order to improve relations with the US.

24. It is difficult to understand why Castro has been pushing the Puerto Rican issue. He probably has few illusions about the vitality of the Puerto Rican independence movement, and he could not have failed to recognize that Cuba's stance would affect the prospects for normalizing relations with the US. A possible explanation is that he contemplated using the Puerto Rican issue as a bargaining chip in dealing with the US. In addition, he may have come to believe that he could generate substantial support for Puerto Rican independence in Latin America and the Third World, while simultaneously enhancing his image as revolutionary and Third World leader. His conviction that the international balance of power has changed and that US strength and influence are decreasing may have produced a simple miscalculation of his prospects. Whatever his reasons, he clearly did not expect the US reaction to be as strong as it was.

Cuba and the USSR

25. Cuba's political, economic, and military ties with the USSR pervade national life and policy more than ever before. The domestic and foreign policies of the Castro government reflect broad acquiescence in Soviet tutelage, and Castro is likely to consent to an even wider range of cooperation during the next year or two. In recent months Havana has gone to some unusual lengths to dem-

debt
[redacted]
Castro's personal respectability has been greatly enhanced, moreover, as the list of Latin American chiefs of state and other senior officials to visit Cuba has grown, and as some Caribbean leaders have attempted to adapt certain Cuban programs and policies to their countries.

23. As Cuban interest and influence in the Caribbean have mounted, Havana has greatly expanded its efforts—carried out sporadically since the

onstrate its affinity for Moscow: it ostentatiously supported Moscow's position in the Sino-Soviet polemic at the recent meeting of Latin American communist parties in Havana, Cuban spokesmen and the media went to extremes in praising the Soviet role in World War II on the recent anniversary of the war's end, and the preamble of the draft Cuban constitution now under consideration contains a laudatory reference to the USSR. These gestures probably were intended emphatically to reaffirm Cuban-Soviet solidarity as Havana maneuvers toward reconciliation with the US.

26. The USSR continues to underwrite the Cuban economy on a substantial scale. Direct Soviet economic assistance totaled about \$275 million in 1974, bringing Soviet balance-of-payments and development aid to some \$4.4 billion since 1961. In addition, Moscow has paid over \$800 million in premium prices for Cuban sugar during this period. It provides nearly all of the island's petroleum needs at less than half the world price, and has subsidized Cuban petroleum purchases to the tune of \$375 million since the rise in world oil prices in 1974. Moscow remains Cuba's principal trading partner, accounting last year for about two fifths of its total trade and about 50 percent of total Cuban imports. Another strong indication of the Soviet commitment is the presence of from 5,000 to 8,000 Soviet civilian advisers and technicians situated throughout the Cuban bureaucracy.

27. The Cuban military establishment is almost entirely dependent on the USSR. Moscow maintains the defensive capabilities of the Cuban armed forces by replenishing materiel at the modest levels of recent years; in 1974, \$36.5 million worth of military hardware was delivered. There is no evidence that new weapon systems have been introduced, although two SA-3 surface-to-air missile sites have been under construction for over a year and could become operational in short order if the required equipment were supplied. The Soviet naval air force continues to use Havana's Jose Marti Airport three or four times a year as a staging point for its long-range TU-95 aircraft, and Soviet naval combatants periodically call at Cuban ports. No Soviet submarines have participated in the last three visits, and joint naval operations with the Cubans were not held as in earlier years.

28. A Soviet military mission consisting of perhaps 2,000 personnel is permanently stationed in Cuba. Of these, an estimated 1,500 are probably assigned to advise their Cuban counterparts in operating and maintaining Soviet-supplied equipment and in related training activities. They probably are concentrated in those areas where the most advanced technology is used: i.e., the air force, surface-to-air missile system, radar networks, and certain naval units. This contingent is commanded by a Soviet army lieutenant general. Soviet advisers also work closely with Cuba's intelligence services, which were organized with extensive Soviet guidance and training and which collaborate with the Soviets in intelligence operations abroad.

EO 12958
3.A(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

29. There appears to be little opposition in the Castro government to the extent of Cuba's dependence on the USSR. The Cuban leadership recognizes the enormous contribution of Soviet assistance in supporting the Cuban economy. Most of the "old" communists have had close ties with Soviet leaders since the 1930s; the military cannot function without Soviet largesse; and the young technocrats are believed generally to reflect Soviet attitudes. Some of Castro's former guerrilla colleagues now in civilian jobs probably desire greater independence from Moscow even at the expense of reduced Soviet support, but they are a distinct minority. Castro weighs in strongly with the majority, for domestic political reasons and because he knows that Cuba has no alternative. Most importantly, he believes that he can successfully pursue his leadership goals in Latin America and the Third World while enjoying the benefits of his close association with Moscow.

Cuba and the US

30. Castro has moved to reconcile Cuba's differences with the US, partly in response to pressures from Moscow and the Rodriguez group. He took the first important steps in that direction by concluding an anti-hijacking agreement with the US in February 1973 and by publicly accepting the principle of detente in early 1974. By then he was satisfied that he was in a favorable position because

of the cohesion and strength of his regime, its increasing accomplishments at home and abroad, and his belief that pressures on the US Government to accommodate him were mounting. Following President Nixon's resignation, he became more willing to reconcile bilateral differences and more optimistic about the chances of doing so to his advantage. He continued, nevertheless, to adhere to his standard demand that the US unilaterally lift its economic sanctions against Cuba before he would negotiate the full list of bilateral problems.

31. The Rodriguez group, the leading force advocating normalization of relations with the US, is probably supported by a majority of the new Cuban technocrats. Both groups favor detente to stay in step with Moscow and to secure the economic benefits that they believe would result from trade and access to US markets. Compared to other groups and individuals in the leadership, they probably would concede the most to US demands for compensation for properties seized during the Revolution and would not place heavy weight on the Guantanamo and overflight issues. On the other hand, they would strongly resist any effort to interfere with Cuba's ties with Moscow or any threats to the regime's ideological integrity. Because of the strong position they have taken in favor of detente with the US, leading members of the Rodriguez group must realize that should Castro feel embarrassed or thwarted in his overtures or in future negotiations, they would be the logical scapegoats.

32. Cuba's military leaders apparently also favor reconciling bilateral differences with the US, but with some serious misgivings. They concurred in Castro's public assessment early this year that the "danger of US aggression" had diminished greatly. They also realize that their goals of regaining Guantanamo and ending US reconnaissance flights can only be achieved in the context of a general rapprochement.

33. At the same time, many present and former military leaders are concerned about the possible effects of detente, and they will insist on playing an important role in any bilateral negotiations in order to protect their interests. They particularly fear that cultural and ideological influences from the US could "corrupt" Cuban youth and have

undertaken a national campaign aimed at preventing such "diversionism." Because of the relatively austere line they take on social and economic issues, they probably attach less importance to any economic advantages that would accrue to Cuba. Although there is no evidence on the point, they may also worry that once Cuba and the US come to terms, the importance of their country and its military needs will recede in the Soviet view. They probably prefer that rapprochement proceed slowly, and probably are counseling Castro to hold fast to his position that Cuba will not enter formal talks until the US sanctions are lifted unilaterally. Raul Castro's opinion on these issues is not known, but as the originator of the campaign against "ideological diversionism" he must share some of the concerns of his top lieutenants.

34. Castro's motives for seeking a reconciliation, the weights he places on the issues, and the timetable and tactics he will pursue are likely to continue reflecting his desire to balance the views of his principal advisers. Like the Rodriguez group, he wants to see the US embargo terminated so that Cuba can gain access to US goods and markets. Reflecting the attitudes of many of his military commanders, he will seek to protect and enhance Cuba's sovereignty. He wants the Guantanamo naval base back, the reconnaissance flights ended, and the security that would result from the acceptance of his government by the US. Castro has concluded that by normalizing relations with the US, he can not only enhance the prestige and legitimacy of his regime, but also gain maneuverability to pursue a more active foreign policy elsewhere in the world. He is ready to negotiate outstanding bilateral issues but seems to believe that he can get most of what he wants without conceding too much in return.

The US Sanctions

35. During the last few months, Havana has modified its long-standing demand that the US unilaterally end its embargo on trade with Cuba as a precondition for negotiations. On May 7, while Senator McGovern was in Cuba, foreign journalists reported that Castro repeated the Cuban demand for a unilateral lifting of the US embargo, but suggested that the suspension of restrictions on the export of food and medicine would be enough to permit

negotiations to begin. The official Cuban press release was more ambiguous, quoting Castro as having said only that a partial lifting would be construed by Havana "as an important step that would lead to a reconsideration of Cuba's relations with the US." On August 21, at a press conference held during the visit to Cuba of President Echeverria of Mexico, Castro said that Cuba did not object to establishing contact or to holding talks. The embargo would have to be lifted, however, before there could be "deep negotiations."

36. Cuban insistence on removing the "blockade" is not merely a symbolic stumbling block or a negotiating device, however. The myriad proscriptions that the US executive and legislative branches applied against the Castro government in the early 1960s were used by the regime for 15 years as one of its most powerful and emotional propaganda themes. Resistance to the "blockade" was employed until recently as a basic means of rallying popular support, motivating the armed forces, and justifying the economic hardships endured by many Cubans under Castro. Castro was closely identified with it, and his stubborn insistence that he would "never negotiate while under the pressure of the blockade" has become an integral part of his personal political platform. In the minds of many Cubans, in addition, the "blockade" includes not only the US economic denial program but past covert actions aimed at undermining the government and the economy. Thus, the issue is deeply imbedded in the consciousness of the Revolution and its leadership, and is particularly salient to present and former military leaders. If it were waived during the next year or two without some significant US concession, Castro's prestige with hardliners in the hierarchy might be badly damaged.

37. We believe, however, that the Rodriguez group and the emerging young technocrats in the government view the sanctions dispassionately from an economic planning perspective. The sanctions still impose annoying restraints on certain sectors of the economy and are the bane of the administrators and planners who are required to compensate for them. A significant portion of Cuba's industrial machinery and equipment was manufactured in the US and is extremely difficult to maintain be-

cause of the lack of US spare parts. More significantly, however, these pragmatists in the hierarchy are anxious to see the sanctions ended because they believe that many of the agricultural and industrial goods that Cuba currently acquires in Europe and Japan can be bought more cheaply in the US. In addition, many Cubans have a preference for US goods and probably continue to believe in the superiority of American technology.

38. If the sanctions were lifted, from one quarter to one half of Cuba's imports from non-communist countries—about \$850 million last year and an estimated \$1 billion in 1975—could be eventually transferred to the US. Cuban interest would probably center on spare parts, foodstuffs (particularly grain), transportation and agricultural equipment, computers, other capital goods including whole plants, and some consumer goods. In return, Havana could sell sugar, nickel, tobacco and tobacco products, and shellfish to the US. After meeting its obligations to the communist markets, it has been selling about 2 million tons of sugar on the free market annually, of which up to half—worth about \$350 million at current world prices—could ultimately be made available for export to the US. Production of nickel, tobacco, and shellfish probably will be sufficient during the next few years to permit exports of these items to the US totaling approximately \$50 million per annum.

Compensation

39. The principal elements in the Cuban leadership recognize that in the US the "blockade" issue is linked historically, legally, and politically with demands for compensation for properties seized by the Revolution. We believe that they take generally divergent views, nevertheless, which are consistent with their perspectives on how much the regime should compromise in order to achieve a rapprochement with the US. Hardliners probably are pressing Castro to remain committed to the position he took repeatedly until a year or so ago, when he ruled out any possibility of providing compensation while demanding "indemnification" for damages caused by the US economic denial program. The Rodriguez group is more flexible and apparently believes that US demands for compensation can be satisfied in a manner acceptable to both sides.

OUTLOOK FOR US-CUBA RELATIONS

40. In assessing the prospects for the normalization of relations with the US, Castro has probably concluded that he enjoys some distinct advantages. Changes within Cuba since 1970, which might have been expected to weaken him, have in fact strengthened his position. As the undisputed head of a united leadership, he is in a position to balance divergent views while preserving his own maneuverability. He appears to believe that the US is on the defensive, that international pressures on the US to accommodate him are increasing, and that US public opinion is shifting gradually but decisively in his favor.

41. Although Castro has unmistakably signaled his willingness to begin a dialogue with the US, we believe that he does not have a concrete timetable or program and that a number of considerations probably tempt him to protract the process. He is under no great pressure to proceed toward normalization and can do some hard and lengthy bargaining from the position of strength he now enjoys. He probably calculates that with the passage of time, pressures on the US to accommodate him will continue to grow. He may also believe that he can improve his bargaining position and get a better settlement with a new US administration.

42. We estimate, nonetheless, that Castro is prepared to enter into negotiations now. He would probably do so without precondition if the talks were of a preliminary and exploratory nature, and were held in secret. We believe that he would not enter into substantive talks on the issues without securing some US concession to his long-standing condition that the "blockade" be terminated unilaterally. In this regard, Castro has already publicly stated that the recent US relaxation on trade with Cuba by subsidiaries of US companies in third countries was a positive gesture, but that in essence the "blockade" was still in force. There is a better than even chance, however, that a partial reduction in the scope of the embargo on US trade with Cuba, e.g., allowing the sale of food and medicine and possibly certain industrial goods and spare parts as well, would be sufficient to induce Castro to negotiate on the issues. He would, of course, expect that one consequence of the nego-

tiations would be the complete lifting of the "blockade," and he may believe that the conduct of negotiations would itself further improve the prospect for trade. He may prefer a more elaborate face-saving device, however, and propose that the US and Cuba engage in secret talks to conclude conceptual agreements on some of the major issues. He may reason that in this manner Cuba could secretly make concessions in advance of formal talks in exchange for the lifting of the embargo as an apparently unilateral move.

43. Castro will be strongly impelled by a desire to establish the legitimacy and permanency of his regime. He would view an agreement to hold talks as serving this purpose and would consider resumption of relations with the US as putting the final stamp of legitimacy on the Cuban Revolution. Thus, as he maneuvers toward negotiations, and during any talks that might ensue, his actions will be motivated by a desire to strengthen an appearance of a Cuba triumphing over "imperialism." He is likely to oppose any negotiating scenario, or concessions, which appear inconsistent with this strategy.

44. Castro will exercise broad personal authority over the conduct of the negotiations and the formulation of Cuban positions. He is likely to try to seize and maintain the initiative, and to indulge his penchant for public dramas to advance Cuban positions. He will probably try to generate pressure on the US executive through appeals to legislative and public opinion and by using domestic and international media. He is also certain to seek expressions of support from other countries, much as General Torrijos has done with respect to the Panama Canal negotiations. In Latin America, he will probably solicit and receive such support from a number of countries on issues related to Cuban sovereignty, such as the return of Guantanamo and an end to US overflights. Conversely, he will be quite sensitive to reactions in Latin America and other Third World countries to what he does prior to and during any talks.

45. Castro is prepared to negotiate on the issue of paying compensation for expropriated US properties. Cuba has publicly recognized the principle of compensation, and Castro almost certainly understands that little progress can be made on other

issues, particularly the embargo, without Cuban concessions on compensation. Therefore, he probably will agree to pay a small percentage of US claims after a great deal of hard bargaining. We have no basis for estimating how much of the \$1.8 billion in claims certified by the US Foreign Claims Commission Cuba would be willing to satisfy. In arriving at a figure, Castro will be influenced by the settlements the US reached in Eastern Europe and Peru. He can be expected to advance counter-claims for damages he alleges the US inflicted on Cuba as a result of the embargo, the Bay of Pigs, exile raids, and similar activities, in order to reduce the amount he would ultimately have to pay. Castro will not agree to any settlement that would put serious strains on the Cuban economy.

46. Despite the strong public statements of its leaders, we believe that there is some flexibility in Cuba's position on Puerto Rico. In late 1972 and early 1973, Cuban Ambassador Alarcon sharply reduced his efforts and rhetoric at the UN aimed at highlighting the issue of the island's status, in order to avoid upsetting the talks then underway between the US and Cuba on airplane hijackings. We believe that Cuba would follow a similar pattern in connection with any future negotiations with the US. Castro reportedly is under pressure from Moscow to reduce the intensity of Cuban propaganda about Puerto Rico in order to facilitate detente with the US, and to support the Puerto Rican Communist Party instead of the more active Socialists. Many of his principal advisers, in addition, probably echo that line, and some reportedly are chagrined that the issue has intruded into the process of normalizing relations with the US.

47. If the subject is raised, we estimate that Havana will initially insist that its support for Puerto Rican independence is nonnegotiable. We believe, however, that to achieve its more important objectives in the normalization of relations with the US, it would ultimately agree to curtail—but not drop entirely—its pro-independence propaganda and its activities at international forums. Cuban negotiators probably would seek US concessions in return for any they make regarding Puerto Rico. Their future support for Puerto Rican independence would probably be increasingly through international front organizations.

48. Castro will be less conciliatory on issues related to Cuban sovereignty. He will demand a definite commitment by the US to relinquish the naval base at Guantanamo Bay as part of any negotiated settlement. His public statements suggest that he would be content to establish a timetable for US withdrawal rather than insist on immediate and total evacuation. He views Guantanamo as a much less important issue in the US than the Panama Canal, nevertheless, and probably will press for complete reversion of the base area to Cuba within a fairly short period of time. In order to achieve this objective he might be willing to provide some form of assurance that Guantanamo Bay would not be made available to the military forces of any foreign nation.²

49. It is highly unlikely that Castro would renounce the right to support "wars of national liberation" as part of any agreement with the United States. Cuba's draft constitution recognizes such "wars" as legitimate and describes Cuban aid for them as its "right and international obligation." Castro would probably agree, however, to a statement by both parties declaring their adherence to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

50. Havana is likely to insist that its relationship with the USSR is nonnegotiable. Cuba's political, economic, and military ties with Moscow are so extensive and vital in the regime's planning for the foreseeable future that there is little room for compromise. Castro might agree to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers in Cuba by several hundred at most, but he is more likely to emphasize that they are engaged in routine roles assisting the Cuban military to maintain its defensive capabilities.

² The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that Castro would consider any open-ended restriction on the future use of Guantanamo Bay as an infringement on Cuban sovereignty.

EO 12958
S (b)(1)-25Yrs

ties. He probably would refuse to negotiate about current use of Cuban air and port facilities by Soviet military units.

51. Castro is not likely to compromise his broader foreign policy objectives in the communist world or in Latin America and the rest of the Third World simply to settle bilateral problems with the US. On the contrary, he hopes that rapprochement will enable him to pursue an even more energetic foreign policy and enhance his prestige as a leading Third World statesman. Castro is likely to maintain high-level and regular consultations with Soviet leaders as the process of rapprochement with the US proceeds. He will do so both to reassure Moscow that he is not compromising any Soviet interests and to seek guidance in formulating Cuban negotiating positions and tactics.

52. Even with the assistance of Soviet experts in US affairs, however, Havana is likely to formulate positions that are based on distorted perceptions.

but many in the Cuban leadership remain surprisingly naive about the complexity of US political dynamics. Castro's interest in the

constitutional separation of powers in the US grew as the Watergate scandals unfolded and as Congress has assumed a more active foreign policy role, but his interpretation of these developments appears to lead him to overestimate the role of individual legislators and newsmen in influencing US foreign policy. This, and his exaggerated view of Cuba's strengths and influence relative to those of the US, could lead him to take extreme and overly optimistic positions in any future negotiations.

53. Castro probably has few illusions about the possibilities of achieving a speedy normalization of relations with the US. He can be expected to move forward progressively and to remain committed in principle to normalization but he will calculate each move according to his readings of a variety of international circumstances. He has entered into the diplomatic gamesmanship of detente, in addition, in the longer-term search for opportunities unavailable now and because he values the chance once again to strut conspicuously on the world stage. Because he fully appreciates the complexity and difficulty of his act, Castro will proceed slowly and cautiously toward reconciliation with the US while energetically pursuing other foreign policy objectives.

EO 12958
3.1(b)(1) > 25Yrs
(C)

delete

ANNEX

THE CUBAN ECONOMY

The Current Situation

1. Cuba's economic situation brightened considerably in 1974 as a result of record world sugar prices and fundamental economic policy changes underway since 1970. Real GNP rose about 5 percent, but part of the increase reflected the recovery from poor sugar crops and lagging industrial output in 1972 and 1973. Cuba's GNP at the end of 1974 is roughly estimated at \$6.1 billion or \$665 per capita.

2. Sugar production and construction accounted for most of the economy's improvement. Sugar output increased to about 6 million tons, up 13 percent over 1973 and one third above the drought-ridden 1972 harvest. The return of normal weather played a major role in the upturn, as did ongoing efforts at rationalization and mechanization which permitted an increase in labor productivity.

3. Construction activity rose an estimated 10 percent in 1974, reflecting Havana's heavy investment program. Expansion of infrastructure, particularly in the rural areas, accounted for much of the growth. Industrial construction continued strong, however, and the beleaguered housing industry, which has been receiving increased attention in recent years, registered a slight gain.

4. The non-sugar sectors of both agriculture and industry lagged behind the economy's general growth. Except for a 7 percent increase in the fishing sector, growth of non-sugar agriculture was hampered by inadequate rainfall during most of the year. The production of refined petroleum products and electric power rose significantly, but light industry achieved only a modest increase. Output in mining and building materials stagnated.

5. Improved management and the greater availability of foreign exchange were important factors

in Cuba's stronger economic performance. Since 1970 Havana has been implementing a number of measures of rationalization, including more orthodox planning and cost accounting procedures, the greater use of material incentives to encourage worker productivity, and the strict enforcement of anti-vagrancy laws to reduce worker absenteeism. In addition, progressive mechanization of the sugar harvest has reduced the disruptive use of "volunteer" cane cutters from other sectors of the economy.

6. Improved import capacity was due primarily to an unprecedented rise in sugar prices and to larger sugar shipments. Total export earnings soared to \$2.7 billion—double the 1973 level. Imports also rose steeply, but not as much as exports, and Cuba achieved its first trade surplus since Castro took power in 1959.

7. In 1974 sugar dominated exports more than ever, accounting for about 90 percent of the total. Nickel, shellfish, citrus, and tobacco accounted for the remaining 10 percent. Capital goods and transportation equipment continued to be the leading imports, but there were increases in imports of petroleum, foodstuffs, construction materials, and other intermediate goods during the year as well.

8. High world sugar prices and the strengthening domestic economy enabled Havana to expand its commercial ties with non-Communist countries. These countries accounted for about 40 percent of total Cuban trade in 1974 (compared with an average of 32 percent in 1971-73) and yielded a trade surplus of about \$400 million. Eager to exploit the expanding Cuban market, Argentina, Spain, the UK, France, and Canada have extended some \$3.2 billion in long-term commercial credits in the last two years—most of which have yet to be drawn.

9. Nevertheless, Havana remained closely tied to the USSR and, to a lesser extent, the other com-

munist countries. The USSR accounted for about two fifths of total Cuban trade in 1974, and it provided virtually all of Cuba's petroleum and a major share of its imports of capital goods and foodstuffs. Cuba continued to run a deficit with the USSR. Soviet aid totaled \$650 million, including some \$275 million in balance-of-payments assistance and development credits and about \$375 million in subsidized petroleum prices. Other communist countries accounted for about one fifth of Cuba's trade, but provided little financial assistance.

Outlook for the Economy

10. The Cuban economy probably will continue to grow slowly over the next couple of years. Continued Soviet assistance and credits from non-communist countries will enable Havana to maintain a high rate of investment, and the Castro regime is not likely to interrupt the economy's momentum by shifting its game plan as it was prone to do in the past. Growth will be considerably below the 6-9 percent annual target set out in Cuba's first Five Year Plan for 1976-80, however.

11. Sugar production in 1975 and 1976 probably will stagnate in the 5.5-6.0 million tons range, because of adverse weather and delayed plantings. Assuming the return of normal weather, output in 1977 should rise to 6.0-6.5 million tons as a result of continued modernization of the industry. Other sectors should continue to grow steadily as the investment program continues to develop both

infrastructure and industry. Cuba's first Five Year Plan to begin next year reportedly calls for investment of \$15 billion over the 1976-80 period, but it is far from certain that this figure will be achieved.

12. In 1975 Cuba's trade balance will show a smaller surplus than in 1974 and will fall back into deficit in subsequent years. After rising in 1975 as a result of a 50 percent increase in the price paid by the USSR for Cuban sugar, exports probably will stagnate and possibly decline in 1976 and 1977, primarily because of lower world sugar prices. Non-sugar exports will rise slightly during this period, but major gains are not expected until after 1980 when large expansion projects in the nickel industry are scheduled to be completed. Imports, on the other hand, are expected to jump sharply in 1975 and continue to grow in the following two years (see the table below). Because earnings from tourism and shipping will offset only part of the projected trade deficits, Cuba will again have to rely on capital inflows from communist and non-communist sources, in the form of trade and development aid, to cover the expected current account deficits.

13. Despite the projected economic improvement, we believe there is little likelihood that Cuba will become a consumer society during this decade. The accent on investment allows little room for significant increase in consumption during the next several years. While some consumer items, particularly luxury goods, will probably be made avail-

Cuba: Foreign Trade

Million US\$

	1958	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Total Exports (f.o.b.).....	742	860	837	1,380	2,745	3,080	2,850	3,075
Communist Countries.....	18	555	448	880	1,485	2,940	2,075	2,090
USSR.....	14	304	244	565	935	1,700	1,715	1,715
Eastern Europe.....	Negl.	160	137	210	375	285	285	300
Far East.....	4	91	65	106	175	75	75	75
Non-Communist Countries.....	724	305	391	500	1,260	1,050	875	985
Total Imports (c.i.f.).....	860	1,387	1,297	1,700	2,450	2,905	3,100	3,300
Communist Countries.....	2	969	896	1,225	1,800	1,905	2,050	2,200
USSR.....	Negl.	731	778	950	1,175	1,500	1,650	1,800
Eastern Europe.....	2	143	126	150	225	330	325	325
Far East.....	Negl.	95	92	125	200	75	75	75
Non-Communist Countries.....	858	418	301	475	850	1,000	1,050	1,100

able in greater quantities, most basic items will continue to be strictly rationed and the Cuban lifestyle will remain Spartan by Western standards.

Cuba-USSR Economic Relations

14. The Cuban economy remains closely tied to the USSR. Moscow is Havana's most important trading partner, providing not only virtually all of Cuba's petroleum needs, but also a major share of its capital goods and foodstuffs. During 1961-74 Cuba utilized some \$4.4 billion in Soviet development and balance-of-payments assistance to bolster its lagging import capacity. In addition, it received some \$800 million in sugar subsidy payments and an estimated \$375 million in petroleum subsidies following the rise in world oil prices in 1974. In 1972 Moscow formally recognized Cuba's inability to repay its debt and agreed to postpone amortization and interest until 1986 with repayment to stretch out over 25 years.

15. On the domestic scene, Soviet influence in economic matters has increased sharply since the disastrous 1969-70 drive to produce 10 million tons of sugar. Moscow has exerted strong pressures on Havana to implement more orthodox planning procedures and to improve economic management. It has also urged greater reliance on the pricing mechanism and material incentives, thus chipping away at some of the basic tenets of the Cuban revolution. To help implement measures of this kind, the number of Soviet technical advisers in Cuba has been greatly increased.

16. The USSR will remain Cuba's most important trading partner over the next few years and will play a major role in the execution of Cuba's Five Year Plan beginning in 1976. Under the recently signed Protocol for Coordination of National Economic Plans, Moscow reaffirmed its commitment to underwrite the development of the Cuban economy. It will provide assistance to all important branches of the economy and increased supplies of oil. Indirect support in the form of sugar and petroleum subsidies will almost certainly remain substantial. In addition, Moscow will continue to extend significant amounts of development aid both unilaterally and in conjunction with other CEMA members.

17. Termination of Soviet assistance would require a drastic cutback in Cuban imports and cause the economy to stagnate or decline. If Soviet sugar subsidies were halted, exports would decline some \$450 million in 1975 and perhaps as much as \$690 million in 1976. The termination of subsidized oil prices would add some \$200 million annually to Cuba's import bill if it attempted to maintain the current volume of purchases abroad.

Prospects for Cuba-US Trade

18. The prospects for Cuban-US bilateral trade, if the US embargo is lifted, are modest at best, and such trade will not return to its pre-Revolutionary levels. Even though the geographical proximity and complementarity of the two economies make them natural trading partners, Cuba is closely aligned with the USSR and other communist countries and for both ideological and economic reasons would not reduce these ties to any significant degree. The potential for US-Cuban trade is further inhibited by Cuba's limited hard-currency earnings and by strong competition for sales in Cuba by other major industrial non-communist countries. Finally, trade would not benefit from direct US investment in Cuba as it did in the period before the Revolution.

19. Nevertheless, Cuba would provide a modest market for US goods and technology. Cuban officials reportedly retain an affinity for US know-how and are not unaware of the potential savings in transportation costs in shifting to the US market. Given the availability of normal commercial credits, we believe that between one-quarter and one half of Cuban imports from the non-communist world, which will total an estimated \$1 billion in 1975, could eventually originate in the US. Because of Cuba's emphasis on investment for economic growth, Havana would be primarily interested in technology and all kinds of capital goods, as well as in replacement parts for US machinery and equipment already in Cuba. It would also probably seek some foodstuffs, principally rice.

20. In return, Havana could sell to the United States sugar, tobacco and tobacco products, nickel, and shellfish. After meeting its annual obligations to the communist markets, Havana has about 2

million tons of sugar available for sale on the world free market. Of this amount, we believe that Cuba would initially be willing to send up to 500,000 tons—worth about \$175 million at current world prices—to the United States. Sales of non-sugar items could bring total Cuban sales to the US to about \$200 million initially. Over the longer run, Cuban sugar sales to the US could rise to some 1 million tons annually, but Havana will avoid its former dependence on the US market.

21. Renewed trade with the US is not likely to have a significant impact on Cuban economic growth. The US embargo has lost much of its effect over time as Cuba has secured alternative

markets and sources of supply. The impact on the vital agricultural sector, for example, would be marginal. Moreover, any Cuban trade with the US would largely reflect a shift in Cuban sales and purchases from other non-communist countries and would not lead to a significant increase in Cuba's capacity to import. Nevertheless, access to US-made spare parts and high-quality US goods and technology would ease Cuba's remaining maintenance problems and provide some initial boost to economic activity in certain sectors. The renewal of trade would also result in some savings in transportation and would provide a sound base for expansion of the Cuban tourist industry.

100

1997

- out of
 of the
 staff
 in
 Nancy
 of time
 ready
 for the
 for the
 for the
 dry

in order
light
H2

1993, p. 117
1994, p. 114
1995, p. 112

100



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1) > 10
(C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

Cuba's Castro: Reactions of an Aging Revolutionary to His Ailing Revolution

An Intelligence Memorandum

~~Secret~~

PA 87 10232
June 1980

000

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

Cuba's Castro: Reactions of an Aging Revolutionary to His Ailing Revolution

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

Summary

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

No longer the youthful and supremely self-confident revolutionary, Fidel Castro—now nearly 54 years old—is reacting in characteristic, if exaggerated, fashion to strong evidence that his revolution is in serious difficulty. Although Castro intellectually recognized that popular discontent was significant and increasing and had decided to counter it by ridding the island of several hundred thousand “undesirables,” he was [redacted] at least initially, by the magnitude of the public discontent represented by the refugee exodus.

This major setback came on the heels of a series of political and personal losses. Because of the international reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Castro was not able to gain for Cuba a coveted seat on the UN Security Council, and he was not able to exploit Tito's death to gain undisputed leadership of the Nonaligned Movement. Furthermore, the death in January of his longtime friend and adviser, Celia Sanchez, deprived him of a moderating influence and a source of support during these difficult times.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

Castro [redacted]

[redacted] quickly moved to direct the blame outward and to unify his people against the “imperialist” United States.

At home, Castro probably will continue to repress dissent rather than fundamentally attack its root causes. At the same time, he will seek new victories on the international scene to compensate for the poor prospects in Cuba. But such victories will not be easy to achieve. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has hurt him in Third World caucuses, and rising world tensions will make Cuban military interventions more risky.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

To the extent that Castro is denied external as well as internal success, [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

The above material is [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Central Reference and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Information as of 28 May 1980 was used in the preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the [redacted]

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25
(C)

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10
(C)

**Cuba's Castro: Reactions of
an Aging Revolutionary
to His Ailing Revolution**

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10
(C)

Fidel Castro's capacity to survive 27 years of revolutionary struggle rests on
a blend of consummate political skill and

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

enabled him to survive numerous crises over the
years.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

Especially early in his regime, Castro was able to
forestall dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled promises of the revolution by
persuasively promising a rosy future.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

[redacted] As time went on, however, his capacity to carry the Cuban populace with him on the strength of his optimistic rhetoric weakened. In 1970, the failure to reach the production goal of 10 million tons of sugar came on the heels of a five-year period studded with policy failures. The dramatic failure of the sugar harvest—on which he had publicly staked the honor of the Cuban revolution—[redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Castro was moved to acknowledge in a major address in July 1970 that the failure was partly his fault. [redacted]

This seemed to sanction personal attacks on Castro. But when intellectuals dared to criticize him in response to this "permissive invitation," he reacted with Soviet-style repression, clamping down on critics. As he was confronted with increasing public dissatisfaction with his unfulfilled promises of a better life, [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] He has often sought to demonstrate his strength on the world scene when domestic developments were troublesome, and his adventurism has paid off. As domestic difficulties became apparent by mid-1977, he chose to intervene in Ethiopia and demonstrated a willingness to provide greater support for Central American revolutionary groups. As problems mounted within Cuba, he played an increasingly active role in the Nonaligned Movement.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Cuba's desperate need for hard currency forced Castro into a move that eventually sowed the seeds of magnified discontent. His decision in late 1978 to permit visits by Cuban exiles who brought gifts of consumer goods and tales of the good life in the United States made the Cuban people realize all the more clearly the gap between what they had been promised and what had been delivered. It set the stage for the unprecedented events of early April when thousands sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, and for the subsequent stream of over 100,000 Cubans to the United States from the port of Mariel.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

Some have said that we are experiencing difficulties. This gives the impression that we are crossing a current, a river. It would be better to say that we are sailing in a sea of difficulties. We have been in this sea for some time, and we will continue in this sea, sometimes more stormy, at other times more calm, but the shore is far away . . . for a long time, who knows how long? . . . We will march through a sea of difficulties; we will not be crossing it.¹

Even before the exodus, Castro clearly was aware that dissatisfaction was growing; he had been acknowledging partial failure of his revolution in a series of speeches over the past two years. In a 5 July speech to the People's Assembly concerning deficiencies in public services, he even went so far as to observe ruefully of the railroad, "Under capitalism it worked better." Most notable was his "secret" speech to the Assembly on 27 December 1979, which was subsequently disseminated to party cadres throughout Cuba and quickly became public. He spoke with candor, and in detail, about the problems facing the regime. He drew attention to the severe lack of hard currency, to plant diseases, import shortfalls, rising petroleum costs, and inefficiency, mismanagement, and waste. He indicated that "the severity of the difficulties we have encountered has led us to expand the circle of those in the know regarding these problems." In confronting the bleak economic prospects and the need to scale back the economic growth rate, he made clear that the difficulties were not transient. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] he acknowledged there had been mismanagement and errors in judgment:

The main enemy is our own shortcomings. Cubans cannot go on blaming the US embargo for all their problems. The most important now are of their own making. . . . We are of age, since the revolution has completed 20 years, and as such we have to take the responsibility for these problems. . . .

Strongly reminiscent of his "mea culpa" speech of 1970, this acknowledgment of failure probably intensified the already widespread discontent. In order to prevent open criticism of the regime such as occurred in 1970, however, Castro imposed a crackdown on dissidents and instituted a governmental reorganization. The refugee crisis soon followed.

¹ Castro to the People's Assembly, 27 December 1979.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Despite his statements and the evidence indicating a significant increase in popular discontent during the past year [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] managed to convert the embarrassment to his regime into a fierce attack on the United States.

The intensity of his reactions probably stems from the fact that the current crisis--like the 1970 crop failure-- [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] He had looked to 1979-80 as the time he would be confirmed as undisputed leader of the Nonaligned Movement. When the Nonaligned Summit took place in Havana in September 1979, Castro used the occasion to make a strong bid for its leadership, ideological as well as titular. Although he was not fully successful at the summit, Tito's health was failing, and Castro saw his time coming. He also hoped to enhance Cuba's international prestige by winning a seat on the UN Security Council. But the invasion of Afghanistan by his Soviet patron halted Castro's momentum. In the face of clear signs that opinion had shifted, he withdrew Cuba's application for a Council seat in January. When Tito died, Castro could not exploit the opportunity; in an ironic twist of fate, he could not even attend the funeral because of the Peruvian Embassy crisis.

The death of Celia Sanchez in January was another profoundly unsettling loss. She had been with him since the days in the Sierra Maestra and was both a wise counselor and moderating influence. Deprived of her support and advice, [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Outlook

Castro is now nearly 54 years old [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] However aware Castro is of Cuba's internal problems, he is unlikely to restrict his efforts on the international scene and concentrate on remedying problems at home. On the contrary, his success in turning public attention to the United States in the current crisis and his success during recent years in exploiting opportunities in Africa, Central

¹ From 1978 to 1979, the number of Cubans illegally departing by boat jumped from 19 to 374; the number illegally gaining entrance to Guantanamo jumped from three to 35; and the number forcing their way into embassies rose from zero to 28.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

America, and the Caribbean argue for increased Cuban efforts in the international arena. [redacted] unable to hold up Cuba as a total success, Castro will be moved to intensify his efforts to be a revolutionary on the international scene while he represses dissent at home.

Victories will not be easy to achieve. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will make Castro's attempts to sustain a leadership role in the Nonaligned Movement more difficult. Increased international tensions will make military adventures abroad more risky. The decreased likelihood of success on the international scene, in concert with the bleak prospects for improvement at home, [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Any diplomatic moves by Castro [redacted] will be designed to maneuver the United States to yield so he can depict the outcome as a victory. [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10<25Yrs
(C)

The above material is [redacted]



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

~~Secret~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

EO 12958 1.6(d) [1]
(C)

Latin America Review

22 August 1980

~~Secret~~

FAIR 80003
22 AUG 1980
000000

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

22 August 1980

CONTENTS

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Cuba: Death of Two Heroines 7

by

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

The deaths of two prominent revolutionary
figures could
add to Cubans' concern for the future.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) >10< 1981
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1) >10<
25Yrs
(C)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25yr
(C)

Cuba: Death of Two Heroines ☐

The deaths this year of two important female personalities of the Cuban revolution could ☐ lead some Cubans to question the current course of the revolution. The death of Celia Sanchez, 55, in January after a long bout with cancer deprived President Fidel Castro of the moderating influence and emotional support of a principal adviser and confidante. The suicide of Haydee Santamaria, 51, in July has prompted questions about ☐ her personal commitment to the Communist regime. A heroine from the earliest days of the revolution, Santamaria had long been revered as an example of revolutionary courage and dedication. Their deaths have come at a time of serious difficulties for Cuba and concern about the future. ☐

EO 12958 1.6(d)
(C)

Castro's Confidante

Celia Sanchez was Minister-Secretary of the Council of State and one of a handful of women belonging to the Communist Party Central Committee since its founding in 1965. Working directly under Castro's supervision, she had been responsible since the triumph of the revolution in 1959 for keeping a semblance of order in the Cuban leader's public and private lives. She was tasked with ensuring that all of Castro's orders were carried out; screening people who wished to see him; answering all of his correspondence; responding to popular grievances; and acting as a coordinator between Castro and other high government officials. She also served as a bridge between Castro and the Cuban people, interceding with him to plead the cause of many petitions lost in the Cuban bureaucracy. ☐

EO 12958 1.6(d)
(C)

Sanchez's death was a personal loss to President Castro. She had ☐ served as his secretary and most trusted confidante since the guerrilla days of the Sierra Maestra. For most of the 1960s, her apartment in Havana had been Castro's home

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10
(C)

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

and Cuban revolutionary head-
quarters. He sought her opinion
on many matters requiring a dif-
ficult decision and generally
followed her recommendations.

"The Girl of Moncada"

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Haydee Santamaria ranked with Sanchez as one of those almost mythical figures from the earliest days of the revolutionary struggle against President Fulgencio Batista. She was one of only two women who participated in the attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba led by Castro on 26 July 1953--the birth of the revolution. [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Santamaria's connection with the anti-Batista struggle was laden with personal tragedy and suffering. Many of the 160-man attacking force were killed; Santamaria's brother, Abel, and her fiancé, Boris Luis Santacoloma, were captured and tortured to death. Santamaria also was captured and forced to endure the tortures of her two loved ones, [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Santamaria later stood trial with Fidel

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C) and Raul Castro and the few other survivors of the abortive attack, and was sentenced to seven months imprisonment. []

After her release, she became known as "the girl of Moncada"; a legend of courage, sacrifice, and dedication built around her. Santamaria, however, was ill, []

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

[] Moreover, she saw a world indifferent to the tragedy of Moncada. []

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
5Yrs
(C) Nonetheless, [] Santamaria felt a debt to her dead men and a quickening of the ideal for which they had perished. She became the instrumental force behind the formation of Castro's 26th of July Movement following Castro's release from prison in 1955, and she served on its national directorate. Her tireless organizational work made her one of the most important figures in the rebel movement. She was largely responsible for organizing and securing funds for the Sierra Maestra guerrillas, and without her the revolutionary struggle might never have gotten off the ground. By the fall of 1958, hunted by Batista's police, she fled to the United States where she continued to raise funds for the rebel movement until victory was achieved in January 1959. []

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
5Yrs
(C) During the early years of the revolution, Santamaria maintained a prominent public position befitting her prestige and close friendship with Castro. She was the only woman on the national directorates of the two organizations that preceded the Cuban Communist Party (PCC)--the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. When the PCC was founded in 1965, she was named to its Central Committee. In 1976 she was elected deputy to the National Assembly and appointed to the Council of State. []

Santamaria's political influence, however, was more nominal than real. She never belonged to the close-knit, all-male group of Cuban policymakers, but her former husband, Armando Hart, is a member of the Politburo and her brother Aldo is Chief of the Cuban Navy and Vice Minister of the Armed Forces. Her influence appears to have been limited to having her friends appointed to

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

various government positions. The job that occupied most of her time and effort--director of the Casa de las Americas, an intellectual-cultural institution--had almost no political content. Her involvement with national and international women's groups also was almost devoid of any significant political substance. Even in the cultural field, Santamaria's role did not extend into

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1)>10<2
(C)

the policymaking area, and her counsel probably was not sought during the cultural retrenchment of the early 1970s, when a number of Cuban intellectuals were repressed severely for their mildly critical positions vis-a-vis the revolution. Her death, however, may cause further despair among Cuban intellectuals, already hard-pressed by the regime's ideological rigidity.

There is no evidence to suggest that Santamaria was dissatisfied with her status in the Cuban hierarchy. The "girl of Moncada" continued to be recognized with the undiminished respect and prestige of a revolutionary heroine.

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1)>10<2
5Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1)>10<2
5Yrs
(C)

Many questions remain unanswered about Santamaria's death. The manner of her suicide has not been revealed by Cuban authorities. The government, clearly embarrassed by such a dramatic demonstration of personal unhappiness from one of its heroes, blamed it on

EO 12958
1.6(d) (1)>10<2
25Yrs
(C)

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] it also expressed its disapproval by refusing to give her a state funeral suitable to her status. Delivering the eulogy at her funeral, Politburo member Juan Almeida left no doubt that Santamaria violated a basic revolutionary ethical principle by selfishly committing suicide: "As a matter of principle, we revolutionaries cannot agree with suicide. The life of a revolutionary belongs to his cause and his people and he should devote it to service until the last atom of energy and the last second of life." For one whose much vaunted personal sacrifices and dedication on behalf of the revolution had been held up for so long as an example for other Cubans, this was a particularly significant indictment. [redacted]

EO 12958

1.6(d) (1) > 10 < 2

5Yrs

(C)

Santamaria's suicide could be perceived by some of the Cuban public as a final act of despair--the most personal statement that the revolutionary dream for which she had sacrificed so much was shattered. She could be seen as a casualty of the sagging revolutionary elan affecting many sectors of the population. At the highest levels of the country's leadership, the dramatic manner of Santamaria's death two days after the 26 July celebrations is likely to reinforce a sense of malaise at this juncture in Cuba's 21-year-old revolution. Coming on the heels of Celia Sanchez's death, Santamaria's suicide also might [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) > 10 < 2

(C)

The Future for Women

Despite the often-claimed liberating impact of the revolution on Cuban women, they have remained effectively excluded from the leadership. No woman has ever served on the party's Politburo or its Secretariat. Out of a total of 124 Central Committee members and alternates selected in 1975, only 11 (8.9 percent) were women; moreover, five of these were alternates, clearly a second-ranking position. [redacted]

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) > 10 < 2

(C)

The deaths of Celia Sanchez and Haydee Santamaria accentuate the underrepresented status of women on the country's government group. The next PCC congress scheduled for December 1980 may elect more women to the Central Committee, but it is doubtful that female representation

22 August 1980

~~SECRET~~

in governing bodies will improve significantly in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Sanchez and Santamaria were more than just Central Committee members; they were irreplaceable heroines of the revolution and role models for Cuban women. Their loss could hamper government efforts to motivate women toward greater sacrifices on behalf of the revolution.

EO 12958 1.6(d) (1) > 10-2
(C)

22 August 1980



National
Intelligence
Council

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2002

~~Secret~~

NI

17 81-10015

**Castro Agonistes:
The Mounting Dilemmas
and Frustrations of
Cuba's *Caudillo*** ☐

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

National Intelligence Council
Memorandum

~~Secret~~

NIC M 81-10015
November 1981

Copy 301

14

3 7 9

Warning Notice

~~Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

National Security
Information

~~Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

Dissemination Control
Abbreviations

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

All material on this page
is Unclassified



National
Intelligence
Council

~~Secret~~

Castro Agonistes: The Mounting Dilemmas and Frustrations of Cuba's *Caudillo*

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

National Intelligence Council
Memorandum

*Information available as of 15 November 1981
was used in the preparation of this report.*

This Memorandum was coordinated within the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the
National Foreign Assessment Center. Comments
are welcome and should be addressed to its author,
Brian Latell, of the

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~Secret~~
NTE M 81-10013
November 1981

BLANK PAGE

~~Secret~~

**Castro Agonistes:
The Mounting Dilemmas
and Frustrations of
Cuba's Caudillo (U)**

Key Judgments

The Castro regime is facing its most serious domestic problems since it came to power in 1959. Familiar social, political, and economic stringencies that generated discontent in the 1960s and '70s, have been greatly aggravated since 1979 by serious demographic and generational pressures, major foreign policy setbacks, and Castro's declining effectiveness as the prophetic leader of the Revolution.

A critical generation gap has become one of Castro's greatest preoccupations:

- Thousands of Cubans born during the early 1960s baby boom have reached maturity over the last few years in a deeply troubled economy in which jobs, housing, and other resources are scarce.
- Cuban youths have already turned to crime and "antisocial" behavior, and as growing numbers come of age during the remainder of the decade, the likelihood of significant opposition to Castro will probably increase.
- Castro seems obsessed with that half of the population under 25, and with the dilemmas of how to inculcate in them the myths and hopes of his generation of revolutionaries.

As these and other pressures have increased, Castro's leadership style and his public mood have changed dramatically. His numerous speeches since December 1979 reveal that he:

- Has been dwelling inordinately on the past, and particularly on his exploits as a young revolutionary.
- Is disturbed that his plan to be an energetic leader of the nonaligned movement was shattered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- Is brooding about the intractable problems of Cuba's underdevelopment and the bleak prospects for the economy during the remainder of the century.
- Has replaced his utopian visions of the 1960s and '70s with a dark preoccupation with holocaust and apocalypse.
- Fears that his regime will have to defend itself in a military conflict with the United States in which a large portion of the Cuban population would remain neutral.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Castro's popularity and credibility are probably lower than ever before, and are likely to continue deteriorating:

- The probability of idle youths rioting or engaging in other overt acts of opposition will increase through the 1980s.
- There is perhaps one chance in three that rising social and economic tensions will result in significant opposition.
- There is a good chance that Castro will decide to launch another minicultural revolution in Cuba.
- Although there is no evidence that any top Cuban leaders are plotting, a coup against Castro is, for the first time in 20 years, no longer unthinkable. To have the slightest chance, Cuban figures would have to mount their coup simultaneously against Castro, his brother Raul, and key hardline officials.

Tensions between the United States and Cuba will continue to rise, and Castro will be an even more dangerous adversary than in the past:

- He is very likely to pursue vendettas against leaders or governments in Latin America that he considers proxies of the United States.
- He will vigorously exploit every opportunity for revolutionary breakthroughs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries to refurbish his and Cuba's revolutionary credentials.
- The United States Interests Section, the Guantanamo Naval Base, and US citizens in Cuba will be increasingly likely targets of abuse.
- It is also highly probable that Cuba will aim anti-US broadcasts at American minority groups, in retaliation for US transmissions to Cuba.
- Even more extreme or irrational actions, which could lead to military conflict with the United States, will be more likely than ever before.
- If, as seems likely, Castro comes under greater pressure and psychological strain, there is a chance—in the range of 20 percent—that he will try to provoke a military conflict with the United States. He could see this as an opportunity to rally the youth, to strengthen his regime and personal position, and to attract international support.
- The greater likelihood, nonetheless, remains that Castro's position will continue to decline, given the absence of US-Cuban hostilities.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Castro Agonistes: The Mounting Dilemmas and Frustrations of Cuba's Caudillo (U)

Introduction

Fidel Castro is struggling with a convergence of old and new problems that appear to be more threatening to the stability of his regime than any it has weathered during nearly 23 years in power. The familiar factors that generated popular discontent in the 1960s and '70s persist: a deeply troubled economy increasingly dependent on exporting sugar and on Soviet largesse; a totalitarian regime unable to motivate or incorporate a large percentage of the people or to overcome the results of years of poor management and planning; and an inordinate commitment of human and other resources to costly foreign involvements that pay few domestic dividends.

These and other problems were greatly aggravated in 1979 and 1980 by natural disasters, major foreign policy setbacks, and especially by some of the most serious errors of judgment over public policy that Castro has ever made. One, the decision to encourage visits by Cuban-Americans, had powerfully destabilizing results, after about 100,000 exiles traveled to the island. In the aftermath of their visits, crime, vandalism, worker absenteeism, and other forms of discontent rose sharply, and were met with increasing repression. Popular malaise was further aroused when Castro and other leaders demanded greater sacrifice and effort, though grudgingly warning that significant improvements in social and economic conditions would not be possible before the end of the century.

By April 1980 public discontent was probably more widespread in Cuba than at any time since the mid-1960s. Yet, Castro and other top leaders seemed surprisingly unaware of its intensity until more than 10,000 Cubans swarmed onto the grounds of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana seeking asylum. In ensuing months, angry confrontations with the United States and about a half dozen Caribbean Basin countries unequivocally established the tone and new directions of Castro's more militant foreign policy. His personal frustration and ire, vented repeatedly in belligerent and rambling speeches, were reminiscent

of his erratic and highly emotional public behavior during the 1960s.

These and other dimensions of Cuba's more pressing internal problems are widely appreciated, but other, perhaps more significant factors affecting the stability of the Castro government have received less attention. One of the most important is the critical generation gap that clearly has become one of Castro's greatest preoccupations. In speech after speech over the last few years he has addressed the ennui and discontent of the younger generation and has seemed at times to be obsessed with the dilemma of how to inculcate in the youth the myths and hopes of his generation of revolutionaries. At 55, Castro presides over a nation where about 86 percent of the people are younger than he is, and where about 52 percent are under 25 and have no memory of his exploits in winning power from the Batista dictatorship.

As his tenure increasingly has dwelled on these concerns, Castro's gloomy public mood has reflected other nagging problems as well. He is profoundly



© Sygma

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

disturbed that his plans to be a forceful leader of the nonaligned movement—a realistic hope in the fall of 1979 when he assumed that role—have been in ruins since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that December. Many of his speeches include ruminations about the intractable problems of underdevelopment in Cuba and elsewhere in the Third World. But, whereas his addresses at the Nonaligned Conference plenary in Havana in September 1979 and at the United Nations the following month were full of high expectations and demands for a restructuring of North-South relations, his rhetoric over the last year or so has been increasingly pessimistic. In part, Castro's dark broodings about underdevelopment reflect his grudging, fatalistic acceptance since Afghanistan of Cuba's inescapable vassalage to the Soviet Union.

Especially startling for longtime observers of Castro's public behavior and rhetoric is his persistent emphasis this year on themes related to holocaust and apocalypse. An apparently despairing Castro has frequently masked his rising fears of conflict with the United States with bravado about how true Cuban revolutionaries must fight to the last man. His apocalyptic mood is often quite explicit. He has repeatedly used the word "holocaust," has mused about Cuba and the world after nuclear warfare between the superpowers, and has admonished his audiences to increase their vigilance and revolutionary work in the face of impending disaster.

This attitude is in stark contrast to the utopian visions and effervescent schemes that the Cuban leader enunciated consistently in the 1960s and '70s. His shift from utopian to apocalyptic visions probably reflects the realization that his unfulfilled promises of a better future have already begun to undermine his legitimacy as the prophetic leader of the Revolution and the stability of his government. Even his exaggerated efforts to use the once effective theme of US aggression have not succeeded in motivating the populace. His gloomy predictions about conflict with the United States may in fact be most unsettling to that large sector of the population about which he is most concerned. The youth of revolutionary Cuba, like youth everywhere, are most readily inspired and

mobilized by utopian visions like those Castro once used so effectively.

This investigation of Castro's changing outlook, mood, and performance, and his key preoccupations, is based largely on his oratory over the last two years. No leader in modern times—probably ever—has left a personal record so voluminous and complete as Castro has in the millions of words he has spoken on the record since he came to power in 1959. From a high of at least a hundred major addresses in that first year, he has averaged about 20 to 25 annually since. In many, like the address to the Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party last December and that at the United Nations in September 1980 (the longest ever delivered there), he droned on for over five hours. Many, especially in the early years, were delivered extemporaneously, and there have been numerous occasions when new policy directions sprang from seemingly spontaneous utterances.

Discourse is a vital function for Castro, an integral part not only of his charismatic style but of his psychological composition. He relies, of course, on considerable doses of deception and camouflage in his public appearances, and until recently showed an uncanny facility for adjusting his tone, style, and thrust to particular audiences. Nonetheless, his speeches have been highly reliable gauges of his changing attitudes, interests, priorities, and expectations. Often—as in the Mariel boatlift last year—they have provided warning of actions he would soon take. Over the last two years, moreover, Castro's speeches—content and delivery—have provided increasingly useful insights into his evolving emotional state and effectiveness as a leader.

The Generation Gap¹

Among the innumerable developments that Castro could not have anticipated when he began to govern as a 32-year-old revolutionary was that the hopes and changes he helped unleash would contribute to an

¹ See *Cuba: The Demography of Revolution*, by Sergio Diaz and Lisandro Perez, 1981.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~


unprecedented surge in the Cuban birth rate (see Figure 1). For the next five years it climbed steadily, from 26.1 births per thousand in 1958 to 35.1 per thousand in 1963. Then, as expectations were dashed, it fell sharply in ensuing years and now ranks among the lowest in the less developed countries. As Castro has noted with seeming irritation on two occasions, the structure of Cuba's population has created enormous practical and political difficulties for the regime (see Figure 2).

Children born in the peak years of the baby boom are now in the 15- to 19-year-old age group. After remaining relatively constant from 1968 to 1974, the numbers in this cohort surged to a level in 1980 that

was more than 50 percent greater than in previous years. Because most entrants to the labor force fall in this group, and because of economic stringencies, many have not found work. In his December 1979 "secret speech," Castro admitted that "some tens of thousands of youth are out of work." The vandalism, crime, and "antisocial" behavior that has preoccupied Castro is probably also confined largely to this age group. Many of these youths are at or close to the age of marriage, in a society that apparently prefers almost universal and early marriage. But shortages of housing, consumer goods, and services will greatly frustrate their plans to establish new households or to start their own families.

Figure 1

Birth and Death Rates: Cuba, 1953-79



Note: Birth and especially death rates before 1964 may be undistorted because of incomplete registration.

Unclassified

100-1000


~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Figure 2

Population Age Pyramid: Cuba, 1979

Percent of population



Unclassified

This generation, in addition, is highly educated and schooled entirely under revolutionary auspices. In the nursery, primary, and secondary schools, children have been a favored class in Cuba, receiving larger rations of better food and goods than the general population. Because of this treatment and the relatively more favorable economic conditions in the mid-1970s, youths in this age group probably had generally high expectations. On graduation, however, they increasingly have had to confront the harsh realities of a constricting and niggardly economy in which their skills and interests find few constructive outlets.

An even larger cohort in the Cuban population is the present 10- to 14-year-old age group born in the trailing end of the baby-boom years. Castro has said that enrollment in middle-level schools is now 13 times higher than in 1959. The employment, housing,

and other prospects of these children as they come of age through the remainder of the 1980s are likely to be even more bleak than for the 15- to 19-year-olds. Without sustained economic growth and development in the next five years—which is highly unlikely—the Cuban leadership will probably confront mounting political, social, and economic dilemmas as it tries to absorb these new generations. A cruel irony that is certainly not lost on Castro is that much of the enormous investment made on these youths over the last several years is in infrastructure that will not be needed once the baby-boom cohorts come of age. Thus, when Castro noted last December that "more than 970 schools" were built in the previous five years, he surely realized that many of them will stand

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

empty by the 1990s as the number of school-age children rapidly declines.

Castro's preoccupation with the numerous problems of the baby-boom generation has been evident in his oratory. Few of his speeches have been without some reference to the youth, and in many he has gone on at length. He undoubtedly fears that they are a potentially explosive counterrevolutionary force both now and in the decades ahead. He may be concerned that many of the young have already been "contaminated" as a result of the visits by Cuban-American exiles and the ever-present allure of prosperity and freedom across the Florida Strait. Probably in large part because of these concerns, Castro has maliciously attacked the planned Radio Marti broadcasts to be sponsored by the United States. He knows how troubling sophisticated programming could be, having boasted last December that there is now on the average more than one radio per Cuban family. Ironically, the medium that he once used so effectively in achieving and consolidating power now has become one of his greatest vulnerabilities.

Castro's obsession with Cuban youth often seems, moreover, to have a mean and petty quality. He often seems to be speaking condescendingly to them, to be preaching righteousness, and to be reminding them of their flaws. There are numerous veiled threats, as when he calls for "more criticism and self-criticism" among the youth or when he stated that "we must act with responsibility and firmness in the formation of the future generations." In a sense Castro has assumed the role of a fundamentalist shepherd vehemently trying to collect his wayward flock. But unlike his largely successful evangelism of the 1960s and early '70s, his sermons increasingly dwell on threats of fire and brimstone rather than the rewards and pleasures of the revolutionary faith. It seems that Castro actually resents many of these children of the Revolution, and may regret having favored them over almost all other groups in Cuba.

Castro's increasingly cynical view of the youth is also suggested by the demographic shell game that he plays with them. In part because so many in the baby-boom generation and others now in their twenties

cannot be employed at home, or productively occupied in Cuba, tens of thousands have been sent abroad. More than 35,000 Cuban troops are in Angola and Ethiopia; at least 5,000 civilian and military advisers are in Nicaragua; and thousands more are assigned to nearly 30 other developing countries. On 26 July 1980 Castro claimed that 50,000 Cubans are providing "exemplary services" abroad. Some, like the 1,300 doctors in Third World countries, are probably among the best and brightest of their generation, but have scant prospects of being able to use their skills in their own country.

Large numbers are also being sent to Soviet Bloc countries, either to study or work as trainees. There are 12,000 Cubans in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union itself will probably increasingly become a temporary home for thousands of others, and some 5,000 to 6,000 are studying there now. Castro has actually stated that he would like to send 10,000 to Siberia to cut timber for Cuban construction projects. Perhaps in an attempt at black humor, he added that at least "it would not be as hot there."

Castro recognizes, of course, that these means of alleviating some of the population pressure are temporary. He worries no doubt about the domestic repercussions if the Cuban troops in Africa were asked to leave or if the East Europeans grew weary of the often disruptive presence of large numbers of Cubans. Largely for these reasons, Castro strongly prefers the permanent solution offered only by another massive emigration to the United States. He has stated publicly that he might launch another sealoft of refugees like the Mariel exodus last year and the one from Camarioca in 1965. The pressures to do so again are likely to rise steadily through the 1980s, perhaps even reaching such critical intensity at times that he will take almost any risk to rid himself of a few hundred thousand to 1 or 2 million people.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Remembrance of Past Glories

It is largely because of his preoccupation with motivating the youth that Castro has been dwelling in his public addresses on past revolutionary struggles and victories. In at least 10 speeches this year, he has exulted in events as wide ranging as the 19th-century struggles of the Cuban independence fighters Martí and Maceo, his own experiences as a youthful revolutionary, and the victory at the Bay of Pigs, and several times has mentioned the difficult days of the 1962 Missile Crisis. At least twice he has explicitly acknowledged the fundamental objective of this large, often emotional body of rhetoric: to forge a symbolic bond linking all generations of Cuban revolutionaries. He closed one speech, for instance, with a reference to the "heroes of the past, the heroes of the present, and the heroes of the future."

It is more interesting to observers of Castro's behavior and performance, however, that his self-assigned mission increasingly has become a highly personal odyssey into his own past. Castro has traveled often this year to the eastern provinces—the old Oriente—where he was born and raised, where he first announced himself as a violent revolutionary in 1953 with the assault on the Moncada army barracks, and where he disembarked from the yacht *Granma* in 1956 to begin a two-year insurgency in the Sierra Maestra mountains. In six major addresses in towns and villages scattered through that area, he has recalled—often vividly and passionately—details of those activities. These speeches seem ripe with clues to Castro's often highly charged emotional state over the last two years.

The memories he has invoked as lessons for the youth have been largely concerned with death, privation, and sacrifice. In Manzanillo, where he dedicated a new hospital last January to his old friend Celia Sanchez, he extemporized at some length about the meaning of her life and of the contributions of other "fallen comrades." Sanchez, who was one of Castro's most intimate confidantes since the late 1950s, had

recently died of cancer.² In Guisa about a week later, he rumbled on again about the difficulties of the Sierra Maestra insurgency, recounting in gory detail how another "comrade" had died. In May, in a village in Guantanamo Province, he lapsed into a similar remembrance speaking by name of five obscure young guerrillas who fought with him in the Sierra and died in battle.

In these and a few other public appearances this year, Castro has actually seemed to lapse into soliloquy. In desultory recollections of his struggles as a young guerrilla, he has seemed to lose contact with his audiences and to be speaking more for his own edification. The most dramatic example of such unprecedented behavior was in the speech he delivered last July on Children's Day, in a small town in Granma Province. Castro emphasized at the outset that "the revolution has certainly concerned itself with the new generation," and enumerated details of the investment it has made in schools, day care centers, and recreational facilities. Then, in another unprecedented reflection of his unusual mood of late, he recalled intimate details of his boyhood before reminiscing at length about minutiae of the 1950s insurgency. He continued in an apparently uncontrolled monologue for at least several more minutes.

This inordinate preoccupation with a faded, heroic past is reflected in other, more tangible ways as well. Castro announced at the Second Party Congress last December, for instance, that 40 new museums were established in Cuba in the preceding five years, and that "91 national monuments and 59 local monuments" were dedicated. He also praised the History Institute, which he revealed has been managing an

² The suicide in July 1980 of Haydee Santamaría—another of the small group of women revolutionaries who were with Castro during the insurgency—was another major blow to him personally. See "Cuba: Death of Two Heroines," *Latin America Review*, 22 August 1980.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

extensive research and publishing program to educate the population in the struggles and achievements of the Revolution. The fruit of that program has been an exhaustingly detailed recounting of even the most insignificant episodes of the insurgency. One long chapter, published last October, is devoted entirely to the events of a week in February 1957 as well as to the role of a previously unheralded peasant farmer and his dutiful wife.

This trivialization of history probably will have little of the intended influence on the young generations, and it may even be counterproductive. It is widely known outside Cuba that the realities of Castro's two-year guerrilla campaign were far less inspiring or interesting than the myths created about it later. The ranks of the guerrillas and their peasant supporters were small, the struggle was largely confined to an isolated area, and there were few significant battles or urban campaigns that involved large numbers of people as there were in Nicaragua in 1979 or more recently in El Salvador. Thus, for the average Cuban youth—educated and traveled—the history campaign may actually tend to demythologize the Revolution.

The Frustrations of Underdevelopment

For Castro, the past that he relishes seems increasingly to substitute for the harsh realities of the present. Over the last two years, there have been few positive developments in internal Cuban affairs, and sometimes—as in the history campaign—even these examples tend toward the absurd. He has made much, for instance, of a "revolutionary" dairy cow—Ubre Blanca—that he claims produced almost 90 liters of milk the day before the 26th of July anniversary celebrations this year. Castro and the regime have generated considerable propaganda about the animal. In October 1980 there was even more fanfare surrounding the flight of the first Cuban astronaut, who Castro was at least better able to hold up to the youth as an example.

Castro also refers often to Cuba's accomplishments in international athletic competition, education, and public health, but even in those areas in which he has been humiliated. In mid-October he publicly lost his temper after a Cuban baseball team lost to one from

the United States, and he criticized the players and the managers. It has been even more embarrassing, however, that over the last year or so the credibility of Cuba's much flaunted public health services has been seriously undermined. Much to Castro's consternation, five human, animal, and crop diseases have reached epidemic proportions in Cuba. With Job-like resignation, he has referred to them as "the five plagues," though he blames the United States for covertly introducing them.

Castro is clearly preoccupied with the numerous symptoms of Cuba's intractable underdevelopment, and angry that after nearly 23 years conditions in many areas are worse than when he started. His speeches reflect a growing interest and expertise in development economics and international finance. He has been able, partially at least, to overcome his previous antipathy for economic theory. After a lengthy discussion of economics in one speech, for example, he stopped in the middle of a thought and apologized to his audience for lecturing on arcane matters. In April 1980 he delivered the inaugural address to the meeting of Third World economists in Havana. In that speech, and others, he has provided a variety of clues to the many facets of his profound frustration about Cuba's economic plight and his narrowing options for dealing with it.

He reserves particular enmity for certain Third World countries that have achieved high rates of economic growth. During the Havana economics conference, he lashed out at Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan for their "deforming industrialization,"—although secretly he probably admires the ability of those countries to industrialize and stimulate their economies without becoming vassals. Similarly, he has attacked the Chilean military government for following Chicago School theories, failing to acknowledge, however, the high economic growth achieved in that country in the last several years. His strong animosity toward the Venezuelan Government is probably in part attributable to the oil wealth of that country, and its willingness to use it for leverage in its foreign policy.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Although there is no evidence, either in his rhetoric or elsewhere, Castro almost certainly is chafing increasingly under the yoke of Cuba's mounting dependence on the Soviet Union. He indicated last December that trade with Soviet Bloc countries, which amounted to 56 percent of Cuba's external commerce in 1975, had grown to 78 percent by 1979. A large percentage of future sugar production is earmarked for the USSR, and Cuba increasingly is becoming a largely inefficient tropical outpost in the "international socialist division of labor." It is unlikely, furthermore, that Havana will be able to develop significant new export markets during the remainder of the 1980s. In 1986, in addition, Cuba is scheduled to begin repayment of its considerable debt to the USSR. This grim outlook, especially when compared to the more favorable prospects of so many other developing nations, has greatly contributed to Castro's apparent despondency.

From Utopia to Apocalypse

During the first several years after he won power, Castro's romanticism and nationalism provided the basis for his enormous charismatic appeal. Later, his uncanny ability to raise new and alluring schemes out of the ashes of ones that had failed provided constant renewal and hope for large numbers of Cubans. His utopian proposals, elaborately expounded in his oratory, were often as unlikely as they were inspiring: instant industrialization; coffee plantations in the tropical lowlands; a horticultural "green belt" extending for miles around Havana; idyllic cooperative farming; a moneyless society; a bureaucracy-free government through mass participation; a 10-million-ton sugar harvest.

Year after year these and other impossible dreams were hatched, tried, and abandoned. Partly to compensate for these failures, Castro strutted about the world stage playing a quixotic role that by the mid-1970s finally began to pay important dividends for him and the USSR in many countries of the Third World. The apogee of his international utopianism was perhaps achieved when he spoke at the United Nations in October 1979 in his new role as leader of the nonaligned movement and as self-appointed spokesman for the poor and oppressed people of the world.

~~Secret~~

Over the last two years, however, Castro's utopian visions increasingly have been replaced by apocalyptic ones. Rather than concocting "solutions" or distractions from Cuba's problems as he did in the past, Castro has been dwelling instead on the problems themselves. Furthermore, he is constantly emphasizing that the problems are more threatening and awesome than ever before. In July 1980 he said, "what is at stake . . . is the fate of humanity, the world." The following September he warned that "the future for the immense majority of mankind is a gloomy one." Last December he employed similar hyperbole, claiming that "the human race has never experienced an era like this one." And most recently, on 24 October 1981, he said that "the present cannot be compared to any other time of mankind."

These apocalyptic visions take various forms. One, frequently reiterated, is that the world faces another cataclysmic economic depression. He has said, for example, that "the world is on the verge of an unprecedented economic and financial catastrophe." He predicts numerous suicides and other horrible repercussions. More typically, however, the nightmare he propounds in public is of nuclear holocaust. On 24 October 1981, he said that a world war "would lead not only to the deaths of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, or millions, or tens of millions, or hundreds of millions, but that a war would lead to the end of mankind."

On 15 September 1981, he said that US defense buildups will "lead to nothing else but a final holocaust." On a few occasions he has used the same kind of apocalyptic visions to arrive at an ostensibly more optimistic view; for example, "we do not accept the notion that a world holocaust is inevitable"; and "we do not accept the idea of the inevitability of war." But in these statements and in a number of others this year in which he has protested that he "is not a pessimist" and that "we will always be optimists," Castro appears to be attempting a kind of public self-exorcism. Such revealing efforts to disguise his somber mood usually are contradicted almost in the next

~~Secret~~

breath, moreover, as on 24 October when he concluded, "well, to die honorably is a good way to behave and act."

These generalized visions of world disaster are usually used in tandem with Castro's immediate concern, that Cuba will have to defend itself militarily against the United States. Since the Republican Party national convention last year, he has come increasingly to believe that he and his regime are gravely threatened. His attacks on President Reagan have become increasingly vicious, and he has also vilified Vice President Bush, Secretary Haig, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Castro's mounting apprehension about threats from the United States has taken many forms. He has seemed obsessed on several occasions with proving that the United States has used chemical or bacteriological agents to sow disease in Cuba, and has repeatedly revealed his fear that Cuba will be blockaded.

He is most concerned about large-scale military conflict between Cuba and the United States, and for at least a year has been attempting to prepare the Cuban people for war. He clearly believes that if any hostilities begin they would be fierce, with considerable fighting and loss of life on both sides. He has said, for example, that "if they dare to invade our country, more Yankees will die here than in World War II," and that "millions of Yankees will die." But, because he may doubt that the Cuban civilian populace would put up any serious resistance to US forces or rally to fight beside their own armed forces, he has used almost every opportunity over the last year or so to try to mobilize their support. He has repeatedly called on them to be prepared for a two-front war: a conventional conflict and an unconventional one in which the people would form guerrilla resistance groups. "We're not like the Christians of ancient Rome," he has said, "who meekly surrendered."

More typically, however, these clarion calls reveal Castro's increasingly paranoid vision of Cuba fighting massing forces of opposition alone. On 24 October in a highly unusual prepared speech that was implicitly critical of the Soviet Union, he said that we should "not expect anyone to defend us ... but to defend

ourselves." This growing sense of beleaguement and isolation has become one of the dominant aspects of Castro's public performance over the last year or so.

Emotions and thoughts of the kind that have preoccupied Castro have in other cases often culminated in a belligerent sense of extreme personal isolation. In Castro's case there have been hints in at least two of his highly personal speeches in his home region of such a catastrophic vision of his and the Revolution's denouement. "As long as there are several armed men in this country ... as long as there is a single armed man," he has said, "we will fight to the last." Thus, just as his Revolution began in the Sierra Maestra with seven armed men, one cannot rule out the possibility that Castro, in his darkest broodings, may actually conceive of it being progressively reduced to that original contingent again. At the end, as in the beginning, Castro and a handful of trusted lieutenants would fight a noble struggle against the encircling forces of his many enemies.

The Outlook

For Castro's Credibility and Popularity. Castro's charismatic appeal through the years consisted in large part of a complex of illusions that now seem one by one to be dissolving. Over the last two years, he has fumbled, and lost his place in the reams of notes and papers that he now usually brings to the podium when he speaks. At the Party Congress speech in December 1980, he complained that his papers were slipping from the podium, and a carpenter was quickly summoned to repair it. Occasionally he has dropped entire paragraphs or thoughts from speeches, and then reinserted them where they didn't belong. On 24 October he limped onto the stage and explained that "in trying ... to fight sedentariness and obesity by engaging in sports, I suffered a small fracture of one of the toes of my right foot." It is quite unlikely that Castro would have called attention to the injury—especially in the manner he did—in previous years.

These and other changes in his oratorical style, which would be insignificant for most leaders, may be highly relevant indicators of his diminishing charisma. The

~~Secret~~

Secret

macho illusion of Castro (the *caballito* stallion) that worked to his advantage in the past, will probably continue to be undermined by the frailties and slips of the kind he is now making in public. The illusion he promoted successfully of being a prestidigitary problem solver has suffered since late 1979. His appeal, based on the popular view that subordinate officials were responsible for mismanagement and poor planning, has undoubtedly also declined as he gets more of the blame. In addition, his extreme mood changes during the last two years probably have increased the concerns of many Cubans about what he might do next. In the 1960s and '70s, he capitalized on his penchant for spontaneity and surprise in policy decisions, but innovation in those days tended to reflect utopian visions.

On a few occasions Castro has also lied blatantly in public. When he told a Nicaraguan audience in July 1980 that in Cuba "we have solved the unemployment problem," he was undoubtedly confident that that part of this speech would not be replayed in Cuba. He did tell a mass Cuban audience a few months later, however, that "the standard of living will improve progressively in the next five-year period." The Cuban people—especially the youth—are probably less likely than in the past to overlook these prevarications or to attribute them to their leader's once appealing flair for the extravagant.

As a result of these and other developments, Castro's popularity is probably lower than ever before and is likely to continue deteriorating. Given recent trends and his frame of mind, he is unlikely to stop lecturing condescendingly to the youth, trivializing the myths of his own insurgency, and dwelling on apocalyptic themes. Even if he were to correct these and other errors, nonetheless, his credibility for being able to satisfy the people's most basic material aspirations may already be hopelessly compromised. Similarly, his ability to motivate and mobilize the populace for "defense and production"—or for any new pet themes—is likely to erode steadily as more cynical and disappointed youths come of age.

Thus, there is probably only a small chance that Castro will again be able to play the prophetic role as

charismatic leader of the Cuban Revolution as he did for so many years. Ironically, the more he feels compelled to resume that role under the pressure of persistent problems, the greater the likelihood that his efforts will be counterproductive. In addition, Castro's preference to depend increasingly on a group of hardline advisers is also likely to erode his popularity further. Some of these officials, like the ruthless Ramiro Valdes, who in December 1979 was reappointed interior minister to deal with rising crime and discontent, are widely feared. Virtually all of them are intimate friends of Castro, colleagues since the insurgency in the 1950s, and veterans of the military and security services. Most are crude and dogmatic men who probably have been fueling some of the more unstable tendencies that Castro has demonstrated.

For Significant Popular Opposition. As the baby-boom generations come of age through the 1980s, the possibilities of significant popular opposition to Castro will probably increase. Unless he can export or exile a large number of people, rising youth unemployment will contribute to high rates of crime, vandalism, and other antisocial behavior. Antiregime wall writings, sabotage, and perhaps even isolated acts of terrorism against lower- or middle-level officials will become more likely. The possibility of groups of idle youths spontaneously rioting in Havana or other cities, or engaging in street demonstrations will increase. If Castro were to vacillate or show leniency in dealing with such outbursts, they might escalate into larger, more serious challenges to the regime. Over the last two years Castro has been profoundly ambivalent about how best to motivate and incorporate the youth into the Revolution, and he has made a number of errors. The chances are high that both of these trends will continue indefinitely.

On balance, nonetheless, there is probably only about one chance in three that rising social and economic tensions associated largely with the arrival of the baby-boom generations will result in significant opposition any time in the 1980s. Unlike Poland, where the Catholic Church has helped for years to give focus

Secret

~~Secret~~

and hope to the dissatisfied, there are no independent institutions in Cuba that could serve a similar purpose. In addition, many of the youths will adopt strategies like those of their parents, refraining from taking risks that might land them in prison, while hoping for an opportunity to emigrate to the United States. The most significant deterrent to organized resistance will continue to be the large, well-trained and equipped military and security forces that are controlled by Castro and his younger brother Raul.

There is a good chance that Castro will decide at almost any time to confront forces of domestic opposition aggressively in a repressive campaign of crackdowns and mass mobilizations. He did this in the 1968 "revolutionary offensive," when discontent was high, and on a smaller scale again last year. The 1968 minicultural revolution was aimed at silencing rising opposition to the regime, at rallying support by putting large numbers of people into "voluntary" agricultural labor, and at forcing ideological purification, especially among the youth. It included the purge of a "microfaction" of Communist Party officials whom Castro blamed for being insufficiently revolutionary and nationalistic. In his "secret speech" in December 1979, he revealed that he had considered such a strategy again: "we do not intend to do traumatic things, we do not intend to unleash a 'cultural revolution' here." Since then, however, the pressures have continued to rise, and with them the chances that Castro will decide—as he has so often in the past—belligerently to seize the initiative with his opponents. The likelihood will be high, in addition, that another revolutionary offensive would hold the United States up as the scapegoat, and include a purge of officials blamed for being too "soft."

For a Coup Against Castro. There is no reason to suspect that any top military or Communist Party leaders are so dissatisfied that they are plotting against Castro. For them, his legitimacy as the Revolution's maximum leader and guide is probably still quite high, even though many must have more doubts than they did a few years ago. These top echelons of Cuba's ruling class do not suffer the deprivations or make the same sacrifices as the populace at large. All of them have passed the innumerable tests of their

loyalty and obedience to Castro that the nearly 23-year steeples chase course of the Revolution has required. Perhaps no more than a few hundred individuals have any real leverage, and all of them are probably regularly observed by the Castro brothers and their hardline advisers.

But, disagreement among key leaders and interest groups is probably higher than in many years, and it is likely to get worse. By frequently adopting the policies of his hardline advisers, Castro has reduced the influence of such key moderates as Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The moderates probably have numerous allies among younger technocrats and administrators throughout the party and government. These officials are believed to give priority to rational planning and economic development at home and to be less interested in Cuba's international "duties" and aspirations. There is no reason to believe, however, that moderate leaders at any level have actual or potential allies among leading officers of the military and security forces. That could change gradually as officials and officers of a new generation assume greater responsibility through the remainder of the decade, especially if confidence in Castro continues to deteriorate.

To have the slightest chance, a coup on the part of disgruntled Cuban figures would have to be mounted simultaneously against Castro, his brother, and their key hardline advisers. As Castro's designated heir, second in charge of the party and the government, and minister of the armed forces, Raul Castro is second in power only to his brother. Though he utterly lacks Castro's charismatic ability, he has built a large and powerful military and security apparatus that from all appearances is completely loyal to him and his brother. There is almost no chance that he would move against Castro unless he were convinced that his brother were mentally incapable of continuing. Raul's ties with the USSR are older and probably stronger than Castro's, and he would keep Cuba in a close Soviet orbit.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Despite the Castro brothers' seemingly totalitarian control of the key levers of power, it is possible for the first time in 20 years to contemplate scenarios in which Cuban figures might try to topple the Castros. Perhaps the best reason is that Castro himself has begun publicly to muse about his growing vulnerability. Although the possibility seems low at present, over the next decade some combination of the following forces could result in profound political change in Cuba, including attempts to overthrow the Castro brothers:

- Mounting social unrest—especially in Havana and the eastern provinces—spearheaded by disaffected members of the younger generation.
- A further decline of economic conditions and expectations.
- Irrational actions by Castro perceived as provoking military conflict with the United States or an allied Latin American country.
- Serious concern among top Soviet leaders that Castro and his clique were, for their own purposes, seeking to provoke a confrontation between the USSR and the United States.
- The coalescence among Cubans now in their teens, twenties, or thirties of a sense of anti-Castro generational solidarity that crossed military-civilian lines.
- The coalescence in the armed forces of a group of nationalistic young officers more interested in Cuba's economic development and social tranquility than in foreign involvements.

For Castro and the United States. Tensions between the United States and the Castro regime will continue to rise. The Cuban leader will tend to blame the United States for most of his problems and to become even more fearful that punitive actions will be taken against him. He will be inclined to identify all voices of opposition and criticism—in fact anyone not sympathizing with his regime—as enemies. The chances will be very high that he will pursue vendettas against leaders or governments that he considers proxies of the United States. The Turbay government in Colombia was the target of a Cuban-sponsored guerrilla incursion last March, and Castro so despises that leader that additional clandestine activities against him are likely. Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga, also

viewed by Castro as a puppet of the United States, is very likely to be the target of Cuban subversive efforts. At the same time Castro will also continue vigorously to seek major revolutionary breakthroughs in other Latin American countries, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Confrontations aimed directly at embarrassing the United States will also be more likely. The readily available United States Interests Section and citizens in Havana and the Guantanamo Naval Base will be increasingly likely targets of abuse. The chances are good that Castro will engineer demonstrations—like those in the spring of 1980—against the United States both in Havana and in eastern Cuba. Mass rallies against the United States could also be accompanied by orchestrated defections of relatively large numbers of Cubans onto the grounds of US facilities. Anti-US rhetoric is likely to become more shrill and menacing. Cuban military forces may go into alert modes and even make threatening gestures against our reconnaissance overflights. There is also a very good chance that Castro will increase anti-US broadcasting and include programming aimed at subverting American minority groups. He has broadly hinted that he would do so once Radio Marti begins operating from the United States.

Even more extreme or irrational actions that could lead to military conflict between the United States and Cuba will be more likely than ever before. Demographic and generational pressures will undoubtedly continue to rise and Castro will be more and more tempted to release large numbers into exile in the United States. Tensions could become so acute in fact that he will decide to carry out bizarre schemes to limit or contain the threat at home. He could, for instance, herd hundreds of thousands of aspiring emigres into concentration camps on the northern coast and then encourage them to leave or be rescued by whatever means. Castro will also be more likely to use his intelligence service to conduct clandestine activities aimed at fomenting violence in Puerto Rico and elsewhere in the United States. It will also be more likely that he will order Cuban agents to conduct terrorism in the United States.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Through his nearly 23 years in power, Castro has operated within a range of action much wider than most world leaders. Even when conditions in Cuba and its foreign relations are favorable and when Castro is in a positive mood, he is less predictable than most. Furthermore, when he is angry, frustrated, or threatened, his behavior has generally tended to be even more erratic and improvisational. Pressures on him now are probably greater than at any time since the early 1960s,¹ and he has made more serious mistakes over the last two years—the visits by Cuban exiles, the repeated promises of a grim future, etc.—than in any comparable period. Most ominous in this context are the numerous indications that his recent brooding pessimism reflects an increasingly belligerent and fatalistic mood. Thus, Castro will in all likelihood be an even more dangerous adversary than in the past.

There will even be a chance—perhaps in the range of 20 percent—that under pressure and great psychological strain, he would throw caution to the winds and try to provoke a military conflict with the United States. He could see this as providing him a final opportunity to rally the youth to the Revolution, to strengthen his regime and personal position, and to attract substantial international support. In reality, it would be no more suicidal than certain guerrilla and military actions he took as a young revolutionary and would be consistent with his proclivity through the years to seek renewal and vindication in heroic activities launched against the odds. He might gamble that Cuba's powerful military forces, joined by popular militia and guerrillas, would be able to withstand US assaults long enough for international opinion to turn strongly in his favor. He would then once again be at the center of a major international crisis out of which he could emerge again triumphant.

¹ *Cuba's Castro: Reactions of an Aging Revolutionary to His Aging Revolution*, 80-10252, June 1980, analyzes Castro's personality and psychology.

~~Secret~~



National Intelligence Council

DCI/NI /M 87-10002

29 JUL 1987

~~Secret~~

(M)

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~CLANIC 87-10002~~

Memorandum

**Fidel and Raul Castro:
Preparing for the
Dynastic Succession in Cuba**

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2002

~~Secret~~

NIC M 87-10002
July 1987

COPY 472

21

--	--

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

**EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)**

A microfiche copy of this document is available from [redacted]
[redacted] printed copies from [redacted] or AIA request
to usaid [redacted]

**EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)**

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

NIC M 87-10002

FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO:
PREPARING FOR THE
DYNASTIC SUCCESSION IN CUBA

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Information available as of 6 July 1997
was used in this report.

(REVERSE BLANK)

~~SECRET~~

2 7 1 0

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

PREFACE

This Memorandum, prepared by Brian Latell of the NIC Analytic Group, complements NIE 85-87, *Cuba: The Faltering Revolution*. Unlike that broad assessment of deepening political and social crises, this is a "Castrocentric" analysis. It views internal Cuban conditions and key foreign policy issues from Castro's point of view, emphasizing his preoccupations, proclivities, and attitudes. It examines his leadership and performing style and estimates how particular Cuban audiences, and the population generally, are reacting to him during a period of acute and worsening hardships.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Consequently, it is both more impressionistic and speculative than the Estimate, reflecting the author's interpretations and insights. Its principal conclusions—that Fidel Castro's continued hegemony is more in doubt than at any time in about a quarter of a century and that major discontinuities in the leadership and direction of the revolution are probable if present trends continue—describe a more urgent situation than that presented in the Estimate. I believe it is important to present these alternative views because of the implications for the United States of such a potential fundamental change in Cuba.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Although the author has exploited information and reporting from many sources, the Memorandum is based predominately on the millions of words Castro has spoken on the record between January 1986 and June 1987. That net public performance includes 39 speeches, 12 lengthy interviews, "dialogues," and press conferences.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

The Memorandum is intended to provide a base of evidence and analysis to stimulate further thought and research on the issues it raises. It is not a coordinated Intelligence Community product. Rather, it is a provocative, and unique work that I believe makes an important contribution to the national security process. I would welcome your comments and reactions.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

(REVERSE BLANK)

Robert Vickers
National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

KEY JUDGMENTS

Fidel Castro's continued hegemony in Cuba appears to be more in doubt than at any time since the early 1960s. Unless he is able soon to restore economic and social stability and to assuage his domestic and Soviet critics, it will be increasingly probable that his younger brother Raul, and top military and party officials associated with the latter, will feel compelled to gradually circumscribe his authority. Such a process may in fact have already begun, and, if so, serious threats and unprecedented opportunities for US interests could result.

Five powerful trends are eroding Castro's position:

- The Cuban economy, stagnant for nearly a decade, is likely to continue deteriorating through the remainder of the 1980s and probably beyond, unless Moscow substantially augments its aid.
- Cuban-Soviet relations have been under mounting stress over the last year or so as Castro has sharply criticized Moscow and has pressed radical and dogmatic policies that are exacerbating internal problems. (See annex.)
- Popular unrest and apathy have reportedly reached unprecedented levels. Although no organized opposition has coalesced, crime, vandalism, juvenile delinquency, sabotage, overt acts of opposition, and defections of high-level officials have become matters of great official concern.
- The quality and credibility of Castro's leadership has conspicuously diminished, and his popularity is reportedly lower than at any time since he came to power in 1959.
- Meanwhile, Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro has been playing a larger and more assertive role. He and key allies, including most of the country's top generals, gained substantial new power last year at the party congress.

An analysis of all of Fidel Castro's recorded public appearances since January 1986 reveals a leader remarkably different from the bombastic and confident revolutionary of the 1960s and 1970s. He has become more defensive, even at times apologetic, and has seemed to vacillate, and to appear uncertain and confused. He has not addressed a mass rally in three years, and now speaks mainly before small and presumably more reliable groups in various halls in Havana. Although it is not clear why he has so dramatically changed his leadership style, his comment in April 1986, "We do not want to stir the masses," may provide a partial explanation.

~~SECRET~~

2 7 1 0

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Thus, Castro appears politically vulnerable-

- The uniformed services have long been under the command of his brother and *raulista* generals, and there have been numerous signs since late 1983 of serious dissatisfaction in the military. The recent defection of Brigadier General del Pino Diaz provides compelling evidence of this.
- Raul Castro and his associates now seem to constitute the largest single bloc in the Politburo and Secretariat, and they are probably viewed in Moscow as more reliable and stable than his brother.
- Unlike in the past, it is now doubtful that Fidel Castro could mobilize a mass of supporters large and enthusiastic enough to override a determined and well-organized opposition that included his brother. []

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

In any situation in which Fidel Castro's hegemony were threatened, the greatest danger is that he would revert to form and lash out boldly and dangerously to bolster his position:

- He is under increasing pressure to export tens or hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied Cubans to the United States, and could soon be more inclined to take bigger risks.
- In the past when under intense pressure he was more likely to seek international outlets for his frustrations by increasing support for revolutionary groups and covert operations. []

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Estimates of how a new collective leadership under Raul Castro would perform are highly speculative at best, although it does seem probable that in the short term Havana would move into closer alignment with Moscow. The Soviet civilian presence on the island would probably grow, and Cuba would receive greater economic support. Unpopular military commitments overseas—particularly in Angola—might be scaled down, and a new regime could succeed in reducing social tensions and improving economic performance. Cuba might then win greater backing and respectability in Latin America and the West. []

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

But, although Raul Castro has consistently expressed strong nationalistic and anti-US attitudes, he is less likely than his brother to base international decisions on personal grievances or resentments. Thus, from the US perspective, a dynastic succession in Cuba could mark the end of an era characterized by Fidel Castro's visceral and intractable hostility blocking every chance of reconciliation. Over time, it might even be increasingly likely that pragmatists in the leadership would want to begin improving relations with the United States even at the expense of their ties to the USSR. []

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

2
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. Fidel Castro has become increasingly preoccupied since early 1986 with problems and dilemmas that are more daunting than any he has confronted since winning power in 1959. The Cuban economy has been stagnant for nearly a decade, and, unless the Soviet Union provides sizable new subsidies, the already miserable conditions of most Cubans will continue to deteriorate through the remainder of the 1980s and probably well beyond. Meanwhile, popular support for the regime appears to have fallen to an unprecedented low, and, most distressing for the leadership, Cuban teenagers and young adults seem to be the most disaffected and apathetic. Rising levels of crime, juvenile delinquency, sabotage, and resistance to the draconian realities of daily life have become so intractable, in fact, that, for the first time in his long rule, Castro has had no alternative but to tolerate high levels of unrest and opposition to his regime. []

2. He has coped with this spreading crisis by exhorting the populace to work harder and to endure greater sacrifices, and by adopting harsh policies intended to purify the revolution and elevate morale. However, his recent appeals and prescriptions have seemed only to rouse many Cubans to greater cynicism, defiance, and despair. In part this is because he has tended to hector and berate his audiences, to intimidate them with warnings of greater austerity and hardships ahead, and to find fault nearly everywhere. Few major segments of the population have escaped his public wrath. On different occasions he has denounced workers, peasants, students, teachers, bureaucrats, party officials, and others for assorted shortcomings and abuses. Only the military and security services have been spared, though even the military was the target of indirect criticism in February 1986 in Castro's report to the Communist Party's Third Congress. []

3. His performance reveals a leader increasingly isolated from and in conflict with his people. He has demonstrated both a deepening distrust of the populace and unprecedented doubts about his ability to inspire and mobilize them. He has not spoken at a large mass rally in Havana since 1984, a significant departure from his practice of appearing at least a few

times every year in the capital's Revolutionary Plaza before enthusiastic crowds numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands. Instead, he has been speaking in various theaters and conference halls before carefully selected audiences of regime stalwarts. This uncharacteristic withdrawal from the masses may be due at least in part to his fear of being booed or heckled and possibly also to security concerns as popular opposition to his personalistic rule has increased. Any demonstration of opposition to Castro at a large public event would be unprecedented and cause him acute embarrassment at home and abroad. []

4. It seems all the more remarkable, therefore, that, as internal tensions have mounted and his popularity has diminished, Castro has put himself on a collision course with the Kremlin. (See annex.) During the same period that the new Soviet leaders have campaigned energetically for *glasnost* and the "airing" of Soviet society, he has moved sharply in the opposite direction. As General Secretary Gorbachev has experimented with market mechanisms, decentralized planning and management, and has called for greater intellectual freedom and expression, Castro has mounted an extreme "rectification" campaign and has reverted to many of the most radical and repressive policies pursued by him so disastrously in the 1960s. Over the past two years he has abolished the farmers' free markets and other experiments in individual private enterprise which for a period had helped to relieve acute shortages of some consumer goods. He has also terminated most material incentives while demanding that workers toil only for the love of "constructing socialism"; he has railed against materialism, corruption, and "neocapitalism." []

5. Meanwhile, Soviet displeasure with Havana is intensifying. Moscow has indicated that it does not intend to augment the approximately \$4.5 billion in annual economic assistance that Cuba receives, and, in fact, is probably intent on reducing it. Castro has tried to make the best of this in public, but it must infuriate him that the USSR has conspicuously sought to distance itself from his country's economic and social problems. In coverage of the closing session of Cuba's party congress last December, for instance, *Pravda* highlighted Castro's admissions that needed economic

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yr
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

2 7 8 0

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

assistance "could not come from abroad" and that "Cuba must resolve its problems by its own efforts and with its own resources." An article in *Kommunist* in August 1996 noted the need for the Cuban regime "substantially to accelerate the progress of building socialism." Another article, in the Soviet journal *Foreign Trade*, singled Cuba out among the CEMA countries because of its need to build "the material and technical base of socialism and (to) improve the well-being of the Cuban people." []

6. Moreover, Castro himself was recently the target of unprecedented criticism in the Soviet press. On 27 May 1987 *Pravda* reprinted an article on Cuba from the *Washington Times* that included the author's assertion that the Kremlin would like Castro to be "more predictable and controllable." Since other portions of the original article were expurgated by Soviet editors, the inclusion of this critical observation was obviously deliberate. (See annex.) []

7. It is probably of considerable significance, moreover, that, as Castro has been placed on the defensive, his brother Raul has begun to play a larger and more conspicuous role. The latter probably consolidated his claim to the succession at last year's party congress when his wife, top generals long associated with him, and other so-called *raulistas* in the leadership were promoted. Together, they now appear to constitute the largest single bloc in top party councils. It is also significant that the younger Castro has been more active in his civilian leadership capacities over the last few years and has been more visible, speaking on a variety of public issues. These and other changes in his role have spurred increasing speculation that he and

his associates—many of whom maintain close ties to Soviet leaders—have acquired substantial new power in areas previously the exclusive domain of Fidel Castro. []

8. Considered together, these and other important developments probably presage major discontinuities in the leadership and direction of the Cuban revolution over the next few years. As long as Fidel Castro refuses to yield to rising popular dissatisfaction and Soviet impatience, threats to his hegemony no doubt will multiply. Popular unrest will continue to spread, the economy will continue to deteriorate, and his popularity and legitimacy will continue to erode. Nonetheless, nearly everything Castro has said and done over the last year or so suggests that he is determined to stay on the radical course he has set. As at other dangerous junctures in his 40-year public career, he seems once again to have staked his own political survival on an unlikely personal crusade. Although in all of his earlier crusades it also seemed probable that he would fail, the odds against him this time are much greater. Thus, if he continues to refuse more reasonable counsel and remains committed to policies that are widely perceived in Cuba and the USSR as self-centered and counterproductive, it will become increasingly unlikely that he will be able to preserve his hegemony. []

Cuba's Deepening Domestic Crisis

9. In a recent speech Castro implicitly admitted that Cuba's social and economic problems are more intractable and pervasive than any he has faced since the early, tumultuous years of the revolution. In other appearances he has acknowledged that the crisis is still mounting, that large sectors of the population have become either apathetic or counterrevolutionary, and that no easy solutions are in sight. These are remarkable admissions for a number of reasons. Most important, they may suggest that discontent is even greater now than it was in 1980, when more than 125,000 Cubans left the island on a boatlift from Mariel and another two million (in a population of 10 million) wanted to do the same. In addition, unlike the problems he faced at the time of Mariel—or in 1965 when he launched a similar boatlift from the port of Camarioca—it is clear from what he has said in public that Castro is uncertain about how to deal with the mounting unrest and alienation he faces. []



Figure 1. The Castro brothers at the Third Communist Party Congress. []

10. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)



11.



12. These and other destabilizing trends have apparently gained momentum since April 1986 when, on the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro launched a harsh campaign of "rectification." He has publicly attacked corruption, inefficiency, materialism, neocapitalism, and other counterrevolutionary behavior in an intensely personal crusade. He denounced Cubans who are "apathetic and negligent ... who do not want to participate in the struggle ... irresponsible people," and condemned "those who shamefully play at capitalism." His attacks became more strident as the year wore on, culminating in a major speech on 26 December, when he imposed a sweeping new austerity program intended to improve productivity and conserve hard currency. Throughout the rectification campaign he has insisted, more dogmatically than ever before, that true revolutionaries should be motivated only by moral imperatives and "internationalist" responsibilities and not by materialistic needs. These harsh appeals and prescriptions have

only tended, however, to fan already high levels of discontent.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

13. Castro has been almost totally preoccupied with these and other internal problems. In all but one of his recorded speeches and other public appearances in Cuba since early last year he has dwelled on domestic issues while virtually ignoring international and foreign policy concerns. With the exception of a period during 1969 and 1970, when he devoted nearly all of his and the regime's energies to an unsuccessful national campaign to harvest 10 million tons of sugar, he has never been so consumed with domestic issues. But, as in all such previous periods when he was distracted from the international causes and issues that he normally prefers, Castro's intense involvement in managing the current crisis has been highly counterproductive. He has personally made and implemented decisions of all types, while riding roughshod over the bureaucracy, and ridiculing and demoting officials who have displeased him.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

14. Although Castro's proclivity to micromanage during periods of acute stress has always been a key characteristic of his leadership style, in other respects his handling of the current crisis has been significantly different. Perhaps most important, he has been unable to devise any bold initiatives (like the 1965 and 1980 boatlifts) that would provide immediate and substantial relief from popular pressures. Similarly, he has failed to distract the populace as he often was able to in the past by enlisting them in mass mobilizations, by provoking an international incident, or by embarking on some startling new policy. Unlike in the past, it seems that Castro has been unable to persuade any significant number of Cubans that most of their country's problems are due to "imperialist hostility" and the US "blockade."

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

15. Thus, Castro has had no choice but to acquiesce impotently in perhaps the highest levels of popular unrest he has ever faced. He even seemed publicly to acknowledge this when, in a speech last October, he spoke angrily about "counterrevolutionaries and worms" who receive "all the benefits" of the revolution. He used that formulation again in the same appearance, implicitly dividing the Cuban populace into two camps: the revolutionary family and the worms and counterrevolutionaries. By making this distinction, Castro suggested how widespread the passive resistance to his regime has become. For years he has employed the term "worms" to describe Cubans who emigrated to the United States, and others still on the island who want to leave, but generally it connotes largely passive opposition. His references to "counter-

5
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

revolutionaries. However, seem to acknowledge that more active and violent enemies have also been present. Castro has never before made such an admission without simultaneously launching some anticommunist move aimed at controlling such pressures. []

Castro's Fading Charisma

16. Various sources confirm that the quality and effectiveness of Castro's leadership have eroded considerably. One, whose reporting has been generally reliable, said early this year that his popularity is at "an alltime low." []

For the first time in his long reign, moreover, it has become clear that Castro is worried about his image, popularity, and ability to sway mass audiences. []

17. As his popularity and confidence have declined, significant changes have become evident in his public performing style. He is more defensive, even at times apologetic—an extraordinary departure from his previous bombastic style. At times he has seemed to vacillate, to appear uncertain, and even be confused. On a few occasions recently he has admitted explicitly that he had been wrong and "made mistakes." Such confessions, although made in the spirit of "self-criticism" that he has promoted throughout the Cuban establishment, are unprecedented for him. Occasionally, he has also revealed what appears to be a concern that he no longer attracts the fawning interest of Western journalists and intellectuals as he did in the past, and on a few occasions has been sharply critical of the US media that he generally courts. []

18. Perhaps the most remarkable and counterproductive change in Castro's rhetorical style, however, is his new tendency to mordantly criticize the Cuban people. In an extraordinary excess in a speech in June 1986, for instance, he attributed the country's serious problems to flaws in the Cuban national character. "I am concerned," he said, "with our native tendency to chaos and anarchy, our lack of respect for the law, and ... to do whatever comes to mind." In a July 1986 speech, he heaped criticism on "the people of Santiago"—

Cuba's second largest city. Though he made it clear that he was aware of how damning such a sweeping denunciation was, he persisted by calling on other leaders present to "speak to the people of Santiago to awaken their shame, because there is a lack of shame in Santiago." He then bitterly attacked the high rates of absenteeism among workers in the city. "The 23-percent rate of absenteeism is unjustifiable. It is truly scandalous." []

19. Castro's estrangement from the masses has also been evident in surprising changes in his public performing style. He has not appeared before a large mass gathering of Cubans since July 1984. In fact, since January 1986 he has delivered only a few speeches outdoors on the island, and it appears that in each of those cases—dedications of a brewery, a hospital, a genetic engineering center and at a ceremony eulogizing a former Politburo member in Revolutionary Plaza—attendance was small and carefully controlled. All of his other appearances have been in various theaters and convention halls in Havana. Castro has even avoided crowds on the two most important revolutionary holidays. His speeches last year and in 1985 on the 26th of July were in provincial towns, where the regime could easily provide security and deliver reliable, albeit small, audiences of stalwarts. []

20. Since 1984 Castro has not talked in public at all on 2 January, the other major revolutionary holiday, although in all but one or two previous years since coming to power he had only passed up that opportunity "once. These changes are extraordinary for a leader, who, in some previous years, spoke at least a dozen times at rallies of hundreds of thousands of Cubans. Perhaps the explanation for his more restrained approach is, as he commented in an April 1986 speech, "We do not want to stir the masses." It is clear that he has not entirely lost his taste for appearing before large, sympathetic crowds, for he spoke at large rallies in Nicaragua in January 1985 and in North Korea in March 1986. []

21. Castro broke with another tradition this year when he failed to assign a rallying name to 1987, as he did to 1986, for example, which he called the "Year of the 30th Anniversary of the Granma Landing." In every previous year since winning power he had done this, announcing the slogan usually on 2 January; the slogan served as a propaganda centerpiece through the remainder of the year. The slogan that he no doubt intended to use this year, "Now we are truly going to build socialism," which he used in closing a speech on 26 December 1986, had to be discarded. Reportedly it

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

generated considerable dismay and anger among Cubans who believed that they had been building socialism for the previous quarter century, and it heightened the fears of many others that the hardships of daily life would only go on getting worse. As a result, Castro uncharacteristically retreated. In subsequent public comments, he apologetically retracted the slogan, and praised the populace for their accomplishments in building socialism since the early 1960s. It is probably for similar reasons, moreover, that in several appearances he has dropped the familiar "fatherland or death" slogan that had always been his standard closing refrain. He may have concluded that it, too, tends to arouse excessively negative feelings during a time of deepening domestic troubles. []

Neocapitalism and Other Vices

22. Castro attributes Cuba's internal crisis partly to "objective" causes. In this category he includes the natural disasters (a severe hurricane and prolonged drought) that have taken a major toll on the economy. He has also frequently emphasized that international factors largely beyond Cuba's control—US economic sanctions, low commodity prices worldwide, unfavorable exchange and interest rates, debt service obligations, and assorted barriers to international trade—impede Cuba's economic diversification and growth. He has often angrily blamed the United States and the European Economic Community for causing or exacerbating such problems. []

23. It is clear, however, that he places most of the blame for Cuba's plight on what he calls "subjective" or human factors. He has railed so often against corruption, crime, materialism, neocapitalism, and counterrevolutionary attitudes, in fact, that it seems he detects such shortcomings nearly everywhere in Cuban society. He has been particularly harsh in his criticisms of workers. On 26 June 1986 he condemned workers who are "spoiled" and "politically underdeveloped," and on other occasions he has berated them for complacently expecting material rewards for their labors. He compared them unfavorably with "intellectual workers" who, he said, are "receiving superior political development," whereas "the workers, who comprise the vanguard, are becoming politically underdeveloped." And, if attacking the proletarian vanguard so stridently were not enough, in a speech in December 1986 he also criticized the peasantry for showing "signs of corruption." []

24. Cuban youth—as well as, occasionally, their teachers—have also been among his principal targets. He has repeatedly demanded that they work and study more. In July 1986, for example, he sounded like

the demanding and irate parent of an entire wayward generation when he complained that "in this country students do not study hard enough." About a week later he carped again about those "not always enthusiastic about their studies." He believes the present generation is spoiled. "Now there are laws that protect adolescents, sometimes even to an excessive degree," he said, insisting that youths "who are wandering the streets" get more involved in organized activities. Castro has also admitted publicly that idle and "anti-social" young people constitute a serious social problem. This was implicit in unusually candid remarks he made in June 1986. "The lumpen are beginning to retreat. You can already see more policemen on the streets . . . the beaches. Steps have been taken . . . banning beer on the beaches. . . . I understand you can go to the beaches now, the number of bullies has decreased." But, in a speech on 5 April 1987, at the closing of the congress of the Union of Young Communists, he seemed to admit that at least one beach, a once fashionable one near Havana, has been taken over by unruly youths who use drugs and alcohol. []

25. Castro is particularly incensed that large numbers of Cuban youths have rejected his incessant preaching about the virtues of voluntarism and internationalism. He has insisted that they eschew materialism and neocapitalism and commit themselves in the same way that he and his guerrilla colleagues did in the 1950s and 1960s. Referring to those years, he told a provincial party meeting in January 1987 that "I do not remember a single case in which an individual received material incentives to do what he did . . . All the great things that this country has accomplished have been done with revolutionary spirit . . . not . . . for money." []

26. Castro has leveled some of his bitterest attacks on what he calls neocapitalism. The case that appears to have rankled him the most is that of an unnamed individual who acquired two trucks and earned hundreds of thousands of pesos as an independent hauler. Castro also complained heatedly about "people painting and selling paintings, even to state institutions, earning more than 200,000 pesos in a year." After all, he pointed out, "these are not the paintings of Picasso or Michaelangelo." Other examples of "neocapitalist profiteering" that Castro has publicly condemned include "wheeler-dealers who dared to go to the garbage dumps and collect cans of discarded goods in order to refurbish and sell the cans," as well as "a man who sold coathangers," and another "who bought chocolate bars in Lenin Park and then sold them for a higher price somewhere else." On several occasions,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

furthermore, he executed peasant farmers for pocketing exorbitant profits by growing garlic and selling single cloves in the farmers' free markets for a peso. That, he declared, "was not a case of peasants working and sweating honestly." Perhaps the most imaginative of these neocapitalists was a Cuban who apparently made a fortune designing and producing a distinctive line of costume jewelry; according to Castro, he bought a large supply of plastic toothbrushes, and then made them into necklaces. []



Figure 2. Raul Castro in civilian attire. []

27. These vignettes dramatize at once the penury of life for most Cubans and the deepening estrangement between them and their increasingly forbidding and didactic leader. Judging from the examples of the abuses that he has cited, moreover, it is clear that many Cubans were remarkably successful entrepreneurs during the period when limited free markets were allowed to operate. Since 1980 Castro has repeatedly warned his audiences that worse times lie ahead and has demanded that they struggle more selflessly. Like some fundamentalist prophet of doom, he has insisted that holocaust, war, and plagues threaten Cuba with extinction. Though it has been clear through the entire decade that such grim and apocalyptic preaching is counterproductive—especially with the younger generation—in some respects he has taken to even greater extremes over the last year or so. []

28. As a result, the gulf between the once charismatic Castro and the populace seems to have widened to the point where today his ability to inspire and mobilize is at its lowest level ever. His extreme denunciations of neocapitalism and his insistence on equating all entrepreneurial impulses with corruption and counterrevolution also seem to place him firmly at the extreme hardline fringe of world Communist leaders. In a major speech last October he even seemed inadvertently to equate Communism with hardship and constant struggle. "What is Communism?" he asked, "A society of abundance? Can we equate the idea of Communism to something so crude, vulgar, or absurd?" []

Raul Castro and the State Within the State

29. As the quality and credibility of Fidel Castro's leadership have eroded, the influence and visibility of his younger brother, Raul, have markedly increased. Raul Castro was born in 1931 and has officially been first in the line of succession since January 1959, and is second in every party and government chain of command behind his brother. Beginning in 1959 his power derived almost exclusively from his position as armed

forces minister, but since 1983 he has played a more prominent civilian leadership role as well, and now often appears in public in civilian clothes. These and other developments gave rise to speculation that he would assume a larger leadership role at the party's Third Congress last year, and that perhaps he would even succeed his brother as first secretary. []

30. Although the younger Castro did not acquire a new title at the congress, his position was considerably strengthened. At least four of the 14 Politburo members—including his wife and a senior general who became full members—are close associates, as are at least five of the 10 alternates. Now there are also at least six *raulistas* in the nine-man party Secretariat. In addition to the Castro brothers, moreover, only Raul's associates Jorge Risquet and Jose Machado Ventura serve simultaneously on the Politburo and the Secretariat, suggesting that the coordination between policymaking and implementation may now be largely in the hands of *raulistas*. Finally, the younger Castro's claim to the succession was made all the more secure during the party congress because his potentially strongest rival, former Interior Minister and revolutionary veteran Ramiro Valdes, was removed from the Politburo. []

31. These changes were undoubtedly welcomed in Moscow, where Raul Castro and leading *raulistas* have long been Soviet favorites. Since the guerrilla struggles of the 1950s, in fact, when Raul Castro was already affiliated with Cuba's prerevolutionary Communist Party, he has been widely viewed as the most unwaveringly pro-Soviet leader in Fidel Castro's original entourage. Judging from the frequency of his travels to the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as from his public statements, he has also emerged as one of the regime's most important interlocutors with leaders in those countries. Unlike Fidel Castro, moreover, who manages to avoid lengthy public discussions of Cuban-Soviet relations and who rarely uses Soviet or Marxist

~~SECRET~~

2785

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

anniversaries for speaking appearances, Raul Castro performs frequently as a predictable and uncritical friend of the Soviet Union. For all these reasons, and because of Raul Castro's reputation as an effective administrator, Kremlin leaders are probably more comfortable dealing with him than with his mercurial brother []

32. The younger Castro's position has been so conspicuously strengthened, in fact, that by the end of last year he actually felt compelled to speak on the record in an apparent effort to clarify his and his brother's roles. In a lengthy published interview utterly without precedent in the 34-year history of their collaboration, Raul Castro defended Fidel Castro's record as a military leader and administrator in a way that suggested the latter had been under attack by military and other officials. "I would like to point out," he told the interviewer, "that Fidel has the traits and virtues of a military leader . . . a modest and unassuming way of dealing with people, and the ability to formulate ideas and transmit them in a precise manner." Raul Castro has never before felt it necessary to publicly vouch for his brother this way. The full text of the interview has been widely circulated in Cuba and internationally. First published in December 1986 in the Ministry of Interior journal *Mano a Mano*, it has been reprinted in *Bohemia* (a large-circulation magazine), and *Granma* (the party newspaper), and was broadcast in its entirety by Havana Radio. []

33. Even more interesting than his defense of his brother's military skills was Raul Castro's extraordinary discussion of his own role. He said that "regarding what is said about a state within a state, I want . . . to make some things clear." He went on to discuss his leadership of the Second Front during the guerrilla insurgency against the Batista government in 1958, but undoubtedly intended the historical reference to refute current speculation that he and the *raufistas* were taking over the regime. Located in the Sierra Cristal Mountains to the east of the Sierra Maestra, where his brother was in command, Raul Castro's guerrilla force developed into the largest and in many respects most effective of the rebel forces, including the First Front commanded by his brother. Raul Castro was the only rebel commander actually to gain control over a large territory and population; moreover, though still in his mid-twenties at the time, he proved to be an imaginative and respected administrator of that area. Even so, he reminded the interviewer, "During the war many worthy cadres were from the First Front. They were designated by Comrade Fidel to extend the armed struggle to other parts of the country and they logically helped with internal organization." []



Figure 3. Raul Castro in 1958 in the Sierra Cristal. []

34. Although it seems that one purpose of the interview was to bolster Fidel Castro's eroding credibility, it is significant that Raul Castro was neither as self-effacing nor deferential toward his brother as he had almost invariably been in the past. At times he actually boasted, commenting, for example, that "on the Second Front we reached a higher level and improved the organic structure to such a degree that in September 1958 . . . Fidel called it a 'model' of organization, administration, and order." Furthermore, by broaching the subject of "a state within a state" himself, the younger Castro was actually enhancing the credibility of the idea, especially considering that he never explicitly denied that such a sharing of power existed either in the late 1950s or today. Thus, he has reinforced speculation that his power continues to increase at the expense of his brother's. []

35. Another historical metaphor that seems to have considerable significance for the Castro brothers concerns their reunion early in the insurgency at a place in the sierra called Cinco Palmas. They met in December 1956 after a grave setback and after having been separated for a few weeks, each with a few colleagues. In the interview last December Raul Castro described Fidel Castro's reaction when they were reunited: "When the five of us arrived to join him, he made the unforgettable comment . . . 'Now we'll win the war.'" For his part, Fidel Castro had not previously focused on that aspect of the incident, and it is no doubt of considerable significance, therefore, that he chose to emphasize it in a major speech last 26 December. "If our people in the past were capable of overcoming very big obstacles and winning very big battles," he said, "now that we just had the 30th anniversary of that meeting of Raul and me in Cinco Palmas, I can repeat today: We are truly going to build socialism." The audience of regime officials—although long accustomed to confining their adulation to Fidel Castro alone—responded with shouts of "Viva Fidel, Viva Raul." []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Is Raul His Brother's Keeper?

36. While such developments seem to indicate that the power of Raul Castro and the *raulistas* has expanded considerably over the last year or so, it is unclear exactly how Fidel Castro's traditional hegemony has been affected. With the exception of his remarks about Casco Palmas and an extensive endorsement at the party congress of his brother's legitimacy as his successor, the elder Castro has not acknowledged any changes in his role. He continues to speak out on a wide range of subjects and to receive considerable attention in the official media. He personally orchestrated the campaign against materialism and neocapitalism. He meets with a large number of foreign visitors and evidently continues to dominate foreign policymaking. There has been no reporting of plotting against him, of any organized opposition groups anywhere on the island, or of efforts to restrict his authority. Thus, there is little doubt that he continues to function as the single most powerful individual in Cuba. ☐

Figure 4A. Fidel Castro in July 1983. ☐EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)Figure 4B. Fidel Castro in September 1986. ☐EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

37. But there is also ample reason to speculate that the virtually unquestioned hegemony that Castro previously exercised has eroded. Discontinuities in his leadership and rhetoric have been striking and inexplicable by his past standards. His failure, for instance, to launch a campaign or even any initiatives to suppress counterrevolutionary activities is unprecedented. Similarly, his failure to participate in a series of rallies and protests in front of the US Interests Section in Havana last December following an SR71 reconnaissance flight is difficult to explain, especially because other Cuban leaders delivered anti-US harangues. Indeed, his absence from mass rallies and his lack of direct contact with the populace is incompatible not only with his well-known style, but with his narcissistic personality requirements. Such changes in his behavior, and in his brother's ostensible role, may be explained by one or more of the following hypotheses. ☐

1983. Castro publicly ridiculed such rumors early in 1986—though it may be significant that he did so without incontrovertibly denying them. "Some say that I have I don't know how many tumors. The truth is that the machines haven't discovered them yet... I will have to have an X-ray taken just in case these people are correct." The rumors have been more effectively belied by Castro's record of public appearances and foreign travel since early 1986. The dozens of speeches and other appearances he has made, and his trips to the USSR, North Korea, Zimbabwe, and Angola would have exhausted many younger, healthy men. ☐

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

38. *Fidel Castro Is Seriously Ill.* Since late 1984 intermittent reporting from various sources has suggested that Fidel Castro has suffered from various serious ailments. That reporting has been reinforced by numerous indications in his public appearances that he is preoccupied with matters of health and mortality, by his widely publicized decision in 1986 to give up the cigars that for years had been a trademark, by his frequent coughing during public appearances, and by reports from people who have met with him over the last two years that he looks pale and sickly. A doctor who has published a popular biography of Fidel Castro says he may have suffered a heart attack in

39. *Castro Is Willingly Yielding Power.* Under mounting pressure from Moscow and elite groups in Cuba to decentralize and depersonalize the regime, Castro may have decided to delegate more power to his brother and the *raulistas*. Since consolidating his personal hegemony in the early 1960s, he has been vulnerable to charges that he has ruled by perpetuating a cult of personality. Numerous allusions in his speeches suggest that he has tried for that reason to reduce his visibility. Before the party congress it was rumored, for instance, that he would step down from one or more of his top positions in favor of his brother



EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

in order to concentrate on Cuban foreign policy and on economic planning. But he did not allow himself to get so far that he forgot about Castro, and he was not so foolish as to believe that he could be winning the long-term battle passively and yield any strength and degree of power to others. []

30. *Raul Castro's New Prominence Is Meant To Deceive Fidel Castro's Critics.* It is possible that Fidel Castro has skillfully orchestrated his brother's and the *raudeles'* rise to greater prominence in order to persuade Soviet leaders, as well as his domestic critics and others, that he is willing to share power through the party's collective leadership. Such a rise would be entirely consistent with his Byzantine instincts and with his extraordinary ability to manipulate and deceive. He might reason that by appearing to accept a reduced leadership role, he could persuade Moscow to augment its economic subsidies to his regime and even increase the chances of winning concessions from the United States that would help relieve domestic pressures. However, to be successful in assuaging Soviet concerns, Castro would almost certainly have to curtail or abandon his present campaign against neocapitalism and materialism in Cuba, and cease criticizing the USSR. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

41. *A Genuine Power Struggle Is Under Way.* The key proposition distinguishing this hypothesis from the three above is that Fidel Castro is *involuntarily* yielding power. It could be argued in this context that in his "state within a state" interview Raul Castro actually intended to announce indirectly that his brother was no longer the revolution's unquestioned "maximum leader." By this reasoning, the younger Castro may have already begun gradually to restrict his brother's hegemony in the belief that the latter is no longer physically or mentally competent or that the revolution is endangered. Raul Castro would be most likely to cross that Rubicon if leading *raudeles*—including ranking generals and Politburo members—also were convinced that Fidel Castro's authority had to be constrained. So far, however, there is no clear evidence to support this hypothesis. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

42. Although it is not yet possible to predict how the relationship between the Castro brothers will evolve, it now seems to loom as one of the most critical variables that will shape the future direction and leadership of the Cuban revolution. The conventional wisdom about Raul Castro holds that since their childhood he has been in awe of his brother and content to remain in a subordinate role. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Figure 5. Fidel and Raul Castro at the Third Communist Party Congress, 1986. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Since he joined Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement in the early 1950s, there have been only a few instances (all of them more than a quarter century ago) when the two appeared to be openly at odds. The younger Castro has otherwise appeared unwavering in his support through the entire steepleschase course his brother has pursued. It would seem to follow that Raul Castro would be extremely unlikely to challenge his brother's hegemony except in certain extreme situations. []

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

43. But just as Raul Castro's important military and administrative contributions during the insurgency against Batista have been largely unheralded, his important role during the first year or two of the regime has also been generally overlooked. He was a committed, pro-Soviet Marxist years before Fidel Castro became a convert, and he probably exerted a stronger ideological influence on him than any other individual except Che Guevara. Raul Castro was openly hostile to the United States long before his brother was, and frequently pressed for the adoption of radical policies certain to antagonize Washington. For a period during the insurgency he held a few dozen US citizens as hostages in an act of apparent



Figure 6. Minister of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces Raul Castro. [] ©

insubordination that undermined support for Fidel Castro's cause in the United States. On other occasions Raul Castro is believed to have played an independent and decisive role, and at a few crucial junctures, to have pushed his own policy agenda. Considered from this perspective, he might be willing to move against his brother if he believed the need to do so was compelling. []

44. In addition, although all of the leading *raulistas* have also worked closely with Fidel Castro and have apparently enjoyed his full confidence, their outlooks and styles seem to differ substantially from his. Whether in top military, party, or government posts, the *raulistas* are believed to put a high priority on maintaining intimate ties to the USSR and on recreating in Cuba the "organization, administration, and order" that Raul Castro said in his "state within a state" interview prevailed in the Second Front. None of the *raulistas*, including Raul Castro, appear to possess charismatic qualities, and, none share Fidel Castro's passion for mass rallies and mobilizations. Instead, they probably favor technocratic, collective leadership, and are undoubtedly greatly concerned about Cuba's worsening domestic crisis and the rising tensions in relations with Moscow. []

45. From this perspective, then, it is conceivable that Raul Castro could lead or join in a cabal intended to gradually restrict his brother's hegemony. For the first time since 1959, moreover, Fidel Castro appears to be highly vulnerable to such a conspiracy because it is not certain he could depend on any of the three bulwarks that uphold his regime:

- The military and security services are under the command of Raul Castro and *raulista* generals who have been with him since the Second Front, and there have been a number of signs since late 1983 of armed forces dissatisfaction with Fidel Castro's leadership.

- Raul and his associates seem to constitute the largest single bloc in the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party.

- Most significant perhaps, is the fundamental change that has occurred over the last few years in Fidel Castro's credibility and contact with the Cuban masses. When he felt his primacy threatened in the past he typically staged mass rallies and mobilizations to demonstrate his substantial popular support, which always intimidated his opponents. Today, it is doubtful that he could mobilize a mass of supporters large and enthusiastic enough to crow a determined and well-organized opposition that included his brother.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Implications for the United States

46. On balance then, it seems that, if the many negative trends undermining Fidel Castro's leadership persist, it will be increasingly unlikely that he will be able to preserve his hegemony. He is apparently already under intense Soviet and domestic pressure to decentralize, depersonalize, and otherwise rationalize the regime, and the longer he presses his crusade against individual enterprise and initiative, the stronger the opposition to him is likely to become. The concessions he already seems to have made to critics of his autocratic and personalistic style may have been largely involuntary; if so, further restrictions will probably be placed on his direct contact with the masses and on his assumed right to unilaterally announce new initiatives. Thus, it is conceivable that Castro's current rectification campaign may be the final test of his leadership. Unless he can restore some measure of social and economic stability, revive popular confidence in the revolution, and assuage the concerns of Cuban officials and Soviet leaders, his authority will probably continue to erode. []

47. The other key variable of course is Raul Castro. If, in fact, he has not already crossed his personal Rubicon and put his relationship with his brother on a new plateau, the pressures on him to do so are likely to intensify steadily. It is unlikely, however, that Fidel Castro will be deposed or disgraced if others gain the upper hand. His brother and leading *raulistas* would probably want to install the elder Castro in some emeritus or ceremonial position from which he could provide residual legitimacy while being prevented from interfering in decisionmaking. []

48. In any situation in which Fidel Castro's hegemony is threatened, the greatest danger for US inter-

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

ests is that he will react, as he typically did in the past, by striking out boldly and dangerously and by taking major risks to bolster his position. He would like to export tens or hundreds of thousands of the disaffected to the United States, either as a result of negotiations, by unleashing another massive boatlift, or possibly through some risky initiative involving the Guantanamo Naval Base. Although so far he has been wary of confronting the Reagan administration, he might conclude that US resolve has been diminished by recent developments. He may believe that the danger posed by domestic threats exceeds the risk of confronting the United States. When under intense domestic pressure in the past, he was more likely to seek some international outlet for his frustrations by increasing support for revolutionary groups or relatively high risk covert operations. However, the longer Castro refrains from such aggressive actions, the more likely it will seem that his hegemony has already been circumscribed.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

49. Estimates of how a collective leadership dominated by Raul Castro would perform are highly speculative at best. Although he has consistently expressed strong nationalistic and anti-US attitudes, and was possibly even more extreme in these regards in the late 1950s than his brother, he may have become more pragmatic as his responsibilities have multiplied. As an effective and respected administrator, he is experienced in balancing competing interests and factions, and most importantly, he has functioned for years as one of the principal intermediaries between his brother and others in the leadership. Persuasive evidence suggests, furthermore, that the younger Castro is emotionally more stable and predictable than his brother, and considerably less likely to base international initiatives on personal grudges, grievances, or resentments. Thus, from the US perspective, the most salubrious result of a dynastic succession in Cuba could be the end of a more than 28-year era characterized by Fidel Castro's visceral and intractable animosity toward the United States blocking every effort at reconciliation.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

50. Though the evidence since the late 1950s clearly established that Raul Castro can be as tough as his brother, equally compelling information in recent years reveals a more human and sensitive side. In sharp contrast to Fidel Castro, he is known to be intimate and altruistic with relatives and friends. He has been married to Vilma Espin since 1959, and, although they were divorced for a period and then remarried, over the last few years they have traveled together on the island and abroad, and appear frequently at the same public events. Unlike his brother,



Figure 7. Raul Castro: A more human and sensitive side.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

Raul Castro remains in touch with sisters who live in exile, is known to have had a close relationship with his parents, and is still respected by male and female friends and intimates from the 1950s. He is known for the loyalty and generosity extended to associates who have fallen out of favor with his brother and for a genuine sense of humor (totally lacking in Fidel Castro). A number of sources have reported, furthermore, that, unlike his brother, Raul Castro has maintained the respect and admiration of subordinates over extended periods of time.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

51. Although it is, of course, difficult to project such personal and professional traits into generalizations about how Raul Castro might conduct Cuban foreign policy, it seems likely at a minimum that, under his leadership, Cuba would be a more predictable neighbor. The *raulistas* would no doubt move swiftly to correct relations with the Soviet Union and would probably at least curtail Fidel Castro's campaign against individual enterprise and initiative. They would probably place a high priority on winning back popular support for the regime through the use of material incentives. They might be inclined to reduce military spending and the size of the armed forces, especially if they abandoned Fidel Castro's paranoid view of a beleaguered Cuba in mortal danger of a US military attack.

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

52. They would probably also be more sensitive to popular opposition to Cuba's large military presence in Angola and to the danger that AIDS and other serious infectious diseases imported from Africa will cause. The *raulistas* would be unlikely to abandon interest in Latin American revolutionary groups or the Sandinista regime, but they would probably be more parsimonious and cautious in supporting them, while placing a higher priority on improving state-to-state relations in the hemisphere.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

53. A *raulista* regime would probably also move, at least temporarily, into closer alignment with Moscow. The Soviet civilian presence on the island would almost certainly grow. Cuba would probably receive additional economic support, and would cooperate more to integrate its economic planning and development with the USSR and the remaining CEMA countries. A *raulista* regime would be more likely, therefore, to alleviate some of the island's most serious economic problems and to begin bringing some order out of the administrative chaos caused by Fidel Castro's incessant interventions and extreme prescriptions. It might then win greater backing and respectability in Latin America and the West generally. ☐

54. It is not at all clear, however, how long a *raulista* regime could survive. Although he was first

designated his brother's successor in January 1959 and presumably has prepared for his turn in power ever since, Raul Castro arouses little popular enthusiasm. Despite his recent efforts to ameliorate his image, moreover, he is still perceived by many Cubans as a ruthless hardliner. Thus, his personal authority and legitimacy would probably be relatively weak, forcing him to depend on *raulista* generals and party officials to form a collective leadership. Under such circumstances, rival leaders, factions, and elites would probably begin jockeying for power, and it is doubtful that he could balance and manipulate them as Fidel Castro has. The odds would then probably be good that some presently unidentified pragmatists would want to begin improving relations with the United States even at the expense of Cuba's military and economic ties to the Soviet Union. ☐

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

~~14
SECRET~~

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)-10-25Yrs
(C)

ANNEX

On a Collision Course With Moscow

1. Castro and Gorbachev have increasingly diverged over the last year or so on such key issues as decentralization, democratization, the use of market mechanisms, the role of intellectuals and dissidents, and cult of personality. The Soviet leader, and his reforms have received scant attention in the Cuban media, and, as of May 1987, Castro had still managed to almost completely avoid public mention of *glasnost* and of Gorbachev personally. The official Cuban position on the Soviet reforms was typified by a cool, two sentence Radio Havana announcement in late February noting that "an extensive description of the restructuring process practiced in the Soviet Union was given in Havana" by the Soviet ambassador. There was no mention of which Cuban officials attended nor was there comment on the nature of the reforms.

2. While he appears to respect Gorbachev for his audacity, vitality, and decisiveness, Castro is also convinced that the Soviet leader has embarked on a disastrous course.

A number of other high-level Soviet officials have also visited Havana since late 1986, and all have no doubt brought the same message of rising impatience with and concern over the radical and dogmatic course that Castro has taken.

3. Castro's ambivalence toward the Soviet leader—respecting him personally while despising and fearing his policies—has been evident in his public appearances. When asked by foreign journalists on at least two occasions in recent months to characterize Gorbachev, Castro was fairly effusive in his praise, and seemed intent on emphasizing his respect for Gorbachev's skills as a leader. In speeches, however, he has voluntarily uttered Gorbachev's name on only a

few times since returning from Moscow after attending the Soviet party congress in February, 1986. Whatever their relationship, it clearly got off to a troubled start when Castro failed to attend the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, which marked the beginning of Gorbachev's rule. Castro claimed that important domestic matters required his presence in Cuba, but then permitted even that poor excuse to be undermined by making time for a lengthy interview by a US network anchorman.

4. Even during his visit to Moscow in late February and early March 1986 for the party congress, Castro refused to endorse the Soviet reform program then emerging. In his speech at the congress he addressed Gorbachev warmly and praised his "brilliant and valiant main report." He immediately added, however, that "it is not for us guests to pass judgments... or to make suggestions as to what can or should be done... (The Soviet) people and party will know how to conquer these obstacles." To distance himself even further from the reforms, Castro went on to assert his view that "the greatest of these" threats is to world peace, and then devoted the remainder of his address to international issues. He took essentially the same line in an impromptu press conference in Moscow a few days later. After visiting the Swedish Embassy to pay his respects following the assassination of Prime Minister Olaf Palme, he was asked by Swedish journalists if the Soviet reforms "will have repercussions in Cuba?" Castro skillfully avoided answering the question, reiterating that the most important issue was that of preserving world peace.

5. During his stay in the Soviet capital, Castro also may have intentionally offended his hosts by being absent from important sessions of the party congress. In particular, it appears that he did not attend on 3 March when Politburo member Nikolai Ryzhkov read the document that, among other things, described many of Gorbachev's domestic reforms. Instead, Castro visited the Institute of Organic Chemistry in Moscow, where he delivered an awkward and at times tense speech in which at one point he even had to defend his decision to be absent from the congress proceedings. Following the Moscow sojourn, he traveled to North Korea where, according to the Cuban

15

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)-10-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)-10-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)-10-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)-10-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

media, he was welcomed by at least one million people. The extensive and dramatic Cuban press treatment of the visit to Pyongyang contrasted sharply with that afforded Castro while he was in the USSR.

6. Within a few months of returning to Cuba, Castro began publicly to criticize the USSR. On at least a half dozen occasions he has used various veiled and indirect formulations to identify major areas of disagreement. Tensions are probably higher now in fact than at any time since the late 1960s, when relations reached their lowest point ever. As at that time, problems result in large part from Castro's stubborn resistance to Soviet pressure on him to adopt new procedures and frameworks to bring order out of the chaos of the Cuban economy. He knows that decentralizing reforms would undermine his personal hegemony and could give impetus to another cycle of neocapitalism. He also strongly resents the interference of Soviet officials in the internal dynamics of the Cuban revolution and has concluded that earlier administrative and managerial reforms imposed by Moscow were disastrous.

7. In four major speeches since June 1986 he has drawn attention to this grievance. On 26 June 1986, he complained of externally imposed solutions and invoked the memory of Che Guevara—the most anti-Soviet leader of his revolutionary inner circle in the 1960s—who he said “mistrusted those mechanisms.” “We made mistakes when we copied the experience of others,” he asserted, “and we made mistakes when we copied the experience of others under different historical circumstances . . . a different state of mind and psychology. That is why we are deeply concerned about current events.” It is clear from this and similar references that Castro compares the present state of Cuban-Soviet relations to the all-time nadir that occurred in the late 1960s. It was then that Havana was compelled, under unrelenting pressure, grudgingly to accept Moscow's prescriptions.

8. On 2 December 1986, speaking to top party leaders, Castro raised the subject again, complaining that acceptance of the Soviet “mechanisms” had been “one of the worst things that happened to us . . . the blind belief that the building of socialism is essentially a problem of mechanisms.” He then went on to press his belief that socialism and Communism can only be built through “political and revolutionary” work. On 7 January 1987, in another speech before party officials he returned to the theme. He said that “mistakes were made and anarchic tendencies developed” after Soviet-imposed approaches were adopted in the early

1970s. Those abuses were “much worse than the idealist mistakes” that he and Guevara had made in the 1960s when they were in sharp conflict with the USSR over a range of domestic and foreign policy differences. “At least those (idealist) mistakes did not jeopardize the people's consciousness,” Castro added. At the heart of the argument in each of these important speeches about Soviet “mechanisms” was Castro's conviction that they ignored the “moral principles, values, and conscience” that “make men achieve great things.”

9. Castro has pressed the issue, moreover, by denouncing those—presumably both in Cuba and the Soviet Union—who are experts in Marxist-Leninist ideology. On 7 January 1987, he said that “Here, there used to be many ‘priests’ who were considered well-versed because they were bookworms and experts in Marxist concepts . . . and quotations. They read all the volumes. It seems that while some worked, others dedicated themselves solely to reading. They were converted into a type of Marxist-Leninist priest.” A week later he warned “Let no one think that by taking a course in Marxism-Leninism we know all about the problems we are discussing . . . Such problems are not listed in any book or manual . . . (and are) not mentioned in classrooms.” In these sharp criticisms, he seemed to put the Kremlin on notice that he will not be persuaded by ideological arguments, that he understands Cuba's needs better than anyone in Moscow, and that in his country judgments about policy and ideology are made by him alone.

10. His public criticism of the Soviet Union has also extended to other important subjects. He has long been irritated that Cuba has been assigned to a role as a producer of sugar and citrus in CEMA, and that Moscow is opposed to his desire to diversify economically. Thus, when on 14 January 1987 he complained publicly that “Cuba has to produce billions of tons of food for other countries—sugar, citrus, and others . . .” he was certainly referring to what he considers a humiliating problem. On two occasions since fall 1986 he has also sought to distance himself from Moscow when speaking to Third World audiences. In a speech in September 1986 at the Nonaligned Summit in Harare, he described “military pacts that divide the most powerful nations in antagonistic blocs” as “anachronisms that must be eliminated.” And, in an interview with a Brazilian weekly in March 1987, he said that the “developed countries including the socialist ones . . . must contribute money” for economic development in the Third World. “With just 20 percent of what is being spent on the arms race,” he said, “we could resolve the foreign debt and the problems of underdevelopment.”

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

16
~~SECRET~~

2 7 9 5

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

11. On balance then, it appears that Castro's problems with the USSR are remarkably similar to those he had in the late 1960s, even though today there are no significant differences between the two countries' policies in Latin America. He is concerned that his hegemony is threatened by a worsening domestic crisis and by intensifying Soviet efforts to dictate Cuban responses. He knows, moreover, that although he was able to maintain his primacy during the 1970s while acquiescing in the Soviet-sponsored decentralization and institutionalization of his regime, he is not likely to

fare as well under similar Soviet pressure in the late 1980s. Castro will be 61 in August 1987 and his energy and popularity have eroded substantially. His position is further weakened, moreover, by the likelihood that no sustainable economic recovery is possible in the foreseeable future, and the clear evidence that he can no longer readily inspire and mobilize the populace to join him in difficult crusades against heavy odds. His deepening confrontation with Gorbachev may, therefore, prove to be the most reckless gamble that he has taken in nearly 20 years.

EO 12958 1.6(d)(1)>10<25Yrs
(C)

17
~~SECRET~~



Director of
Central
Intelligence

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

~~Secret~~ SM
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

FILM PER C/CIA LIBRARY

National Intelligence Estimate

Cuba: The Outlook for Castro and Beyond (C NF)

NEB|-----|NIE 93-30|-----

GRAPHIC MATERIAL
MAY NOT REPRODUCE CLEARLY

*This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

NIE 93-30
August 1993

Copy 456

21

2149

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT~~

NIE 93-30

Cuba: The Outlook for Castro and Beyond (C NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

August 1993

~~Secret~~
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT


POOR QUALITY PAGE

Figure 1
Composition of Cuban Trade, 1989-93

Total Imports

Billion US \$


9



Total Exports

Billion US \$

6



* Other includes raw material, chemical products, semifinished goods, transport equipment, and consumer goods.

^b Other includes fish, tobacco, fruit, coffee and cocoa, and fuels.

^c Estimated from official data from Cuba's trade partners.

^d Projected from partial data on trade volumes and values.

Sources: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1989, official data from Cuba's trade partners.

Confidential NOFORN

040403 740

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

Key Judgments

Tensions and uncertainties in Cuba are so acute that significant miscalculations by Castro, a deterioration of his health, or plotting in the military could provoke regime-threatening instability at virtually any time. There is a better than even chance that Fidel Castro's government will fall within the next few years. (S NF)

Underlying Premises

These judgments are based on the following underlying premises:

- *Fidel Castro will not voluntarily relinquish power.*
- *The Cuban economy will not benefit from some domestic economic bonanza, such as discovery of a large oil deposit.*
- *There is a direct correlation between severe economic deprivation and political instability. (S NF)*

Regardless of when and how such developments occur, US interests will be challenged in complex and possibly unprecedented ways. Almost all succession scenarios are likely to entail substantial and possibly protracted instability and large-scale emigration to the United States, while generating demands for US involvement. (S NF)

The demise of Castro's government will be the signal event in what is likely to be a lengthy and conflictive process of national reconciliation among pro- and anti-Castro elements on the island and the Cuban diaspora. The new era will be marred by retributory and other violence. (S NF)

New Cuban leaders will be poorly prepared to deal with the extraordinary economic and social problems they will face. In particular, tensions will be high between stalwarts of the ancien regime committed to maintaining a high degree of statism and reformers attracted to free market models. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

U1

~~Secret~~
NIE 93-30
August 1993

~~Secret~~
 NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

With few exceptions, exile political leaders are likely to find scant support on the island and will probably be greeted with suspicion and hostility if they are perceived as trying to seize control. Demands by exiles to purge Castro-era officials, or to put some on trial, would arouse fierce opposition. Similarly, exile efforts to recover properties seized in the 1960s would be highly contentious. (S NF)

Devastating Economic Decline

Cuba's economy has contracted by more than 40 percent since 1989 and will probably continue to decline. Virtually without foreign subsidies, credits, or assistance, Cuba faces severe fuel, food, and other shortages. (S NF)

But, even with the survival of his regime at stake, Castro remains rigid in his hatred of capitalism, rejection of meaningful political reform and large-scale private enterprise, insistence that Cuba not be overwhelmed by US culture and economic power, and loathing of the dominant groups and attitudes in the exile community. (S NF)

His strategy for survival hinges on (1) implementing limited economic reforms to ameliorate internal dissatisfaction and attract hard currency; (2) seeking accommodation with the United States to win relief from the embargo; and (3) controlling dissidents, critics, and potential opponents on the island. Castro retains considerable strengths, especially the loyalty of the military and security services. (S NF)

But, as economic conditions deteriorate, antiregime violence—which thus far has been rare—is likely to increase. A large uprising would prompt Castro to devote whatever force necessary to repress it, even at the risk of a bloodbath. If public disorder continued to spread he would have to call upon the military, whose willingness to carry out the order would be questionable. (S NF)

In general, military units are not trained for riot control and have never been used against civilians. Many military personnel probably would desert if ordered to fire on civilians, and some might oppose the regime. In such circumstances, a unit or units probably would turn on the government and forces still loyal to it. (S NF)

~~Secret~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
 DATE: JUN 2001

iv

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT~~

Serious instability in Cuba will have an immediate impact on the United States:

- From 20,000 to 80,000 Cubans would be able to flee on small craft available in Cuba, and larger numbers would leave if boats arrived from the United States.
- Pressures for urgent humanitarian rescue efforts at sea would be intense.
- Pressure would also increase for US or international intervention in Cuba, especially if a large number of exiles became involved there. (S NF)

If he believed that his or his regime's survival were imminently threatened, Castro might try to provoke an incident with the United States in an attempt to arouse nationalist fervor and deflect popular hostility from himself. (S NF)

Finally, if faced with the certainty of his fall, Castro might lash out against the United States. It is remotely possible he could order an air attack on an installation on the US mainland, the military occupation of Guantanamo, or terrorist attacks. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT

Discussion

Even with the survival of his regime at stake, Fidel Castro remains rigid in his hatred of capitalism, rejection of meaningful political reforms and large-scale private enterprise, insistence that Cuba not be overwhelmed by US culture and economic power, and loathing of the dominant groups and attitudes in the Cuban exile community. (S NF)

As a result of the loss of more than \$4 billion in annual Soviet and other Communist subsidies, economic activity—which fell by about 35 percent between 1989 and 1992—is likely to contract by another 10 percent this year. And, if Castro manages to retain power, and leaves present policies essentially unchanged, the economy will probably continue declining through 1996, the period treated in this Estimate. (S)

The impact on the population already has been devastating. Food shortages and distribution problems have caused malnutrition and disease, and the difficulties of subsisting will intensify. Public health, sanitation, and other services will further deteriorate, additional factories will be idled (more than half already have curtailed production), and those unemployed or underemployed will rise above the current 50 percent of the labor force. Severe shortages of fuel, now causing daily blackouts of up to 10 to 16 hours in Havana, and the virtual collapse of public transportation, will persist and possibly worsen. (C)

Largely because this year's sugar harvest of 4.3 million metric tons is the smallest in 30 years, total export revenues will fall to about \$1.6 billion. There is little chance, moreover, that they will surpass \$2 billion annually through 1996:

- Exports of sugar will be constrained by the lack of fertilizers and herbicides, the decrepitude of mills and equipment, and mounting transportation problems.
- Earnings from nickel and other traditional exports are unlikely to rise much above the levels of recent years.
- Nontraditional exports, such as biomedical products, have only marginal prospects. (C)

Hard currency inflows from other sources will not offset declining export earnings:

- Gross revenues from tourism will rise from \$380 million last year to nearly \$450 million in 1993, but net income may be only about half that because of the high operating costs.
- Foreign investment, mostly in tourism, totaled about \$100 million annually between 1990 and 1992 and seems likely to rise to \$200 million this year.

~~Secret~~

- If implemented soon, expected policy changes to increase remittance income and facilitate visits by Cuban exiles could generate several hundred million dollars by the end of this year. (C)

Foreign economic assistance is unlikely to exceed about \$200 million annually. Russia is providing construction credits of \$380 million, spread over several years. Although Moscow denies giving Cuba any trade subsidy, preliminary trade data for 1993 indicate a \$50-100 million balance in Havana's favor. Spain, Cuba's only other significant benefactor, has extended a credit of \$40 million for food purchases. But substantial new credits are unlikely because debt to Western creditors of more than \$7 billion has been in arrears since the mid-1980s. Beijing rebuffed Cuban entreaties for aid this year, and Castro has also been stymied in efforts to attract \$200 million in Western financing to complete the nuclear power plant at Juragua. (S NF)

As a result of these financial constraints, imports—which declined by nearly 75 percent between 1989 and 1992—will fall another 20 to 25 percent this year. With food and petroleum constituting nearly two-thirds of import spending, only several hundred million dollars will be available for all other purchases abroad. Sharply curtailed imports of industrial spare parts, machinery, and equipment; transportation goods; agricultural inputs; and other critical commodities will further undermine the prospects for economic recovery. And, even if Castro attracted another \$1 billion annually—through Cuban exile remittances, for example—expanded imports of food, petroleum, and other critically needed goods would not reverse Cuba's economic decline. (C)

Castro's Survival Strategy

As pressures mount, Castro will pursue his survival strategy, which emphasizes three key elements:

- Implementing limited economic reforms to ameliorate internal dissatisfaction and attract foreign economic relief.
- Seeking accommodation with the United States to win an easing or lifting of the economic embargo.
- Intimidating, harassing, exiling, and, when necessary, repressing dissidents, critics, and potential opponents. (S)

He will also seek to retain the support of the Cuban public by portraying US policy as hostile and driven by an exile community determined to reclaim lost properties, seize power, and undo the social gains of his regime. At the same time, by allowing increased family visits he hopes to earn additional hard currency while sowing divisions in the exile community. He will also try to preserve the illusion that he alone can rule Cuba and defend its interests. (S NF)

Castro will remain a largely unitary decisionmaker. Although he relies on younger officials, especially in economic affairs, none appears willing to push credible alternative views, as respected officials did in the past. Few of Castro's subordinates from the early years retain top civilian posts, while many others have been disgraced or retired. Even his younger brother Raul, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, would intervene only if Fidel Castro were in steep physical or mental decline. Despite a few vague and qualified hints that he might consider retiring, we believe Fidel Castro will not voluntarily relinquish power. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

his regime. By overreacting with excessive force to antiregime demonstrations or civil unrest or by underreacting and allowing disturbances to spread, Castro would provoke more serious challenges to his authority. Thus, his continued good health and the constancy of his leadership will be the critical variables affecting the survival of his regime. (C NF)

Feeding the Trojan Horse

The greatest potential for serious error lies in the implementation of economic reforms:

- With living standards plunging, Cuban leaders have acknowledged that no end of the hardships is in sight, and many recognize that significant economic reform is essential.

But profound changes, like those implemented in the Soviet Union and other former Communist countries, are anathema to Castro because they would undermine his authority and eventually cause his regime to unravel.

- Even economic reforms legitimizing large-scale private enterprise, like those adopted by China and Vietnam, are unacceptable because Castro could not abide the reemergence of a vigorous private sector.
- He will have no choice, therefore, but to maneuver warily in the narrowing space between these irreconcilable imperatives. (S)

The cautious implementation of economic reforms highlights Castro's problem. Despite harsh denunciations of "neo-capitalist" exploiters, he grudgingly permitted foreign investment and large-scale foreign tourism in

In his efforts to manage the domestic crisis, Castro often functions in a practical, rational, and flexible manner. Recognizing, for example, that Cuba can no longer support a large military or indulge in costly foreign adventures, he has slashed military programs and personnel and shelved active support for subversion in Latin America. And, considering the challenges he has faced since 1989, he has borne the strains with outward equanimity. He has maintained a busy public schedule, traveled abroad at least once a year, and made no serious tactical errors. (S NF)

But, as his options narrow, Castro will be more likely to miscalculate—with the odds rising that a serious error would be fatal for

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~**The Trojan Horse**

In a published interview last February, then Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon was asked by a foreign reporter if tourism and foreign investment in Cuba might turn out to be a destabilizing Trojan horse. (U)

Alarcon responded that: "We have no other choice but to feed the Trojan horse. ... We must take a chance ... we are familiar with the social and political price, but the real danger is the economic crisis." (U)

the late 1980s. In 1991 he adopted a key element of Asian Communist reform programs by authorizing small tradesmen to operate. But relatively few have been licensed, and none can buy supplies openly. Castro will probably open new areas of the economy to foreign investment and broaden experiments in wage and price reform. He may even relent in his longstanding opposition to farmers' markets but only if they were strictly regulated. Such measures may alleviate dissatisfaction and sustain the hopes of proreform officials, but they are unlikely to attract substantial amounts of hard currency. (C)

In contrast, Castro's boldest economic move yet, his recent decision to legalize the circulation of US dollars, will attract large amounts of foreign exchange by making it more attractive for exiles to send cash to family members in Cuba. Remittances of cash and goods—worth perhaps \$300 million annually in recent years—will probably increase to as much as \$500 million to

\$1 billion annually, with most of it in dollars. Dollarization will help the regime acquire large amounts of illegal foreign currency now circulating, stimulate consumption, and probably aggravate divisions within the exile community. (S NF)

Dollarization also entails significant risks:

- The benefits will be unevenly spread, creating new tensions between those who receive remittances—probably a minority consisting mainly of the better educated, urban, and predominantly white segment of the population—and those who do not.
- Regime loyalists are the least likely to have relatives willing to send them money, and thus they become relatively disadvantaged by the new policy.
- Remittance recipients will have little incentive to work in the official economy, as the real value of peso salaries erodes even more rapidly.
- The dollar will become the primary medium of exchange in the black market and in the informal service economy, invigorating both and increasing individual economic independence from the state.
- The ability of dissidents to hold dollars will remove a key legal instrument of repression and could enable them to operate more effectively. (C NF)

Moreover, the regime will be able to recapture only a portion of the inflow of dollars for its own purposes. In order to induce Cubans to spend their remittances in official dollar

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

stores, they must have goods to sell, and most of these will have to be imported, requiring expenditure of hard currency. Prices in dollar stores will doubtless be much higher than the true cost of the goods sold, but the black market and pressure from the foreign community should impose some limits. (C NF)

Additional hard currency will also be acquired as Havana allows larger numbers of Cuban exiles to visit the island. This too is a high-risk change of policy. About 200,000 exiles were allowed to visit Cuba in 1978 and 1979 at a time of serious economic hardship and demoralization. Their cumulative impact was highly subversive and contributed to the Mariel exodus. Conditions today are far worse than in 1980, and leaders can have no misconceptions about how destabilizing visits by large numbers—tens of thousands—of exiles would be. (C)

Seeking Relief From the US Embargo

With the loss of Soviet economic aid, relief from the US trade embargo has gained importance for Castro. He has redoubled his worldwide lobbying effort against the embargo and continues signaling readiness for comprehensive bilateral talks. Even in more straitened circumstances, however, there is virtually no chance that he would negotiate the essential structure of his regime or agree to free elections, as specified by the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). For example, he would make no concessions with respect to his regime's absolute monopoly over the media or its prohibitions on independent political parties, labor unions, pressure groups, or others that could be critical of the regime. (C NF)

Rather, he hopes to build support in the United States and the international community for circumventing the CDA and to

engage in talks on an agenda restricted to normalization of trade relations, settlement of claims, and perhaps the Guantanamo Naval Base, as well as some peripheral issues such as narcotics interdiction and emigration. As part of such an effort, he may make cosmetic economic and political reforms and release additional prisoners, particularly if they agree to leave the country. (C NF)

If the United States lifted the embargo, either unilaterally or as a result of negotiations, Cuba would benefit in the following ways:

- Savings on lower prices and shipping costs.
- Increased tourism revenues possibly amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
- Some additional foreign investment and possibly increased emigre remittances. (S NF)

Some Intelligence Community analysts believe the economic impact of an end to the US embargo would be substantial. They hold that the benefits would probably generate minimal economic growth and relieve many of the worst shortages and other pressures the regime faces, in large part because Havana has shown increasing flexibility in its efforts to generate economic relief. (S NF)

Other analysts believe the sum total of Cuba's gains would be relatively minor and probably would not reverse its economic slide. An end to the embargo might slow further decline and generate some growth in specific sectors such as tourism and assembly industries. But infrastructure bottlenecks

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

and high import costs in the tourism industry would limit real net income from that source. Moreover, Cuba's principal export, sugar, would be excluded under the current terms of the US sugar import quota system. (C NF)

Proponents of both views agree that Cuba's insistence on maintaining a state-controlled economy and efforts to contain the political impact of foreign-owned and -managed enterprises will likely continue to restrict investment to a few enclave industries, limiting the attractiveness of Cuba to US investors. (C NF)

The embargo gives Castro political advantages both domestically and internationally. His incessant claims that it is primarily to blame for economic hardship continue to find credence among the Cuban public, and he has used the CDA as a scapegoat for increased deprivations during the past year. Catholic and Protestant leaders oppose the embargo on humanitarian grounds. Most political dissidents also oppose it, saying that it limits their efforts to broaden their appeal by enabling the government to tie them to a hostile US policy that hurts the average Cuban. Castro uses the embargo to drum up sympathy in Latin America, Canada, and Europe, where its extraterritorial aspects are resented and rejected. (C NF)

Lifting the embargo would present Castro with new political challenges. Although he would claim a major victory, he would be unable to satisfy popular expectations for rapid economic improvement. Moreover, blame for continued austerity would rest solely with his government. Mounting, unmet expectations would increase the prospects for instability and violence that Castro would be unable to control. (S NF)

Outlook for a Popular Uprising

The government has a number of residual strengths. Castro benefits from his identification with Cuban nationalism. Many Cubans still view him with awe and resignation, although the younger generation tends to be apolitical or alienated. Most important, he is buoyed by the apparent loyalty of the military and security services and the acquiescence of senior civilian technocrats and Party officials, who generally believe their fate is inextricably tied to his. The population is continually told of how badly conditions in former Communist countries have deteriorated, and stability and continuity are enhanced by the historical tendency of Cubans to endure adversity with extraordinary stoicism. (C NF)

Between 100 and 200 activists and more than 1,000 supporters are involved with organized dissident groups that span the ideological spectrum. Over the last year or so they have modestly increased their efforts—organizing more foreign press conferences and joint activities, including in recent months a small march and the issuance of a declaration calling for political and economic reforms. (C NF)

These groups will remain small, dispersed, and intimidated by Castro's security forces. They are unlikely directly to provoke regime-threatening events. The most prominent leaders are committed to nonviolence, and some continue naively to hope that they will be permitted to organize openly. In addition, the dissidents' ability to influence events will continue to be limited by rivalries, government harassment, the difficulties of subsisting since few have paying jobs, the lack of

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

Secret

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

and the absence of means to disseminate their messages to the public. (S)

But unpredictable developments would increase the prospects that a dissident leader or group would become the focus of popular dissatisfaction. If prominent leaders broke publicly with the regime and embraced

dissident grievances, Castro probably would respond to prevent a larger rupture in the leadership. But, under such circumstances, his response might be harsh and invite a popular backlash. One or more dissident leaders might increase the viability of their cause by attracting significant international support or funding. (C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

Secret

~~Secret~~

Antiregime disturbances most likely will occur spontaneously. Violent unrest has been rare, but the number and size of incidents have increased. Disorders have occurred in recent months in Camaguey and at Cojimar (on the outskirts of Havana). In the latter case, a crowd of Cubans rioted after police killed at least three persons when a group from Florida arrived on a speedboat to extract relatives. As conditions on the island further deteriorate, violent incidents are most likely to be sparked by mounting frustration over shortages of electricity, transportation, and food; the use of excessive force by the regime; and provocations by militant exiles. (C NF)

A large uprising would prompt Castro to devote whatever force necessary to repress it, even at the risk of a bloodbath and irreparable damage to his political legitimacy. He would make no meaningful concessions to dissident demands and would ignore international criticism. If public disorder continued to spread, however, his efforts to hold power would entail mounting costs, and he would have to call upon the military whose reliability under orders to confront unarmed citizens would be questionable. (S NF)

The Role of the Military

In general, military units are not trained for riot control, have never been used against civilians, and would be called on to confront civilian protesters only if the security services and special troops of the Interior Ministry were unable to contain the situation. By that time, regime survival would be in doubt. Anxious to avoid association with a legacy of brutality and a doomed cause, many military personnel probably would desert, and some might even oppose the regime. In such circumstances, a unit or units probably would

turn on the government and forces still loyal to the government. The loyal units most likely would include certain special troops and High Command Reserve units. (S NF)

A significant split in the military would increase pressure on the United States to become involved. Anti-Castro rebels would be likely to seek foreign support and intervention and, if they controlled a significant portion of the island, would probably become a magnet for exile volunteers. If military rebels faced extermination by pro-Castro forces, there would be a small chance they would attempt to stage provocations against US targets to touch off a larger conflict. (C NF)

Military Coup Possibilities. Like the rest of society, the military has accepted dramatically reduced resources, including the loss of Soviet support. Once famous for operations in Africa and Central America, attaining self-sufficiency in food production is now a key mission. Raul Castro has described the military as "too large and too costly" for Cuba, and it is evolving into a leaner institution with two distinct parts—a combat-ready core and a greater mass devoted to economic production. (See annex.) (S)

Dissent in the military appears to be as formless and disorganized as it is in civilian institutions, and a military-led coup is less likely than an assassination attempt or a rebellion touched off by an unpopular order. Officers who have experienced or who have been prepared for battle may resent service as agricultural overseers, but reports of disaffection are limited to grumbling about lost missions and perquisites and private conversations about the need for greater economic reform. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~**Elite Units**

Elite units—less than a 10th of the active-duty military—are Cuba's best fighting forces and continue to be well provided for. None, however, would be key to stopping or instigating a coup attempt against Castro. Most are small and are based away from the seat of government in downtown Havana. The few larger formations deployed near the capital are not trained in commando-style operations and could not move on Castro's office or residence without attracting attention. The attitudes of Interior Ministry personnel guarding Castro would be key, and we have no reason to believe their loyalty has waned. (S NF)

Elite formations include the High Command Reserve; various Armed Forces Special Troops entities; the Naval Infantry; the Navy's Special Mission Detachment; and the Interior Ministry's Special Troops. The High Command Reserve—primarily better grade ground troops—and the airborne-qualified Armed Forces

Special Troops Mobile Brigade are tasked with defending Havana in the event of a US invasion. Under those circumstances, they almost certainly would mount a spirited defense. (S NF)

The loyalty of individual units is impossible to assess. Despite somewhat higher morale than that of regular troops, elite units have not been insulated from austerity, including downsizing and agricultural labor. The Interior Ministry Special Troops—the first Cuban unit to intervene in Angola—are today only a few hundred strong. The former Naval Infantry Regiment was downsized and broken into three independent, regionally based battalions. The Special Troops Mobile Brigade—formerly the Landing and Assault Brigade—probably numbers no more than half its former 1,500-man total. (S NF)

Top officers, most of whom have followed Castro for decades, are well represented in important political posts and meet routinely with civilian counterparts. A blend of personal loyalty to Castro, nationalism, and fear—of the post-Communist future, the extensive counterintelligence apparatus, and exile intentions—has kept the officer corps in line. Given the difficulty of keeping an anti-Castro conspiracy secret, dissident officers are more likely to opt for defection in growing numbers. (C NF)

Should a conspiracy develop, however, plotters would not risk contacting the United States in advance, and we probably would not know about a coup until it was under way. Factors conducive to a coup are already in place:

- Deteriorating conditions for soldiers and civilians.
- A spreading perception that Castro cannot reverse the downward trend.

~~Secret~~


POOR QUALITY PAGE

Figure 2

Exodus of Indigenous Small Craft From Cuba



Cuban Migrants Intercepted at Sea by USCG, 1990-93



(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

- The substantial ongoing reduction in military manpower and resources.

Midlevel officers with fewer personal bonds to Castro may be more inclined to revolt, especially if they suffer most from personnel downsizing. (S NF)

Implications for the United States

Serious instability in Cuba will have an immediate impact on the United States:

- Castro has maintained relatively effective border surveillance—the major brake on illegal seaborne migration—to preserve domestic order. If Cuban authorities lose control, massive, panicky illegal emigration toward the United States will occur. Between 20,000 and 80,000 Cubans would be able to flee the island with little or no preparation or warning on small craft. Larger numbers would leave in the event that boats, captained by private individuals from the United States or elsewhere, participated.
- Pressures on the United States to mount urgent humanitarian rescue efforts at sea would be intense. Groups on the island and in exile probably would call for large-scale humanitarian aid to Cuba.
- There would also be pressure for US or international military intervention, especially if a large number of exiles became involved on the island in abetting the collapse of Castro's regime. (S NF)

Moreover, if he believed that his or his regime's survival were imminently threatened, Castro might try to provoke an incident with the United States in an attempt to

arouse nationalist fervor and deflect popular hostility from himself. He might, for example, fabricate an "attack" by exile militants—and would certainly exploit a real one—in order to mobilize military and popular militia units and confuse domestic opponents. US military exercises, US Coast Guard patrols, reconnaissance flights, and operations from Guantanamo Naval Base might offer opportunities to create a crisis. In extremis, he might suspend all efforts to prevent illegal emigration in the belief that the turmoil resulting from a massive exodus would be more confounding to his enemies than destabilizing to his regime. (S NF)

Finally, if faced with the certainty of his and his regime's fall, Castro might lash out against the United States. He would be constrained by a variety of factors including uncertainties that subordinates would in fact carry out extreme orders and his desire to be viewed in a positive historical context. Nonetheless, the following extreme developments are remotely possible: Castro could order an air attack on an installation on the US mainland, the military occupation of Guantanamo, or terrorist attacks. (S NF)

The Outlook for Post-Castro Cuba

Tensions and uncertainties in Cuba are so acute that significant miscalculations by Castro, a deterioration of his health, or plotting in the military could provoke regime-threatening instability at virtually any time. There is a better than even chance that Fidel Castro's government will fall within the next few years. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~**Underlying Premises**

These judgments are based on the following underlying premises:

- *Fidel Castro will not voluntarily relinquish power.*
- *The Cuban economy will not benefit from some domestic economic bonanza, such as discovery of a large oil deposit.*
- *There is a direct correlation between severe economic deprivation and political instability. (S NF)*

Almost all succession scenarios involve the likelihood of substantial and possibly protracted instability on the island, large-scale emigration, and a variety of other challenges to US interests. Fidel Castro's fall will be the signal event in what is likely to be a lengthy and conflictive process of national reconciliation among pro- and anti-Castro elements on the island and the Cuban diaspora. The new era will be marred by retributory and other violence and powerful animosities and will generate demands for costly and energetic US involvement. (S NF)

The longevity and composition of any successor government will depend on the way in which Fidel Castro leaves power. Raul Castro would almost certainly succeed if his brother died of natural causes, and he would immediately face growing and probably conflicting demands for change. Lacking Fidel Castro's charisma, determination, and political skills, he would probably not seek to replace his

brother as an all-powerful leader, preferring instead to head a civil-military coalition. Unlike other potential players, he would be torn between the need to implement sweeping reforms and the desire to preserve as much as possible of Fidel Castro's legacy. In that environment, other coalition members would promptly begin plotting against him and the odds are better than even he would be unable to retain control for as long as a year. (S NF)

Raul Castro's accession would be much less certain if Fidel Castro were assassinated or fell in a military coup. A successful, bloodless coup against both Castros that preserved the unity of the armed forces would be the only succession scenario with a good chance of producing a relatively stable and flexible new regime. (S NF)

New leaders will be poorly prepared to deal with the extraordinary problems they will face. They are handicapped by their lack of experience in exercising responsibility, establishing goals, or resolving conflicts because of Fidel Castro's decades of micromanagement and distrust of subordinates. Heightened popular expectations for systemic changes will be opposed by Communist Party and other bureaucrats and leaders of the security apparatus seeking to salvage maximum personal advantages. Tensions will intensify between stalwarts of the ancien regime who are committed to maintaining a high degree of statism and reformers attracted to free market models. (S NF)

Most of Cuba's technocratic establishment will survive, if only because there is nothing to replace it. Most technocrats are likely to be apolitical and may be favorably disposed

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

to economic and political reform. They are, therefore, likely to adapt to a changing environment, and some will probably push for change once they are no longer repressed by Fidel Castro. Despite fears of a "Miami invasion," technocrats are likely to pursue closer ties to the United States on a wide range of issues. (S NF)

Improving relations and opening of economic ties to the United States will be a top priority for any successor government. But that objective will be complicated because relations with the exile community will be a source of intense dispute. With few exceptions, exile political leaders are likely to find little support among the population on the island and will probably be greeted with suspicion and hostility if they are perceived

as trying to seize control. Demands by exiles to purge Castro-era officials, or to put some on trial, would arouse fierce opposition. Similarly, exile efforts to recover properties seized in the 1960s will be highly contentious. (C)

The Cuban military stands a good chance of surviving largely intact into the post-Castro era, assuming it can avoid being drawn into a debilitating civil war. The post-Castro military—considerably smaller and under a new generation of officers—would probably evolve into a modernizing force. Officers would probably seek improved relations with the United States and Latin American countries and eventually would be likely to lend their support to creating a democratic system. (S)

(REVERSE BLANK)

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Annex

Cuba's Military in a Continuing Decline

Cuba's armed forces have declined over the past several years, and there is no prospect for a reversal as long as the economy continues to slide. Even if a reversal were to occur, an upturn in the military's capabilities would not necessarily take place because much of its equipment is antiquated and would have to be replaced. The armed forces can no longer mount much of a conventional defense against a larger and more sophisticated force. (S NF)

The military has placed redundant and unnecessary systems in storage, and training is at an alltime low. However, the military can defend against exile attacks, and defense doctrine has been restructured to preserve the government's ability to defend itself through unconventional means. Periodic small-scale exercises and training activities are designed to sustain minimal operational readiness. (S NF)

Castro's "War of all the People" calls for a protracted guerrilla war in the event of an attack. The Cuban plan is to inflict maximum casualties on attacking forces in hopes of forcing a withdrawal, while at the same time trying to gain international political support. This plan would rely on a militia force of more than 1 million people. The military has stockpiled massive amounts of weapons, constructed underground facilities throughout the island, and built an impressive indications and warning system. (S NF)

Ground Forces. As the largest of Cuba's armed services, the ground forces have taken the largest cuts in personnel. We estimate its

total strength (active and reserve) to be 75,000 to 100,000 men, or about one-third its peak size in the 1980s. The ground forces will shrink still further in the next two to three years as units further contract. Except in the highest priority units, the Cubans have dramatically curtailed training, mainly due to fuel and replacement part shortages. In most units, training is limited to basic soldiering skills and small-unit tactics. We have not seen the Cubans practice brigade-level maneuvers, used effectively in Angola, for nearly two years. (S NF)

Air and Air Defense Forces. These forces probably have declined to about 10,000 to 15,000, about one-half of their peak strength in the 1980s. Many Cuban fighter aircraft are in storage—possibly more than 50 percent of them; pilot training is minimal, and readiness is low. Only about one-half of Cuba's surface-to-air missile sites are maintained. Havana remains heavily defended, however. (S NF)

The Navy. The Navy continues a steady decline. Almost a third of its ships have had their weapons removed and parts cannibalized to repair active units. The Navy has not acquired a new ship since 1990, and the frequency of operations continues to decline. Cuba's three submarines, for example, have not conducted submerged operations in over three years, and two are inoperable. As the number of working ships has declined so has the number of personnel. We estimate the Navy now has about 6,000 to 9,000 active and reserve personnel, a decline of over one-third since the 1980s. (S NF)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

~~Secret~~

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

**National Security
Information**

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Information available as of 5 August 1993 was used
in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
The Director of Intelligence,
Department of Energy

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
United States Coast Guard,
Department of Transportation

This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.

Dissemination Control Abbreviations	NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	PROPIN (PR)	Caution—proprietary information involved
	ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
	REL	This information has been authorized for release to...
	WN	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
 3615 Chestnut Street
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
 (215) 382-0685 Fax (215) 382-0131

December 10, 1993

President
 Harvey Sicherman

Vice President
 Alan H. Luzzanberg

Board of Trustees
 John Gilray Christy,
 Chairman
 Bruce H. Hooper,
 Vice-Chairman
 W. W. Keen Butcher,
 Treasurer
 Robert A. Fox
 Susan H. Goldberg
 Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
 Kenneth D. Hill
 Ronald S. Lauder
 John F. Lehman
 Leslie Lenkowsky
 David Luetcherhand
 Martin Meyerson
 Ronald J. Naples
 Irene E. Nunn
 Frank N. Piasecki
 Daniel Pipes
 Harvey Sicherman
 Edward M. Snider
 Robert Strauss-Hupé
 Marvin Wachman
 David V. Wachs
 Daniel W. Weil
 Albert J. Wood

Board of Advisors
 James Courtar
 Midge Decter
 David Eisenhower
 Erwin A. Glikas
 Samuel P. Huntington
 Bernard Lewis
 William H. McNeill
 Martin Peretz
 James R. Thompson
 Dick Thornburgh
 Murray Weidenbaum
 R. James Woolsey

[REDACTED]
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, DC 20505

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)
 (N)

Dear [REDACTED]:

Our conversation last week was most enjoyable and, having been Special Assistant to a very active Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of my own.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)
 (N)

As threatened, please find enclosed a brief list of proposals that might be of interest: several concern key political developments in Russia and the NIS; one concerns China and the longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposal offers a unique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike the Director's interest.

I appreciate your willingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further information or for that matter, any "special assistance" from a former special assistant.

With best wishes,

Harvey Sicherman

HS/sb

Enclosures

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
 DATE: OCT 1999

DCI
 EXEC
 REG

1-262-PIR

PROPOSAL SUMMARIES

December 10, 1993

Foreign Policy Research Institute
3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-382-0685

Contact: Harvey Sicherman, 215-382-0685, ext. 110

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 1999**

THREE PROPOSALS ON RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

For these three proposals, the principal investigator is **Martha Brill Olcott** (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1978). A specialist on Russia, Central Asia, and Islam, Dr. Olcott has spent many years in the former USSR, especially in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. She has authored or edited three books, including *Islam in Everyday Life: Religion in Rural Central Asia* (M.E. Sharpe, 1991), *The Kazakhs* (Hoover Institution Press, 1987), and *The Soviet Multinational State* (M.E. Sharpe, 1987). She is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a professor of political science at Colgate University.

CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan is one of the most important "fault-line" states -- even perhaps the most important -- in the NIS. Kazakhstan has the potential to be wealthy and stable; if political and economic problems prevent the republic from achieving that potential, what hope do other, less "gifted" states have? The current political and social situation in the republic is extremely delicate. The immediate and short-term fate of Kazakhstan will be indicative not only of the future of Central Asia, but of Russia as well.

This project would seek to answer five specific questions:

1. Are the ideologies of Kazakhstan's major ethnic and political communities moving farther apart?
2. To what degree is Kazakhstan developing regional interests?
3. What impact will this emerging regionalism have as Kazakhstan begins local elections in 1994?
4. Can the existing unitary political system deal with Kazakhstan's growing list of problems?
5. Can Kazakhstan develop a national identity which can serve as the basis for domestic stability and formation of international policy?

THE TENSION BETWEEN CENTRALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM WITHIN RUSSIA

Russia began its succession of the Soviet Union committed to decentralization; the stalemate with Parliament and subsequent events has swung political indicators ~~strongly in the opposite~~ toward the severe centralism of the past. However, the regional needs and interests ~~will be met~~ have been articulated in the various localities of Russia will still have to be met. This study would monitor the tensions between regionalism and centralism, in four critical localities: the North Caucasus; Western Siberia; the Far East; and the Karelia, St. Petersburg, and Pskov regions.

First, this study would describe each of the areas in detail, explaining why each region is of importance to Russia as a whole. Second, the study would then attempt to answer a number of question for each region:

Are there significant legal differentiations among the regions?

What are the current political agendas in each of the areas, and what will become of these agendas under the new constitution?

Is there any significant leverage which a region can exert in pursuit of local interests?

What likelihood exists of the growth of separatist sentiment of movements, and around what issues?

To what extent are policies in each area designed to facilitate an aggressive Russian foreign in the region across the border?

What impact do these domestic regional issues have upon the formation of Russian foreign policy?

What are the implications for US policy of the development of regional interests in these border area?

THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE FORMER USSR, AS MEASURED BY PROTECTION FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES

This project does not seek to duplicate the efforts of international human-rights monitoring organizations. Rather the thesis is that elaboration of mechanisms for safeguarding rights of minorities is a reliable indicator of the process of transformation from ethnic to legal definitions of citizenship, and so measures the degree of political maturation. The study will survey de jure and de facto treatment of three sorts of minority populations, for each of the NIS (including Russia):

1. Minorities in a given state who have a titular state elsewhere (e.g., Russians in the other NIS, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Poles in Lithuania);
2. Peoples who have never had states, but who have been minority members of local populations since pre-Soviet times (e.g., Uighurs and Dungans in Kazakhstan, Cossacks);
3. Peoples who have been moved into existing populations as a result of Soviet policies (e.g., Russians again, but also Meshket Turks in Kyrgyzstan, Lezgins and Avars in Kazakhstan).

The second part of this project would then survey ethnic minority-related issues as factors in foreign policy formation within the NIS. This would permit comparison of expressed concern over other states' treatment of minorities with actual treatment of minorities within a given state, for purposes of determining the degree to which policies of supporting irredentist or foreign minority populations are genuine, and the degree to which they are dictated by other policy ends.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE OCT 1999

CUBA'S ONGOING TRANSITION: LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE

For this proposal, the principal investigator is Michael Radu (Ph.D., Columbia University). He is author or editor of 7 books on international affairs, including *Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries* (Transaction) and *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Pergamon Brassey's). He has served as Principal Investigator on 5 contracts with DIA and CIA. A former editor of *Agora*, FPRI's Romanian-language journal of culture and politics, Dr. Radu specializes in post-communist nationalism. He is a resident scholar at FPRI and has taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University. Dr. Radu has monitored elections in Cambodia, Romania, Peru, and Guatemala. He is fluent in Spanish and Romanian.

The experience of most of Eastern Europe and the former USSR since 1989 strongly suggests that the collapse of communism as a political, economic and ideological system did not necessarily translate into the collapse of communism's entire institutional base. While significant variations from country to country are noticeable, in most instances the government and economic bureaucracy, the military, intelligence services and in some cases even the secret police and the communist party have survived largely intact. The very ubiquitousness of this phenomenon suggests that while "communism" as a whole is not reformable, some of its institutional parts possess enough flexibility and are capable to successfully adapt to changing circumstances — as demonstrated by the fact that in a majority of East European and former Soviet republics prominent members of the communist nomenclatura are still in power — via elections. This institutional resilience, combined with the lasting appeal of at least some aspects of communism, has facilitated the survival of some institutions of the communist era and proved that change without reform is possible.

Based on the admittedly limited and often circumstantial data available, it appears that recent developments in Cuba suggest important parallels with those of Eastern Europe during the last few years of communist rule. The Cuban case is important in this respect since it provides a unique opportunity to test the post-1989 insights on communist institutional adaptation capacities in a pre-revolutionary environment. To simply declare Castro's regime as an ideological dinosaur is by now insufficient and misleading at best, particularly in light of the adaptative measures (as distinct from *bona fide* reforms) taken by Havana recently. Those measures — legalization of private hard currency holdings and of limited self-employment, *de facto* tolerance of Western capitalist enclaves — may not, and probably will not save the Castro regime as is, but they suggest that Castro does try to adapt to the new circumstances — internal as well as external. At the same time, his regime's individual institutions, such as the PCC, the military, youth and women's organizations, etc., are doing the same and, most importantly, are doing so at varying paces, thus weakening the system's monolithic nature. Simply put, the post-Castro transition has already started, is in the process of definition and it shows incipient signs of going beyond Fidel's ability to control or even understand it.

The question then is the extent to which various institutions, autonomously, by learning from the East European experience or as a result of prodding by Fidel are showing signs of adaptation to change, and what that means for their survival in the post-Castro era. A few examples are relevant:

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a good example of such adaptation without reform. From a loyal pillar of Cuba's regime, they have been ~~turned inward~~ and became massively involved in the civilian economy — as a source of cheap and disciplined labor — a process analogous to that of Ceausescu's Romania during the 1980s. As a process of de-professionalization set in, doubts over the military's loyalty grew at the same time as their surveillance by the secret police intensified. Long a favorite instrument of Castro's foreign policy, the FAR mission is now increasingly seen as imposing internal law and order in an emergency — in competition with but less trusted than the Interior Ministry.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 1999

The economic policy bureaucracy is yet another institutionalized group which is trying to adapt to new circumstances, as the legalization of hard currency holdings and self-employment limits its power and the scope of its activities.

At a more general level, the economic crisis and the general weariness and apathy it has led to has resulted in an extensive effort by the propaganda apparatus, including all the Communist Party's ancillary organizations (youth, women, artists, etc.) to redirect and reframe their efforts, from abstract slogans coming from the top toward references to daily life, the economy and participation. Superficial as those efforts may be, they may well change the relationship between the population and regime in unexpected ways and for the first time allow some inputs from below. That is precisely what happened in the early 1980s in places like Bulgaria and even the USSR under Andropov.

Finally, institutions outside the regime's structure, and thus with a long dormant potential for independence, are beginning to actualize that potential. In Cuba that now applies to the Roman Catholic Church, just as it applied to the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe during the 1980s.

The main issue under examination is not the probable success or failure of Castro's conscious attempts to reform the system, but their unplanned impact, actual or probable, upon existing Cuban institutions. The analytical framework is defined by the experience of Eastern Europe during the 1980s because, as Fidel Castro himself has admitted, there are strong similarities between Cuba's present situation and that of its erstwhile allies in the Warsaw Pact. Most importantly, whether the present developments within Cuba will result in a relatively peaceful transition to a post-Castro regime or in a violent convulsion will have quite different implications for the U.S. role and interests in the island.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 1999

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH

For this proposal, the principal investigator is Ross H. Munro. Mr. Munro joined the Foreign Policy Research Institute in 1990 as a resident scholar and head of its Asia Program, after a distinguished career as a journalist and foreign correspondent. Mr. Munro served as Peking correspondent for *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, Canada's leading national newspaper, and served as Bureau Chief for *TIME Magazine* in Hong Kong, New Delhi, and Bangkok. His recent articles on China and India have appeared in *Policy Review* and *The National Interest*. He has also written for *Foreign Policy* and *Commentary*.

China's explosive economic growth has strategic implications that are difficult to grasp. History has never before witnessed an economy of such size (the world's third largest GNP and its largest workforce) growing at such a rapid rate (8 to 14 percent) for such a sustained period of time (14 years so far, with only one significant pause).

With most of the global economy flaccid at best, the magnitude of China's growth compels the attention of the world's major corporations and financial concerns. Convinced that many of the world's best economic opportunities will be found in China for years to come, most major business groups in Asia, Europe and North America are now courting China's powerholders. The impact on the foreign policies of all OECD members is already discernible. In Asia today, we are seeing the emergence of "clientism," that is, business groups willing to do China's bidding in return for preferential treatment in trade and investment. This is most obvious in Hong Kong but it is also taking root in Southeast Asia and, in a more subtle way, Taiwan.

Meanwhile, largely unnoticed, an economically expansive China is rapidly establishing trade, investment and infrastructural links across its southwest and northwest land frontiers that presage the creation of new spheres of influence. On its southwest frontier, Chinese influence is growing rapidly in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; Burma is already firmly ensconced in China's sphere of influence. On its northwest frontier, China's trade with the five new Central Asian republics is second only to Russia. Significantly, China is proposing joint development with the republics of a New Silk Road of highways, railways and pipelines that would ultimately link China with Iran.

While the Japanese economy still far outstrips China's in size and sophistication, the increasingly serious problems that beset Japan's economy raise questions about its long-term effectiveness as a balancer or challenger to Chinese economic power. Talk of an Asian yen block, for instance, is dead.

China's economic power is magnified throughout Asia by the military weakness of its largest neighbors. The military effectiveness for Japan's expensive self-defense force is problematic; Russia's huge nuclear edge is less significant than the sad state of its army; India this year effectively abandoned its pretense of being China's military rival.

The United States, concerned primarily with human rights and proliferation issues in recent years, has not yet focused on the implications of China's growing economic power. Those implications, both immediate and long term, are profound. Already, the current scale of China's economic growth, combined with the Chinese authorities' eno-mercantilist economic strategy, is creating a flood of low-priced, often effectively subsidized, exports. Simultaneously, China has created a thicket of indirect import barriers. The result is a rapidly growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the largest by far with a non-ally!

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Even the normal workings of market economics will prove disruptive. ~~DATE: 00110901~~ Large and rapidly growing China, for instance, has the economic fundamentals favorable to building modern, giant-scale petrochemical complexes with production costs significantly below current world levels.

We propose a study that will document and explore these trends and discuss their implications for the United States, Asia and the world.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 9 MAR 1994
TO: ASST. VC ESTIMATES		
ROOM NO. 7E 62	BUILDING OHB	
REMARKS: Gayle This is the letter I spoke to you about last week.		
FROM: Jonathan Friedman		
ROOM NO. 5560	BUILDING OHB	EXTENSION 57358

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

ER 93-6040/1

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
(215) 382-0685 Fax (215) 382-0131

December 10, 1993

for CIA
NY

It was most enjoyable and, having been Special Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of

enclosed a brief list of proposals that might be of key political developments in Russia and the NIS; the longer term strategic implications of its economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposal offers a unique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available should any of these strike the Director's interest.

I appreciate your willingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please call upon me for any further information or for that matter, any "special assistance" from a former special assistant.

With best wishes,

Sam

Harvey Stenhouse
DATE: OCT 1999

Martin Meyerson
Ronald J. Naples
Irene E. Nunn
Frank N. Piasecki
Daniel Pipes
Harvey Richman
Edward M. Snider
Robert Strauss-Hupé
Marvin Wachman
David V. Wachs
Daniel W. Well
Albert J. Wood

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Erwin A. Glicks
Samuel P. Huntington
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
James R. Thompson
Dick Thornburgh
Murray Weidenbaum
R. James Woolsey

HS/sb

Enclosures



TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		09 MAR 1994
TO	EADDI Frankfurt	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
DE 44	OHB	
REMARKS:		
This is the letter I spoke to you about last week.		
FROM Jonathan Friedman		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
DD68	OHB	37558
FORM NO. 1 FEB 56 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)		

ER 93-6040/1

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
(215) 382-0685 Fax (215) 382-0131

December 10, 1993

for CIA
cy

k was most enjoyable and, having been Special
Secretary of State, your experiences remind me of

enclosed a brief list of proposals that might be of
key political developments in Russia and the NIS;

one concerns China and the longer term strategic implications of its
economic growth and one concerns Cuba, where our proposal offers a
unique comparative analysis to other communist transitions. The scholars
who have prepared these ideas are outstanding in their fields and short bios
of them are also included. We have full-scale outlines and budgets available
should any of these strike the Director's interest.

I appreciate your willingness to convey this material as you see fit. Please
call upon me for any further information or for that matter, any "special
assistance" from a former special assistant.

With best wishes,

Harvey

Harvey Sicherman
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 1999

BOARD OF ADVISORS
Ronald J. Naples
Irene E. Nunn
Frank N. Piasecki
Daniel Pipes
Harvey Sicherman
Edward M. Snider
Robert Strauss-Hupé
Marvin Wachman
David V. Wachs
Daniel W. Weil
Albert J. Wood

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Erwin A. Glikson
Samuel P. Huntington
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
James R. Thompson
Dick Thornburgh
Murray Weidenbaum
R. James Woolsey

HS/sb

Enclosures

17
FBI
FBI
FBI